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Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake:
Toward an Expanded Vision of the
Fourth Amendment Privacy
Province
By

JAMES

J. TOMKOVICZ*

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution proclaims
"the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Although the provision has a "central [role] . . . in our

scheme of constitutional liberty,"' the explicit terms of the guarantee
confine it to the regulation of governmental searches and seizures. The
task of defining the constitutional concept of "searches" has attracted
much judicial attention, produced considerable analysis, raised complex,

troublesome issues, 2 and generated an intricate body of doctrine. Because the fourth amendment exerts regulatory control over government
action only if a search has occurred, development of a framework for
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; B.A., 1973, University of Southern California; J.D., 1976, University of California Los Angeles.
I am indebted to Patrick Heider for his dedication and his intelligent and exceptionally
diligent research assistance during the preparation of this Article. My colleagues, Martha
Chamallas, David Vernon, Gregory Williams, and Patricia Fetzer all provided helpful criticism and even more valuable encouragement. Murray L. Schwartz, mentor that he is, wisely
counseled and supported my efforts. John Odendahl also provided helpful research assistance.
Finally, the tireless secretarial labors of Sandra Reese contributed enormously to the production process. For all of these individuals, and for their assistance, I am deeply grateful.
dissenting); see also 2 J.
1. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 42 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
STORY, COMMENTAUES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 679 (1858) ("This
provision seems indispensable to the full enjoyment of the rights of personal security, personal
liberty and private property."); Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN.
L. REv. 349, 396 (1974) ("Mhe amendment is not 'a kind of nuisance, a serious impediment
in the war against crime' or 'an outworn bit of Eighteenth Century romantic rationalism but
an indispensable need for a democratic society.' ") (quoting Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 157, 161 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
2. In his 1966 fourth amendment study, Jacob Landyski noted that Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), "the first Fourth Amendment case of real consequence," began
"the judicial definition of the Fourth Amendment, a task not yet ended and growing ever more
complicated." J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 49 (1966).
The task is still far from complete and the complications it presented in 1966 pale by comparison to those that have emanated from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
[645]
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that threshold 3 decision is an endeavor of enormous significance. 4 The
purpose of this Article is to propose such a framework.
During the past century, the Supreme Court's approach to deciding
whether conduct falls within the ambit of fourth amendment searches
has changed radically. First, in Boyd v. United States,5 the Supreme
Court held that any activity which accomplished the same purposes or
objects as prototypical searches fell within constitutional bounds. 6 Forty
years later, in Olmstead v. United States,7 the Court relied upon fourth
amendment text and history in concluding that an "actual physical invasion" 8 of a protected location was the critical attribute, an essential characteristic of a fourth amendment search. The tangible intrusion requirement proved dominant and lasted for another forty years, 9 but was gradually tempered by the Court's growing conviction that the primary
fourth amendment objective is privacy protection.10
In Katz v. United States, l l the semantic-historical Olmstead standard succumbed to the combined pressure of the privacy protection rationale and the sense that fidelity to fourth amendment goals necessitated
3. I use the word "threshold" to refer to determinations, issues, or processes concerned
with whether the fourth amendment operates in a particular situation. Unless there is some
basis for distinction or a contrary intent is expressed, these references should be understood to
encompass "standing" matters also. I merely employ "threshold" as a shorthand expression
for all matters concerned with the definition of fourth amendment boundaries.
4. I can think of few constitutionalissues more important than defining the reach of
the fourth amendment-the extent to which it controls the array of activities of the
police. . . . I can think of few issues more important to a society than the amount
of power that it permits its police to use without effective control by law.
Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 377 (emphasis added).
It was resentment of the twin instruments of British arbitariness and oppression, general
warrants and writs of assistance, that produced the fourth amendment. See Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100 (1937); T. TAYLOR,
Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 38 (1969); Stengel, The Background of

the FourthAmendment to the Constitution of the United States, Part Two, 4 U. RICH. L. REV.
60, 74 (1969). When government investigatory practices are found outside the fourth amendment and freed of any constitutional reasonableness requirements, the scope of official discretion allowed creates risks of arbitrariness and oppression similar to, and potentially more
hazardous than those feared by the Framers. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139
(1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
5. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6. Id. at 622.
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8. Id. at 466.
9. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1942). Those intrusions also had to be against the will of the victim of the alleged
search. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952).
10. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), discussed infra note 21.
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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a purpose-oriented methodology. The Court, simply and concisely, held
that official behavior which "violate[s] . . . privacy upon which [one]
justifiably relie[s]" lies within the scope of the fourth amendment.' 2 The
interest-dictated methodology of Katz and its mandate to assess "privacy
violations" has endured and remains the prescribed method for defining
fourth amendment scope today.
The Katz approach reflects a commendable recognition that the
"Constitution would be an utterly impractical instrument of contemporary government if it were deemed to reach only problems familiar to the
technology of the eighteenth century," 1 3 and that although "the Framers
. . . focused on the wrongs of the day, [they] intended the Fourth
Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which would far outlast
the specific abuses which gave it birth."1 4 Yet Katz itself provided little
guidance and information concerning the operation and content of the
new methodology. 15 Without a more specific understanding of the nature of the new controlling force, fourth amendment privacy, the future
bore risks of either excessive restriction of governmental action by an
overly expansive privacy spirit or, conversely, of deficient regulation by
an overly narrow concept. Katz merely began the revolution, presenting
the challenge of understanding and defining fourth amendment privacy
and developing workable doctrine.
The Court soon responded to the challenge by adopting the "reasonable expectation of privacy" formula to describe more precisely the interest sheltered by the amendment.' 6 Later, the Court endorsed a two-stage
test for assessing the reasonableness of expectations, and over time several specific criteria have emerged to guide application of the test.' 7 At
present, a considerable body of doctrinal refinements supplements the basic methodology. Unfortunately, the developments have neither fulfilled
the promises of Katz nor been consonant with an appropriately conceived
fourth amendment core. In the almost twenty years since Katz, the
Court has neglected development of a clear vision of fourth amendment
privacy. It has also, through the medium of reasonable expectations doctrine, "8' allowed a restrictive, de facto conception of privacy to operate,
12. Id. at 353.
13. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 459 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
15. See Amsterdam, supra note 1,at 349, 386; see also infra notes 29-30 & accompanying
text.
16. See infra notes 31-34 & accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 35-65 & accompanying text.
18. While the Katz majority criticized its predecessors for unthinking "incantation of the
phrase 'constitutionally protected area,' "Katz, 389 U.S. at 350, subsequent majorities can be
fairly indicted for unconsidered incantation of the reasonable expectation of privacy formula.
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The bestowal of
such magical powers upon any verbal formula is inconsistent with Katz. The great failure of
subsequent development, however, transcends excessive faith in a collection of words.
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and has utterly failed to look beyond mere secrecy to the reasons why
people need confidentiality in their relationships with government. As a
result, the fourth amendment cannot perform its function as groundwork
for the free society envisioned by the Constitution. While "[t]he shadow
of 1984 has . . . not yet fallen upon us," the failings of current doctrine
and analysis have brought us much too close to "an Orwellian society in
which a citizen, in order to preserve a modicum of privacy, [is] compelled to encase himself in a light-tight, air-proof box."' 19
The first part of this Article analyzes Katz and its progeny and documents the doctrinal factors that form the reasonable expectations test.
The second part reviews the character of privacy, criticizes the conception of privacy that underlies the current doctrine, and proposes a view
of fourth amendment privacy as instrumental, existing for the protection
and promotion of other vital liberties and interests. The third part criticizes the language of the reasonable expectations test as misleading and
unjustifiable and maintains that the determinative factors in current
fourth amendment analysis, when evaluated against the instrumental
view of privacy, prove to be inappropriate, irrelevant, or even counterproductive. The fourth section articulates proposals for the development
of doctrine faithful to an instrumental view of privacy. Finally, to illustrate the serious defects in current doctrine and analysis and to demonstrate the remedial potential of those proposals, five "problem contexts"
raising threshold fourth amendment questions are examined in light of
the analysis suggested.
Understanding the Boundaries of the Fourth Amendment
Regulation of Searches: Birth, Maturation, and
Refinement of the Interest-Dictated Approach
All current doctrine and analysis concerning the scope of the fourth
amendment coverage can find an origin in Katz v. United States. 20 The
goals of this part are to describe the holding and assess the significance of
Katz, to review the evolution and refinement of threshold doctrine since
that seminal case, and, thus, to present a complete picture of the present
state of fourth amendment jurisprudence.

19. Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 637, 511 P.2d 33, 41, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585,
593 (1973).
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Unfortunately, some of the doctrinal refinements of Katz are
throwbacks to pre-privacy conceptions of fourth amendment reach. See infra note 205.
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The Katz Revolution 2 '

In Katz v. United States,22 federal agents attached an electronic device to a telephone booth and recorded Mr. Katz' conversations regarding illegal wagering. The lower courts, bound by doctrine demanding a
physical intrusion, properly rejected Mr. Katz' fourth amendment challenge. By deciding to consider the case, the Supreme Court set the stage
for the most significant of all developments in fourth amendment purview law.
Justice Stewart laid the groundwork for the demise of the "physical
intrusion" doctrine by emphasizing that privacy, not property, is the primary object of fourth amendment concern. 23 Once the Court acknowledged that privacy was the predominant motive for the constitutional
safeguard against "unreasonable searches and seizures, it [became] clear
that the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment [could not] turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 24
Put simply, because the physical intrusion doctrine was neither designed
core fourth amendment interest, it had
for nor capable of preserving the
25
to be categorically abandoned.
21. Prior to Katz, the law of fourth amendment purview had passed through two major
phases. The first phase began in 1886 with Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
wherein Justice Bradley concluded that compulsory production of an invoice was a search and
seizure because "it accomplishe[d] the substantial object of... forcing from a party evidence
against himself." Id. at 622. In other words, a production order entered the fourth
amendment realm "because it [was] a material ingredient, and effect[ed] the sole object and
purpose of search and seizure," id., which "almost always" was "compelling a man to give
evidence against himself." Id. at 633.
The Boyd methodology persisted until 1928, when the Court took a conservative turn in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Taking guidance from both the literal
terminology of the fourth amendment and the specific historical practices that had spawned
that guarantee, the Court held that wiretapping "did not amount to a search" because there
was no "actual physical invasion" of a home or other protected place. Id. at 466. The
Olmstead approach prescribed comparison of the physical attributes of a challenged
government activity to those of traditional searches and seizures and demanded one essential
similarity for inclusion-tangible breach of a physical enclave.
The restrictive Olmstead approach survived for nearly 40 years despite vehement dissent.
See, eg., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,446-51 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 762 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Goldman v.United States, 316 U.S. 129, 141 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). It
was not until 1967 -Awn the Court, in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), referred to the
"premise that property interests control the right of the government to search and seize" as
"discredited," id. at 304, and emphasized that "privacy," not property, was the "principal
object" of that guarantee, id., and that the property-oriented "physical intrusion" foundation
of Olmstead was damaged beyond repair.
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Id. at 351-52.
24. Id. at 353.
25. The recognition that privacy is the fourth amendment's object did not compel the
conclusion that the Olmstead approach was erroneous. Although not designed to promote
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After overthrowing the previous methodology, the Court majority
replaced it with the simple conclusion that a fourth amendment search
occurs when governmental conduct violates justifiably relied upon privacy. 2 6 For the first time, the Court defined the ambit of fourth amendment regulation by evaluating the threat to its core interests. 27 Activity
would no longer be categorized as a search or nonsearch due to its purpose or physical qualities, but would instead be judged by whether it
jeopardized the privacy entitlements that the Framers sought to safeguard against official encroachment.
The truly monumental theoretical achievement of Katz was its liberation of the fourth amendment by the announcement that purview determinations must be informed primarily by the values underlying the
guarantee.2 8 The majority opinion, liberator, efficient dismantler, but
privacy, Olmstead did in fact result in some privacy protection. The Katz Court might have
concluded that "people, not places," are protected, id. at 351, but only when intrusion into
places associated with those people occurs; that privacy, not property, is safeguarded, but only
the privacy contained within physical enclosures. See id. at 374 (Black, J., dissenting). In
other words, disavowal of Olmstead required not only the acknowledgement of privacy as the
core constitutional concern, but also the recognition that the privacy deserving protection was
broader than the privacy that the physical intrusion doctrine had sheltered.
26. "The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording [Mr. Katz']
words violated the privacy upon which hejustifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 389
U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).
27. According to Professor Amsterdam, Katz did not break new ground:
Katz. . . returned to the grand conception of Boyd v. United States. . . which the
Supreme Court had largely forgotten throughout the Olmstead era. Katz held, as
Boyd had, that whatever "is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and
purpose of search and seizure" is a search and seizure in the only sense that the
Constitution demands.
Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 384 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
That conclusion either gives Boyd too much or Katz too little credit. While the Boyd
Court did characterize the core concerns of the fourth amendment as "personal security, personal liberty and private property" as well as "the privacies of life," 116 U.S. at 630, it did so
not in analyzing the threshold question, but during discussion of the reasonableness of the
production order which had already been declareda search. Boyd's approach to the threshold
question did not mandate evaluation of official conduct according to its impacts upon those
core privacy entitlements. Rather, it involved a comparison of the "purpose" or "object" of an
archetypal search to the "purpose" or "object" of a challenged practice, and apparently perceived that purpose to be compulsory self-incrimination.
In sum, the Boyd Court did not prescribe a Katz-like, interest-dictated threshold analysis.
That type of approach may find parentage in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305
(1921). Its more evident roots run throughout Justice Brandeis' powerful dissent in Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28. The choice of an interest-guided mode for interpreting a Bill of Rights provision was
certainly not novel or surprising. Maintaining the vitality of principles worthy of constitutionalization demands an approach based ultimately upon the animating spirits of such guarantees.
While other sources of understanding-for example, history and the common law, language,
and practical constraints-should contribute, they should ordinarily serve as no more than
supplemental aids. Cf. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1745-46 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
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neglectful reconstructor, bestowed a controlling role upon privacy, but
neglected to provide any clear or comprehensive standards for determining whether a relevant privacy interest is threatened in a particular
case.29 Accurate discernment of the new substantive limitations upon
fourth amendment scope and derivation of suitable boundary criteria required that the Court identify clearly the character of the core privacy
interest. 30
The Emergence of Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
When the Supreme Court began the task of making Katz operational, it did not look far for assistance. Within Justice Harlan's brief
explanatory Katz concurrence the Court discovered an acceptable description of the focal fourth amendment interest and a two-pronged doctrinal test for resolving threshold "search" questions. 3 1 Justice Harlan
had observed that it is not simply "privacy," but "reasonable expectations of privacy" that reside at the heart of the guarantee. 32 According
to his "understanding of the rule that [had] emerged from prior decisions" and had been implicitly endorsed by the Katz majority, establishment of a cognizable fourth amendment privacy interest requires "first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 33 Soon after Katz, the Court adopted Justice
Harlan's "reasonable expectation of privacy" characterization of the cendissenting) (Bill of Rights provisions, including fourth amendment, not "designed to prescribe

with 'precision' permissible and impermissible activities, but to identify . . . fundamental
human libert[ies]" and, therefore, should be interpreted "to effectuate their purposes," protection of those liberties). The intentionally imprecise, open-ended character of most such provisions demands that accomplishment of the drafters' goals be guided by the rationales for their
existence.
29. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 385 ("Katz. . . offers neither a comprehensive test
of fourth amendment coverage nor any positive principles by which questions of coverage can
be resolved."); Bacigal, Some Observationsand Proposalson the Nature of the FourthAmendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 529, 533-34 (1978) (The Katz "majority opinion failed to delineate the contours of the right of privacy or explain when and why an individual is justified in
relying on this right."); Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the FourthAmendment,
1968 Sup. Cr. REv. 133, 138 (1968) ("[It seems clear that the [Katz] opinion is intentionally
ambiguous ....
").
30. A quest for the more precise limitations of the Katz methodology is not contrary to
that opinion's spirit. Any impression that Katz was intended to be an open-ended, accommodating vehicle for the protection of all privacy from government encroachment is belied by the
majority's admonition that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy."' 389 U.S. at 350; see also Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1,

1 n.6 (1977).
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 360.
33. Id. at 361.
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tral fourth amendment interest.3 4 It took twelve years, however, for the
Court to complete the merger of the Stewart and Harlan Katz opinions
by endorsing the latter's twofold requirement.
In Smith v. Maryland,35 the Court majority reiterated the entrenched view that "the application of the Fourth Amendment depends
on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a
'reasonable' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded
by government action."'3 6 Drawing support from the Katz majority's language, the Smith Court then announced that this "inquiry. . . normally
embraces [the] two discrete questions" 37 prescribed by Justice Harlan.
That embracement of the Harlan interpretation is the most significant
development in the maturation of Katz' general threshold theory into
functional doctrine. The courts have consistently relied upon the KatzSmith standard to resolve fourth amendment coverage questions, and in
refining the standard have provided insights into the perceived nature of
reasonable privacy expectations.
Evolution of the Katz-Smith Doctrine-Characteristics and Qualities of
Reasonable Privacy Expectations
Although judicial treatments of threshold claims under reasonable
expectation of privacy standards often seem excessively conclusional, 38
courts repeatedly advert to and purport to apply certain criteria. The
34. A majority of the Court first employed the Harlan terminology less than one year
after Katz. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Chief Justice Warren stated: "We have recently held that 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,' and whenever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' he is entitled to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion." Id. at 9 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring)). In the years following Terry, although the particular language varied, the
essence of the reasonable expectation of privacy description generally survived. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
336 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364, 368 (1968).
It is somewhat surprising that the adoption of the Harlan characterization by a majority
of the Court occurred without dissent or debate. Although the several post-Katz opinions that
effected the transition convey the impression that Justice Stewart's omission of the Harlan
phrase was a mere inadvertent oversight, see, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; Terry, 392 U.S. at 9,
it is more likely that the majority's omission reflected a conscious choice not to endorse the
Harlan characterization at that time.
35. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
36. Id. at 740 (citation omitted).
37. Id. The Court did qualify its approval of the actual expectation requirement. See
infra note 165 & accompanying text.
38. Statements in Supreme Court and lower court opinions frequently evince an ipse dixit
style of adjudication. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983); Smith, 442
U.S. at 746-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 155 (Powell, J., concurring); United
States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938,
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present section identifies the noteworthy doctrinal features that have
emerged during the evolution of the reasonable expectation formula.
The Actual, Subjective Expectation Requirement
Ostensibly, the Court demands an actual privacy expectation as a
prerequisite to, although not sufficient for, a cognizable fourth amendment interest. The meaning of the actual expectation requirement, however, has been confused by its protean capacity to assume two different
shapes. In Smith v. Maryland, the Court's reliance upon that element
first found expression in its "doubt that people in general entertain any
actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial" 39 and in the similar reference to the mindsets of "telephone users, in general."4° Shortly
thereafter, however, the Court phrased the issue as whether Mr. Smith
"did harbor some subjective expectation. 4 1 In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 42
the latter, individualized visage of the actual expectation requirement appeared in the Court's reference to the petitioner's "frank admission...
that he had no subjective expectation . . .[of freedom] from governmen-

tal intrusion.

'4 3

Thus, the Court has promulgated both "people in general" and
"particular individual" perspectives on actual expectations, but has pro-

vided little insight into the rationale for any such requirement or the
appropriate role of either version of the actual expectation component.
In sum, despite the effective abandonment of the "actual (subjective) expectation" ingredient by its author,44 a majority of the Court remains
wedded to the requirement. 45
944 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977).
The Katz Court certainly did not intend to replace the former determinants of fourth
amendment scope with a "standard to be evolved according to the notions ofjudges of a given
time and place." United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 261 (5th Cir.) (concerning the
amount and kind of privacy preserved by the fourth amendment), cert denied, 454 U.S. 950
(1981). That has, however, been the frequent upshot of lower court implementations of reasonable expectation doctrine.
39. 442 U.S. at 742-43 (1979) (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
43. Id. at 105 (emphasis added); see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658-59
n.12 (1980) (reference apparently made both to the expectations of specific individuals and
those of people in general).
44. Only four years after proffering his two-pronged test in Katz, Justice Harlan observed
that "analysis must. . . transcend the search for subjective expectations .. " United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.
Ct. 3194, 3199 n.7 (1984).
45. Analysis of the actual expectation component is undertaken in a subsequent portion
of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 139-60.
In the face of uncertain rumblings from the Supreme Court about the meaning of and

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

The Reasonable Expectation Requirement

The resolution of threshold issues under the Katz-Smith doctrine
usually has hinged upon the second prong inquiry: whether society is
prepared to recognize a privacy expectation as reasonable. Several criteria for judicial assessment of the reasonableness of actual privacy expectations have emerged.
Taking its cue from the Katz declaration that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection," 4 6 the Court has deemed public accessibility or exposure a pertinent criterion and has rejected reasonable expectation claims due to the "openness" of an individual's conduct
or property. 47 Nonetheless, on occasion the Court has limited the impact
of the exposure factor, in one case repudiating the suggestion that the
proper role for the actual expectation prong, the lower courts rarely have resolved questions of
fourth amendment purview on the basis of that element. The question often asked has been
whether or not one acting like the claimant has behaviorally exhibited an expectation of privacy, not whether the particular individual had a subjective expectation. See, e.g., State v.
Thorton, 453 A.2d 489, 494 (Me. 1982) ("In the present case, the defendant's conduct evidenced a clear expectation of privacy. He chose a spot for the marijuana patches that was
observable only from his land; he posted No Trespassing and No Hunting signs on his land; he
generally excluded the public from his land.") (emphasis added), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984);
see also United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 943 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cassity,
546 F. Supp. 611, 618-19 (E.D. Mich. 1981); State v. Rickard, 420 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 1982).
That perspective is not disloyal to its origins. Justice Harlan's original formulation of the first
question was whether "a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy."
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added). His phraseology permits, and may even suggest,
reference to the expectations of those whose conduct resembles the claimant's. See United
States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980).
46. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Even if interpreted literally, the quoted language declares not
every exposure fatal to fourth amendment protection. Only those exposures that are sufficiently "knowing" or "public" forfeit constitutional shelter.
While the liberating character of the fundamental purpose-guided Katz message casts
some doubt on any interpretation of Katz that yields a categorical, inflexible constraint upon
fourth amendment reach, it is possible that the Katz Court was misled by an improperly narrow vision of fourth amendment privacy into erroneously believing that a knowing and public
exposure limitation upon constitutional scope is universally appropriate. Under an instrumental view of privacy, however, there are instances in which even "knowing" and "public" exposure ought not preclude the right to claim fourth amendment protection. See infra text
accompanying notes 192-96.
47. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (exposure of automobile travel on a
"public thoroughfare" counted against reasonableness of privacy expectations in such movements and contributed to "nonsearch" conclusion for "beeper" surveillance); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (grand jury subpoenas of voice exemplars held not to implicate
fourth amendment interests because a person publicly exposes such characteristics in daily
life); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (same result for handwriting exemplars); see
also United States v. Place, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2644-45 (1983) (conclusion that canine sniffs are
not searches bolstered by the presence of the sniffed luggage in a public place); Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (illuminating and observing automobile interior with flashlight not a
search because those areas "may be viewed from outside the vehicle").
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"congregation of a large number of persons in a private home [automatically] transform[s] it into a public place open to the police,"'4 8 and in
another case rejecting the similar contention that the public display of a
businessowner's wares renders his expectations of privacy unreasonable.49 In sum, while expressing misgivings about its indiscriminate operation, the Court has continued to rely upon the principle that individuals
sacrifice fourth amendment interests when they expose their behavior or
50
possessions to others.
A related criterion that has surfaced among the factors apposite to
deciding whether an expectation is reasonable is the failure of individuals
to take precautionary measures to safeguard their privacy.5 1 While not
relying upon this element frequently, the Court has indicated-contrary
to Justice Harlan's admonition that "the burden of guarding privacy in a
free society should not be on its citizens" 52 -that failure to erect barriers
against the government can deprive one of fourth amendment entitle48. Reeznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 168-69 (1968).
49. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979); cf.Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974) (dicta to the effect that "the exercise of a desire to be mobile does not,
of course, waive one's right to be free of unreasonable government intrusion").
50. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (use of beeper to document travel
patterns is outside fourth amendment due to public nature of individual's conduct). The lower
courts, possibly reflecting the equivocation of the Supreme Court, have been somewhat divided
concerning the appropriate operation and significance of the public exposure criterion. They
have pointed to the factor most often in open fields cases, see, eg., United States v. Swart, 679
F.2d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 869 (5th Cir. 1975),
affid inpart,rev'd in part,537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976), in common area cases, see, e.g., United
States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 992 (1st Cir. 1980), cert denied,450 U.S. 917 (1981); United
States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 100 (10th Cir.), cert denied,449 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v.
Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Freeman, 426 F.2d 1351, 1353
(9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Lanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1032 (1969), in beeper surveillance cases, see, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938,
942-43 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 896 (1978); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1002 (1976), and in trash container inspection cases, see, eg., United States v. Michaels, 726
F.2d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980);
United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972).
While lower courts frequently rely upon the exposure criterion in denying constitutional
protection, not all accord the factor unlimited sway. See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635
F.2d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1980); State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489,495 (Me. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.
Ct. 1735 (1984); People v. Whotte, 113 Mich. App. 12, 17-18, 317 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1982).
51. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) ("precipitous nature" of bailment
fails to support "a reasonable inference . . .[of] normal precautions to maintain . . . privacy"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy" included in compilation of relevant reasonableness
factors). Of course, because public accessibility can result from the failure to engage in precautionary measures, these two factors are related in many cases, and reliance upon both of them
in such cases may amount to unfair double-counting.
52. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 793 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ment. 53
A factor that has played a decisive role in some prominent post-Katz
cases is the voluntary disclosure of information to third parties who, acting as agents of the government, convey such information to the government. To preserve reasonable expectations, according to the Court,
individuals must not grant government enlistees, even unknown agents,
specific access to information.5 4 One who discloses surrenders any legiti53. The ability of an individual to do more than he or she has done to safeguard his or
her interest in privacy is a favorite criterion of the lower courts. The close relationship between this factor and the public accessibility component, as well as the suggested possibility of
double-counting, are highlighted by the reliance upon the "precaution availability" element in
the exact settings in which "public exposure" has been influential. See, e.g., United States v.
Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 309
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2095 (1983); United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 101 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979).
At times, the absence of self-protective measures had led to a declaration of no reasonable
expectation. See, e.g., Michaels, 726 F.2d at 1312-13; Terry, 702 F.2d at 309; United States v.
Biondich, 652 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981); United States v.
Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 991 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981); Vahalik, 606
F.2d at 101; Crowell, 586 F.2d at 1025. Quite often, however, a claimant's prophylactic steps
have been deemed adequate to maintain an interest worthy of fourth amendment protection.
See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2380
(1984); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Brien,
617 F.2d 299, 306 n.9 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d
357, 366, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 68 (1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), afi'd, 8
Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973); State v.
Rickard, 420 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 1982); State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489, 494-96 (Me. 1982),
rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
Dispute sometimes centers upon the degree of responsibility with which anyone ought to
be chargeable and whether a given person has done enough. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver,
686 F.2d 356, 360, 371-72 (6th Cir. 1982) (Keith, J., dissenting), ajf'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984);
id. at 373 (Lively, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1156, 1160
(4th Cir. 1980) (Ervin, C.J., dissenting); see also United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380
(9th Cir. 1980) ("We agree. . . that a person need not construct an opaque bubble over his or
her land in order to have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the activities occurring
there in all circumstances.").
In any event, most concur that the protective means available to and utilized by those
claiming fourth amendment entitlement are relevant considerations. See, e.g., United States v.
Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1981); United States v.
Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 306 n.9 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); State v. Rickard, 420
So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 1982); Thornton, 453 A.2d at 496 (Me. 1982).
54. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen registers found outside fourth
amendment ambit because numbers dialed are voluntarily conveyed to phone company);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (financial record procurement and review not a
search because information obtained was voluntarily conveyed to bank); see also United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (pre-Katz holding regarding fourth amendment status of "secret
agents" reaffirmed after Katz due to voluntary disclosure). Pre-Katz and post-Katz opinions
have also couched their reasoning in the alternative terminology of "assumed risks" and "mis-
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mate claim to a protectable fourth amendment interest.
"[B]y focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned the
use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the
privacy interests protected by that Amendment. ' 56 The Court has, in
fact, specifically relied on ownership, possession, and the related right to
exclude others from property in evaluating privacy interests.5 7 The
Court, however, has neither proffered a comprehensive catalogue of relevant property concerns, nor prescribed the weight particular property

placed trust." See White, 401 U.S. at 752; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court's current reliance upon the voluntary disclosure to a third party criterion is
reminiscent of the Olmstead Court's earlier reliance upon the telephone user's "conversational
voluntariness" as a basis for holding that wiretapping was beyond fourth amendment control.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). The criteria, however, are not
identical. The conversations in Olmstead that contributed to a forfeiture of fourth amendment
protection, although voluntary, were directed to another private party and not to a government agent. The mere fact that the claimant's speech was voluntary and not compelled influenced the Court's decision that the fourth amendment did not prevent the government from
intruding upon the conversation. The current criterion, on the other hand, refers to noncompelled disclosure directly to an agent of the government. It is not simply voluntary speech, but
voluntary speech to a government agent that forfeits constitutional coverage today. See United
States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3304 n.4 (1984).
Despite that critical distinction, the two factors do share common ground. Beyond the
surface similarity of reference to the voluntariness of one's revelatory conduct, both seem to be
grounded in the premise that people desiring privacy should not engage in conduct that shows
a lack of concern for privacy. That premise has been accorded excessive influence due to an
improper conception of fourth amendment privacy. Because the post-Katz voluntary disclosure factor is rooted in that conception, it is as seriously flawed as the pre-Katz conversational
voluntariness criterion. See infra text accompanying notes 192-96.
55. The voluntary disclosure ingredient is related to the less firmly entrenched "public
exposure" factor. It is different, however, insofar as it involves a specific grant of access to a
limited audience and requires that the party with access serve as the conveyor to the government. It does not, therefore, entitle the government to access without the willing assistance of
the specific intended recipient. See Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3304 n.4 ("There would be nothing left
of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy if anything that a hypothetical government informant might reveal [i.e., anything voluntarily disclosed to anyone or no one, but not to a government agent] is stripped of constitutional protection." (emphasis in the original)). It also is
closely connected to the less confidently endorsed "absence of precaution" criterion insofar as
it requires personal responsibility for sheltering privacy as a condition for retaining constitutionally protected interests. The voluntary disclosure rationale would seem to be a narrow
subset of each of the two preceding categories.
56. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978); see also id. at 153 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
57. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (ownership or possession of property seized is relevant, though not decisive on question of privacy interests); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (use of pen registers does not involve a property invasion or
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41
(1976) (lack of property interest in subpoenaed bank records considered relevant to privacy
interest).
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interests ought to be accorded. 58
Initially, the frequency with which references to intrusion or invasion have appeared in opinions after Katz is surprising. 59 The intended
58. Although property interests in seized property do not alone give rise to cognizable
privacy interests, Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105, ownership or possession can generate protectible
fourth amendment interests. The interests of an owner or possessor in the security, integrity,
and continued availability of her property are constitutionally protected against governmental
seizures. See United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662-63 (1984).
Justice Marshall believes that one with an adequate property basis in a seized item should
always be able to contest a precedent search because it is the combination of the search and the
seizure that "interferes with his constitutionally protected right to be secure in his effects."
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 117-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to Justice Marshall, "[i]f
the defendant's property was seized as the result of an unreasonable search, the seizure cannot
be other than unreasonable." Id. at 118.
Reliance upon property elements does not contravene Katz, which declared only that
physical intrusions and property interests must not exert absolute control over the operative
sphere of fourth amendment protection. The use of property notions, however, must be kept
within proper bounds lest a de facto return to the pre-Katz approach occur. In lower court
threshold determinations, reliance upon property concepts may well be excessive. They are
regularly involved in trash cases, see, e.g., United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 307 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2095 (1983); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir.
1981), in open fields cases, see, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984); United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 853 (1lth Cir.
1982); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 870 (5th Cir. 1975), afl'd in part, rev'd in part,
537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976), and in beeper attachment and monitoring cases, see, e.g., Karo,
710 F.2d at 1438; United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 860-61 (9th Cir. 1980).
Property-related factors come in a variety of forms. Ownership and possession generate a
greater likelihood that privacy expectations will be deemed reasonable. See, e.g., United States
v. Hernandez, 668 F.2d 824, 826 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765, 770
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); United States v. Arce, 633 F.2d 689, 694 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1253 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955 (1979). But see United States v. Dall, 608 F.2d 910, 914-15
(1st Cir. 1979) (despite ownership, giving of temporary vehicle to another deprived defendant
of reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980). At times distinctions
between open fields and curtilage, and between those two areas and houses have been determinative. See, e.g., Dunn, 674 F.2d at 1100; United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993 (4th
Cir. 1981); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir. 1976); Ball v. State, 205 N.W.2d 353,
356-57 (Wis. 1973). The reasonableness of expectations declines as one moves from the realm
of the home to the curtilage and finally out into the open fields. The Supreme Court recently
settled some of the disputed matters in this area by declaring that open fields cannot harbor
any reasonable privacy expectations. See infra text accompanying notes 276-91.
In addition, an individual's incapacity to possess a legitimate property interest in contraband has lessened or destroyed the reasonableness of the claimed privacy expectations. See,
e.g., United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956 (1978); United States v.
Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1976). Finally, the "abandonment" of one's personal
property is usually fatal to a claim of fourth amendment protection. See, e.g., Terry, 702 F.2d
at 309; United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 871
(1982); Reicherter, 647 F.2d at 399; Magda, 536 F.2d at 112; United States v. Mustone, 469
F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972).
59. See Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984) (government's intrusion
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meaning of those terms, however, is not always clear. Although the
words connote physical breach or trespass, it is by no means clear that in
all instances in which the Court has employed such language it has intended to deliver that message. 6° Whatever its intended significance, intrusion or invasion has6 1been another undeniable factor in reasonable
expectation evaluations.
upon activities conducted in open fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home,
does not violate reasonable expectations of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741
(1979) (in pen register surveillance, government does not "intrude into a 'constitutionally protected area' "); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("Katz held that. . . the protection
of the Fourth Amendment depends. . . upon whether the person who claims the protection
.. . has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invadedplace.") (emphasis added); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (procurement of bank record involves no "intrusion
into a zone of privacy").
60. In United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1983), the Court mentioned the
intrusion factor in concluding that canine sniffs are not fourth amendment searches. The discussion in that opinion might be understood as referring to "physical intrusiveness." Subsequently, however, the Court has explained that it was not the absence of physical invasion
itself that was critical in Place,but rather the lessened risk of intrusion upon legitimate privacy
interests because only limited information could be acquired from a canine sniff. See United
States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662 n.24 (1984). The Jacobsen opinion downplays the
significance of tangible, physical breaches and undercuts possible contrary implications of earlier opinions.
For the view that although the absence of physical intrusion should not dictate a "nonsearch" conclusion, the presence of physical intrusion probably should compel a "search" finding, see Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3325 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. As with property notions, the spirit of Katz is not violated as long as the physical
intrusion factor functions as an aid in discerning protectable privacies, see, eg., Jacobsen, 104
S. Ct. at 1662 n.24, and does not become a necessary component of reasonable expectations.
Difficulties arise, however, when such criteria assume excessive and undeserved significance in
defining the constitutional boundaries. That may be the case in the lower courts. Although
some courts have disputed the pertinence and usefulness of the intrusion factor, see, e.g.,
United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1332 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Taborda, 635
F.2d 131, 138 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 940 n.4 (6th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1975), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 537
F.2d 227 (1976), the absence or minimal degree of intrusion effected by a government activity
has often weighed against the reasonableness of an alleged expectation. See, eg., Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Waltzer,
682 F.2d 370, 372-73 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Weir, 657 F.2d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir.
1981); United States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509, 510-11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867
(1981); United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 177 (9th Cir.), cert denied,439 U.S. 953 (1978),
afId, 619 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980).
In many of the cases in which the lack or negligible extent of an intrusion has contributed
to rejection of a fourth amendment claim, the courts' references have clearly been to the physical quality of the intrusion. These references have sometimes been explicit. See, eg., Horton,
690 F.2d at 478-79; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Cecil Mills), 686 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1020 (1982); Weir, 657 F.2d at 1007. At other times, courts have
evinced a physical focus through the language of trespass. See, eg., United States v. Dunn,
674 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984); see also Waltzer, 682 F.2d
at 372-73; Hiera, 644 F.2d at 510-11.
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In a growing number of fourth amendment contexts, the Court has
accorded the interest in efficient law enforcement an ever-expanding doctrinal role. 62 In threshold analysis, however, its influence has been relatively modest. Until recently, the Court had adverted to that element in
only one major post-Katz threshold decision. 63 During the 1983-1984
term, however, the Court showed an inclination to expand the role of the
criminal law efficacy factor in threshold analysis. 64 Thus, the law enforcement factor cannot be dismissed as inapposite to reasonable expecta65
tion doctrine.

As keeper of the fourth amendment gateway, the Katz-Smith reasonable expectation of privacy formula governs some of the most significant adjudications in constitutional law. Despite its importance, the
formula's theoretical roots and doctrinal refinements have been subjected
to only the most shallow judicial analysis. The doctrine's central role in
62. The interest in effective criminal law enforcement has been quite influential in the
"stop and frisk" line of cases, beginning with Chief Justice Warren's observation in Terry:
One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection; it is
this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is not probable cause to
make an arrest.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983);
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981).
The concern for an efficient and successful law enforcement system has operated in other
fourth amendment contexts as well. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805 (1982)
(discussing the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement); United States v. Havens,
446 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1980) (holding that illegally seized evidence may be used to impeach
defendant); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976) (holding that police officers
need not obtain warrants to make public felony arrests). This listing is certainly not exhaustive. The law enforcement factor has become one of the most prevalent forces in fourth
amendment reasoning.
63. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (expressing fear that a contrary
threshold holding regarding "secret agent" activity would "erect constitutional barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable"); see also id. at 786 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (suggesting factoring "the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement" into the constitutional threshold calculus).
64. See Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200-01 (1984) (prisoners' expectations of
privacy in jail cells not reasonable because of the paramount interest of society in security of
penal institutions); Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1743 n. 13 (1984) (unwillingness to
"shelter criminal activity" influenced decision that fourth amendment does not apply in open
fields).
65. Governmental interests and the harm to criminal law enforcement have been employed to a limited extent in the lower courts. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356,
360-61 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982), affid, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984); United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d
252, 259 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981). The impact upon the outcome of cases,
however, has been relatively insubstantial. See, e.g., United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165,
179 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978), afl'd, 619 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 951 (1980); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 956 (1978).
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fourth amendment
threshold decisionmaking, its expansion into the
"standing" area, 66 and its frequent invocation by litigants and widespread employment by the courts make a thorough understanding and
evaluation critical. That task requires identification 67and comprehension
of the true character of fourth amendment privacy.
Proper Guides to Constitutional Coverage: The Nature of
Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests
Perhaps the most famous legal definition of privacy is the simple,
exceedingly open-ended Warren and Brandeis formulation: "the right to
be let alone."' 68 That description encompasses most, possibly all, of the
66. A most significant expansion of the doctrine's functions occurred when the Court
gave it control over the territory traditionally ruled by "standing" analysis. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (only individuals who demonstrate infringement of reasonable
expectation of privacy are entitled to exclusion of evidence by virtue of unreasonable search);
see also infra notes 342-50. Since Rakas declared that the reasonable expectation of privacy
formula is the determinant of whether an activity that is a search in the abstract is a search as
to a particularindividual,it transformed the former "standing" inquiry into an intimate relative of the fourth amendment threshold inquiry. Because they both involve the definition of
fourth amendment scope, this Article treats both inquiries.
67. For several reasons, it is important to focus concern upon threshold fourth amendment questions of coverage independent of substantive questions of content. First, scope inquiries pose the initial fourth amendment analytical hurdle. It is illogical not to address them
first and would be pointless and academic to discuss how the guarantee will operate if, in fact,
it does not operate at all. Fourth amendment content questions (for example: Is a warrant
required? Should probable cause be replaced by reasonable suspicion?) are clearly distinct in
character and purpose. They involve a balancing process-often done by the Constitution
itself-aimed at evaluating the "reasonableness" of an activity that is subject to some constitutional regulation. Threshold matters, on the other hand, should not involve such balancing.
See infra text accompanying notes 200-04. Unprincipled balancing at the content stage might
well nullify liberty gains made possible by proper threshold analysis. That potentiality, however, rather than detracting from the propriety of initial, separate confrontation of scope questions, simply raises questions about, and should prompt critical analysis of, the processes used
to determine fourth amendment substance.
Furthermore, collapsing the coverage and content stages into one analytical inquiry is
inadvisable for reasons beyond their logical separateness. If substantive determinations were
melded with threshold analyses, the risk of total sacrifice of individual entitlements to the
compelling needs of law enforcement would increase. Separately performed threshold tasks
will result more often in declarations that individuals are entitled to some measure of constitutional protection. The symbolic worth of such declarations and their practical effects on law
enforcement should not be minimized. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733, 760 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). It may well be that the fact of limitation is of greater ultimate importance than the characterof that limitation. Additionally, as a practical matter, affirmnative
threshold declarations ensure some operative safeguards against unbounded government power
and discretion. Moreover, correctly performed threshold analyses should isolate and define
the values and concerns which ought to weigh on the individual's side in the balancing
processes used to determine substantive fourth amendment content.
68. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890). Certain
members of the Supreme Court have found this definition a fitting description of the fourth
amendment entitlement. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
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variant interests which have been labelled "privacy." While the interest
in peace, quiet, repose, and freedom from physical disturbance 69 may be
the most apparent referent of the Warren and Brandeis description, being
let alone includes other "privacies," such as the interests in not having
potentially embarrassing facts publicly disseminated, 70 in not having another profit from such information, 7 1 in autonomy to decide how to conduct intimate, personal affairs, 72 and in generally controlling access to
confidential information about one's life. 73 Considering the variety of

privacy species, it is not surprising that the "right to be let alone" has
been termed "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,"' 74 and that privacy
has had a prominent and en75
during role in Anglo-American society.
Privacy's amorphous nature and chameleon-like capacity to de76
scribe disparate interests make it a somewhat problematic concept,
J., dissenting); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3216 n.34 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1751 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3326 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
69. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389-92 (1960); Comment, A Taxonomy
of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary,and IntimateDecision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1451-56 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, A Taxonomy]; see also Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom, in PRIVACY 72 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971).
70. See United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 397
(1983); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419 (1974); cf. Prosser,
supra note 69, at 389 (at common law, "right to privacy" included cause of action for "public
disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff," and for "publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye").
71. See M. ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 1 (1962);
Prosser, supra note 69, at 389.
72. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Comment, A Taxonomy, supra note
69, at 1466-78; cf. United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 949 (6th Cir. 1980) (Keith, J., concurring) (referring to "control of personal identity" which "extends to those elements which constitute one's existence as a sentient being").
73. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); C. FRIED,
AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 140 (1971); A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L.

REV. 275, 281 (1974); Comment, A Taxonomy, supra note 69, at 1456-66.
74. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
75. Not all civilized societies hold privacy as dear as we traditionally have. "One could
compile a long list of societies, primitive and modem, that neither have nor admire the norms
of privacy found in American culture-norms which some Americans regard as 'natural'
needs of all men living in society." A. WESTIN, supra note 73, at 12. Nonetheless, apparently
some "[n]eeds for individual and group privacy. . . are present in virtually every society." Id.
at 13; see also Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many?, in PRIVACY, supra note 69, at 196.
76. See Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 261 (1977) ("In
the inevitable muddle of adjudication, privacy may still look, as it did to Paul Freund, like 'too
greedy a concept' to let into the storehouse of legal rules and principles.") (footnote omitted);
id. at 234 ("[I]f privacy is indeed the most comprehensive of rights, is it not then too vast and
weighty a thing to invoke in specific legal settings for specific and narrowly defined purposes?"); Comment, A Taxonomy, supra note 69, at 1448 ("Different interests, which compel
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preventing definition of the term that is both comprehensive and comprehensible. 77 Fortunately, ascertaining the appropriate scope of fourth
amendment privacy protection does not require such definition. Fidelity
to constitutional purposes, however, does demand understanding and
isolation of those attributes that are a proper part of the fourth amendment privacy entitlement and elimination of those that are not.78
The Primarily "Informational" Nature of the Privacy
Protected Against Searches
The Constitution grants no general, comprehensive right to privacy.
The term, of course, is not even in the Bill of Rights. 79 Nevertheless, the
entity has been discovered within more than one of that charter's specific
guarantees, 80 and plays its most significant constitutional role in the
different treatment by court and counsel, have nonetheless been included under the common
rubric of 'privacy.' "); id. at 1482 ("Whenever a generalized claim to privacy is put forward
without distinguishing carefully between the transactional types, parties and courts alike may
become hopelessly muddled in obscure claims."); see also Henkin, supra note 70, at 1425. But
cf Gerety, supra, at 236, 296 ("Privacy. . . . as a concept and a right, stands in great need of
the few certainties and limitations that definiton affords us.").
77. See Henkin, supra note 70, at 1419. For a sample of definitional attempts evincing
both the diversity and ambiguity bound to result from such an effort, see Roe v. Ingraham, 403
F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd sub nom., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977);
PRIVACY, supra note 69, at xi-xiii; A. WESrIN, supra note 73, at 7; Henkin, supra note 70, at
1419; Parker, supra note 73, at 283-84.
Any attempt at comprehensiveness is destined for inadequacy due to the variety of qualities and characteristics that have been joined under the common title. Although they share
some common ground, the different kinds of privacy are so unrelated that a successful effort at
capturing them all will likely be exceedingly nebulous, unfocused, and unmanageable. See
Bacigal, supranote 29, at 534. One risk of an ill-defined, all-inclusive definition is that privacy
becomes paradoxically vulnerable to deprivation of content. Vagueness and imprecision permit not only inclusion, but also selective exclusion of interests. One who disfavors a'given
claim to privacy can interpret ambiguity in ways which exclude the claim. Also, definitions
that bring various facets of privacy beneath one umbrella generate opportunities for manipulative focus upon one variety at the expense of others. The reasonable and feasible alternative is
formulation of many definitions, each concerned with a segregable portion of privacy.
It is understandable that "[tihe concept of a constitutional right of privacy still remains
largely undefined." Kurland, The PrivateI, U. CHI.MAG., Autumn 1976, at 7, 8. Faced with
the different forms of privacy contained in the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments,
the Supreme Court has wisely not even attempted to furnish a comprehensive definition.
78. Refinement of our understanding of fourth amendment privacy is critical because
privacy does "service in a variety of legal contexts" and, as a result, "entails risks of slovenly,
overbroad, and one-dimensional thinking." Freund, supra note 75, at 196-97. "The clearer
the understanding of what privacy is, the wiser judgments will be concerning when to protect
it and when to sacrifice it." Parker, supranote 73, at 296. In addition, our judgments concerning how much and what kind of protection to afford privacy will also be immeasurably wiser if
grounded in a clearer comprehension of the concept.
79. See Gerety, supra note 76, at 239-40; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 365, 373 (Black, J.,
dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965).
80. In addition to the fourth amendment, the Court has determined that the first amendment and the ninth amendment are repositories of privacy interests. See, eg., Stanley v. Geor-
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fourth amendment sphere. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's responses to the critical inquiry for fourth amendment threshold analysiswhich of the various privacy interests are protected by that guarantee?have been sketchy, indirect, and largely unenlightening.
The text of the fourth amendment literally restricts only
"searches. 8 1 Inherent in the notion of "searching" is an attempt to acquire, or the acquisition of, information. A common feature of indisputable governmental searches is the objective of obtaining data in order to
fulfill an "ultimate" institutional purpose. From the historical entering
and rummaging to secure proof of seditious libel to the modem attachment of electronic listening devices on telephone booths to uncover organized crime, the governmental design has been "the securing of
information to fortify the coercive power of the state."'8 2 A commonsense understanding of "searching, ' 83 therefore, would seem to encompass government efforts intended to result in, or even unintentionally but
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. The fifth amendment also protects
privacy, although no broader a zone than that necessarily delineated by the prohibition of
compelled self-incrimination. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976). The unused
third amendment "prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of. . .privacy." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
81. A narrow linguistic approach and a myopic focus upon historically objectionable
practices once limited the scope of "searches" to physical entries. See supra note 21. Notions
of privacy and adoption of an interest-oriented approach to definition of the term released the
fourth amendment from that suffocating confinement. See supra text accompanying notes 23-

27. Adoption of the latter approach, however, did not render language and history useless in
ascertaining what privacy rests within the fourth amendment core. Katz merely admonishes
us not to rely excessively upon those valid sources of constitutional construction.
It would be unwise to refuse the assistance of language and history in understanding
fourth amendment privacy. Justice Black was correct in believing that language and history
are useful guides that should not be ignored. He erred, however, in finding them dispositive
and controlling. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting). Language and history ought
to perform the significant, but more modest role of assisting our understanding of that interest
which, ultimately, must be the prime determinant of coverage.
82. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959). For cases supporting the view that the
fourth amendment protection against searches is intended to be a shield against government
information acquisition, see United States v. Karo, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 3302-04 (1984); United
States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1658-60 (1984); United States v. Place, 103 S.Ct. 2637,
2644 (1983); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 792 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 459 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf.Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3326 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (one aspect of the privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment
is the right to keep information from the government).
83. A common-sense understanding of the fourth amendment language led the Court in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), to impose the "physical intrusion" limitation.
That gloss on "searching," however, is not consonant with the dictionary definitions of the
word which are not confined by a physical intrusion qualifier. See 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 333-34 (1961). The predominant themes among those definitions are ascertainment,
exploration, investigation, and examination--concepts quite consonant with information gathering and not demanding a physical intrusion.
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84
potentially resulting in, information acquisition.
Examination of the government practices that inspired constitutional protection from a perspective that emphasizes their purposes and
effects, rather than merely their tangible attributes, also supports an "information-acquisitive" characterization of fourth amendment searches.8 5
The physical breaches of and rummaging within homes that prompted
constitutional control were ordinarily designed to acquire, and inevitably
had the effect of yielding, information about the affairs of their victims.
They were, if nothing else, information-gathering endeavors.8 6
Recognition of the fundamentally information-acquisitive nature of
constitutional searches leads logically toward a conception of the fourth

84. Scholarly commentary reinforces the information acquisition aspect of fourth amendment searches. See Bacigal, supra note 29, at 562; Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three
Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: FourthAmendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CRiM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 425, 434-35 (1978); Hufstedler, The
Directionsand Misdirectionsof a ConstitutionalRight of Privacy, 26 REc. N.Y.B.A. 546, 561
(1971); Comment, Pen Registers After Smith v. Maryland, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RPv. 753,
761 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Pen Registers]; Comment, A Taxonomy, supra note
69, at 1461. While these commentators include all information-gathering endeavors within the
concept of fourth amendment searches, I suggest that information acquisition is but the initial
criterion for deciding whether the constitutional threshold has been crossed. I consider the
crucial additional criteria to be the liberties potentially infringed by governmental informationgathering efforts.
Almost all government activities which should be considered searches would be included
if the initial criterion were simply an intent or design to acquire information. Nonetheless, I
have included unintentional information acquisitions because the government should be held
accountable for fortuitous impacts upon informational privacy. See Bacigal, supra note 29, at
573. Whether or not their design is obtainment of data, when agents acquire information they
have satisfied the initial prerequisite for a search.
85. In Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft also relied upon history to bolster his conclusions
about the limits of constitutional coverage. He stated that the "well known historical purpose
of the Fourth Amendment. . . was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's
house, his person, his papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his will." 277
U.S. at 463.
It is the narrowness of his historical perspective, rather than the accuracy of his reading of
history, that is objectionable. Rather than examining the underlying purposes of the fourth
amendment, he focused narrowly upon the unimportant physical attributes of the historically
offensive governmental conduct. Such a confined perspective on history neither gives sufficient
credit to the wisdom or intent of the Framers, nor accords with the true nature of a Constitution which, to endure, must not be limited by the abuses or technology of any particular time
period. See Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1745-46 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
A proper historical perspective faithful to the Framers' purposes looks beneath the superficial
characteristics of quintessential searches and seizures, and generalizes from those practices by
evaluating their perpetrators' goals and their impacts on victims. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at
487-88 (Butler, J., dissenting).
86. One of Patrick Henry's most famous admonitions alludes to this facet of traditional
searches. Henry feared authorities "who may search, at any time, your houses and most secret
recesses" and who "may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or
some similar restriction, go into your cellars and rooms and search, ransack and measure
everything you eat, drink or wear." N. LASSON, supra note 4, at 92-93 (emphasis added).
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amendment's ward as primarily informational privacy-that is, an interest in maintaining confidentiality or secrecy, in not having data about
one's life learned by the government. 87 Apparently, the Supreme Court
has accurately perceived the informational character of fourth amendment privacy.8 8 Nevertheless, its analyses and resolutions of threshold
questions have often proven unsatisfying and unfaithful to constitutional
goals. 89 The inadequacies transcend the mere selection of inappropriate
terminology, or a failure to explain adequately results that are consistent
with fourth amendment intent. The Court's discussions betray an illiberal, truncated conception of informational privacy that is fundamentally
incompatible with the ambitious aims of that provision. 90
87. Another variety of "privacy" mentioned earlier is the interest in "repose," i.e., in not
being physically or psychologically unsettled or disturbed by governmental action. Protection
of repose may have been among the Framers' purposes, and enforcement of the fourth amendment's safeguards will certainly result in some protection for that interest. Nevertheless, it
should not be treated as the primary or even as a significant fourth amendment goal.
First, unless "repose" is defined broadly, a focus upon perils to that interest would
threaten severe shrinkage of the fourth amendment domain. Many modern activities that are
presently considered "searches," for example, electronic eavesdropping and beeper monitoring,
probably would not be constitutionally controlled if repose protection dictated coverage. Even
traditional searches might be unregulated if the government invaded premises only during our
absences and left the scenes physically undisturbed. Furthermore, repose-type privacy interests are less significant and valuable than informational privacy interests because deprivations
of informational privacy pose much more serious and extensive threats to the free exercise of
other liberties.
88. See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3302-04 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen,
104 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (1984); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3324 (1983); United States v.
Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1983). Some lower courts have accurately perceived the informational character of fourth amendment privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139,
1149 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978), aff'd, 619 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980) (Hufstedler, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Other notions of privacy have also appeared in lower court reasoning. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
397 (1983) (interests in peace and quiet, relaxation, retiring someplace, and public esteem);
United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 949 (6th Cir. 1980) (Keith, J., concurring) ("the intimacies of personal identity") (emphasis in original).
89. The Court's discussions and depictions of fourth amendment privacy can fairly be
described as skeletal. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977) (The "facet" of
privacy "directly protected by the Fourth Amendment" is "the right of the individual to be
free in his private affairs from governmental surveillance and intrusion."). The unsatisfying,
disloyal reasoning and results in purview cases may well be directly attributable to the failure
to investigate and explain the nature of fourth amendment privacy in any depth. Cf. Weinreb,
Generalitiesof the FourthAmendment, 42 U. Csii. L. REV. 47, 49 (1974) ("The absence of a
continuously developing rationalization of the amendment has enabled the Court to change
direction, even veer rapidly or sharply, without too obvious inconsistency; but the result is a
body of doctrine that is unstable and unconvincing.").
90. See infra notes 91-136 & accompanying text.
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Remedying the Inadequacies of the Current Conception of Fourth
Amendment Privacy: Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake
The emphasis upon secrecy and confidentiality in current conceptions of fourth amendment privacy does not mischaracterize or devalue
the core of the guarantee. Focus upon that facet of privacy is appropriate and defensible in terms of the language, history, and intent of the
Framers. The flaws in doctrine and analysis have been spawned by an
excessively limited vision of the significance and ambitions of informational privacy-that is, by valuing secrecy merely for secrecy's sake.
While secrecy and confidentiality are recognized as the guiding lights of
fourth amendment analysis, 9 1 only rarely is any underlying rationale or
purpose for such a secrecy grant acknowledged. The notion that an interest in keeping affairs undisclosed is the ultimate constitutional value
seems to be a basic, widespread, but unexamined working assumption.
The informational privacy protected by the fourth amendment,
however, is not important and valuable merely for its own sake. 92 The
constitutional text, structure, and history, as well as early fourth amendment cases, support the conclusion that the main reason for constitutionalizing informational privacy is its instrumentalrole as a medium within
which other rights and interests can survive, even flourish. Just as confidentiality-type privacy, in general, permits individuals to be themselves,
to behave and conduct their lives in ways that might otherwise be difficult and impractical, if not inconceivable, 93 constitutional informational
privacy enables people to enjoy and freely exercise other entitlements afforded by our free society. The uninhibited exercise of fundamental
rights and the complete enjoyment of constitutionally guaranteed benefits
often depends upon the ability to keep matters unknown and undisclosed
to the government. Thus, to the extent that the fourth amendment
grants a secrecy entitlement, it affords opportunities to take advantage of
other guarantees. Conversely, insofar as our constitutional secrecy entitlement is restricted, and the government is permitted cognizance of our
affairs, those opportunities are diminished. In essence, fourth amendment privacy stands as a bulwark against governmental omniscience and
its consequences-the subtle, unwarranted contraction of fundamental
rights and liberties.
91. See supra notes 87-88 & accompanying text. But cf. United States v. Haydel, 649
F.2d 1152, 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1981) (criticizing the "confinement" of
fourth amendment interests to confidentiality as too "narrow").
92. Confidentiality vis-a-vis the government is inherently valuable, and undoubtedly the
fourth amendment is concerned with protecting that intrinsic worth. The point is simply that
the fourth amendment intent is to secure that interest and much more.
93. See, eg., Greenawalt, The Right to Privacy, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 301 (N.

Dorsen ed. 1971); Simmel, supra note 69, at 81; see also United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d
789, 793-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 397 (1983).
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The Status of Fourth Amendment Privacy

An initial reason for according fourth amendment privacy a role as
protector and nurturer of other liberties is the relatively insubstantial object of fourth amendment concern that otherwise results. Although secrecy for secrecy's sake, because of the comfort and contentment that can
be derived simply from the availability of such a private sphere, is valuable, the fourth amendment would not seem to merit its prominent place
among vital Bill of Rights constituents if that were its sole object of protection. 94 It is difficult to believe that the Framers considered mere secrecy worthy of the respect and commitment given expression in their
constitutionalization of protection against unregulated search and seizure
power. 95 Nor would such a limited goal deserve the judicial attention
and reverence accorded it through time. 96 Fourth amendment privacy's
94.

Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (without exclusionary rule sanction,

freedom from governmental invasions of privacy would "not ...

merit ...

high regard as a

freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' "). There are provisions of the Bill of
Rights centered around quite limited and relatively insignificant concerns, for example, the
second and third amendments. Such guarantees have proven to be of little value in postcolonial society. If confined to the safeguarding of secrecy for its own sake (a danger posed by
current doctrine), the fourth amendment undoubtedly retains more significance than the two
amendments which precede it. Nonetheless, its role in American society is attenuated to a
degree dissonant with the importance expressly accorded it by its Framers, later analysts, and
the judiciary since Boyd.
95. Patrick Henry described Virginia's constitutional search and seizure provision as the
result of "some celestial influence governing those who deliberated on that Constitution; for
they have with the most cautious and enlightened circumspection, guarded those indefeasible
rights which ought ever to be held sacred!" N. LASSON, supra note 4, at 93.
96. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Justice Bradley stated that the "principles" behind restraint upon searches and seizures "affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security." Id. at 630. He referred to the "indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property" embodied in the fourth amendment as a "sacred right."
Id. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921), the Court declared fourth amendment rights "to be. . . of the very essence of constitutional liberty." See also ICC v. Brimson,
154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894) ("[O]f all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or
more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security .
) (quoting
In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250 (N.D. Cal. 1887)).
While modem Supreme Court majorities have not been as generous in praising fourth
amendment blessings, the lower courts have not entirely lost sight of the vital significance of
that provision. See, e.g., United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1153 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The
fourth amendment has been the individual's shield for decades, one of the primary bulwarks of
our liberty and freedom. Few other nations have given their citizens such privileges. Let us be
the last to yield them."). Dissenters on the High Court have also continued the tradition. See,
e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3446 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("There is
hope, however, that in time this or some later Court will restore these precious freedoms to
their rightful place as a primary protection for our citizens against overreaching officialdom.");
id. at 3453 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Fourth amendment rights "are not mere second-class
rights, but belong in the catalog of indispensible freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none
is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in
every heart.") (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dis-
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significance must be commensurate with our profound and enduring dedication to the fundamental principle of constrained search and seizure
97
power.
The elevated status of the fourth amendment should prompt us toward a suitably broad vision of informational privacy, but does not indicate the direction or form that a more expansive conception should take.
The need for a more significant privacy entitlement does not lead ineluctably to the concept of privacy as a medium, for other conceptions might
also substantially enhance the value of fourth amendment privacy. Fur-

thermore, even if an instrumental view is the most logical reinterpretation of the significance of informational privacy, support beyond logical

inferences from status is desirable, if not essential.
The Characterof Informational Privacy

The idea that confidentiality-type privacy, in general, is a medium
within which "other values and activities may or may not thrive in the
lives of different individuals" 98 is not novel or original. While some
downplay emphasis upon the instrumental role of privacy, 9 9 others have
no difficulty conceiving of privacy as a medium and, indeed, as most valuable for that reason.lc °
senting)); see also Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1751 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
97. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 2, at 47 (The fourth amendment embodies "the belief
that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against
the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity. . . ."); Bacigal, supra
note 29, at 559 ("Security against arbitrary police intrusion is a basic tenet of free society and
lies at the heart of the fourth amendment.").
98. Gerety, supra note 76, at 245.
99. Professor Weinreb believes that although the "privacy secured by the fourth amendment fosters large social interests," it would "misconceive the great purpose of the amendment
to see it primarily as the servant of other social goods, however large and generally valuable."
Weinreb, supra note 89, at 85. The suggestion seems to be that the importance of fourth
amendment privacy is somehow diminished by discovering much of its significance in its operation as a medium, its role as "guarantor of other guarantees." To the contrary, acknowledgement of the substantially instrumental role of fourth amendment privacy enhances its value,
elevates the constitutional notion of secrecy-confidentiality above its current, unexalted level,
and expands its influence beyond the presently constricted sphere. There are few more significant or ambitious constitutional tasks than those the fourth amendment performs under an
instrumental view.
100. See, e.g., Gerety, supra note 76, at 245:
[P]rivacy is not a metaphysical entity but an ethical and legal boundary that we
prescribe for others and ourselves. In defining it we define. . . a province. Within
the bounds of that province other values and activities may or may not thrive in the
lives of different individuals. But privacy is the necessary, limiting condition of much
or all that we value in our intimate lives. It may well be that as an ethical and
philosophical matter, privacy derives rather than creates its own significance. Its
value is then a derivative of the value we attach to the possibility of the conditions
and activities it protects.
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As a value, privacy does not exist in isolation, but is part and parcel of
the system of values that regulates action in society . . . . If privacy
prospers, much else will prosper. If privacy is extinguished, much else
that we care about will be snuffed out. If privacy changes, much else
will change.' 0 1

The intrinsically instrumental nature of confidentiality-type privacy
in general should prompt us toward a similar conception of constitutional informational privacy as an enabler of the exercise of other liberties. The constitutional assurance of informational privacy should be
viewed as "empirically necessary to virtually all of our basic political
rights."' 1 2 We should remain constantly aware that "its loss is a prereq10 3
uisite for a violation of most of [our] other basic rights and freedoms."'
The Fourth Amendment Text and History

The object of the fourth amendment guarantee was and is, if one is
to believe the exact language of the safeguard,1 04 to promote the security
of people "in their persons, houses, papers and effects" by regulating governmental searches and seizures.105 To purport to discover in the Framers' word choice clear evidence that fourth amendment privacy is
inherently instrumental would strain credulity. Nonetheless, the assurance of a "right .

.

. to be secure" should yield the inference, or at least

the suspicion, that the privacy safeguarded was meant to serve a broader
end than secrecy merely for secrecy's sake. In sum, the constitutional
text is hospitable to an instrumental view of privacy, and nothing in the
language undermines that perspective.
Professor Amsterdam has termed history a "standoff" on questions
of fourth amendment meaning and scope, and has observed that we cannot know what the Framers thought about modem practices because
See also C. FRIED, supra note 73, at 138, 140, 147; Freund, supra note 75, at 194-95; Simmel,
supra note 69, at 71. Some of the privacy analysts apparently believe that the entire worth of
privacy lies in its role as growth medium for other values and interests.
101. Simmel, supra note 69, at 71.
102. Parker, supra note 73, at 287.
103. Id. at 288. I concede that Professor Parker does not go so far as to declare that the
fourth amendment is the prime intended guardian of the instrumental privacy that he describes. Although he does characterize the fourth amendment as among those guarantees "peculiarly related to privacy," id., his discussion contains neither the express conclusion nor the
clear implication that the fourth amendment's inherent nature and vital role is as shelter for
other Bill of Rights provisions. In contrast, I expressly maintain that the fourth amendment is
the master and servant of our other political liberties.
104. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(emphasis added).
105. Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3326 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); ICC v.
Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); cf. T.
TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 68 ("[P]ersonal security is the fourth amendment's declared and
prime aim .... ").
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they had no opportunity to confront them or to consider the fundamentally different social conditions of today.10 6 We can only know for certain what the Framers thought of the breaking, entering, and rummaging
that directly affected them. 0 7 It is undeniable that history frequently
proves to be an uncertain, even contradictory, guide to the resolution of
specific fourth amendment issues.'l0 It provides no definitive answers
concerning the constitutional validity of conceiving of privacy as a medium concept. Nevertheless, pertinent and helpful intimations regarding
the nature of fourth amendment privacy are discernible in the historical
record. 0 9
The fourth amendment's earliest judicial ancestor, Entick v. Carrington, 0 proffered the preservation of secrecy in our relationships with
the government as a purpose of protection against searches and seizures.
Lord Camden's condemnation of general warrant authority indicated
more than once that secrecy was the jeopardized desideratum. " '1 In this
country, one of Patrick Henry's most memorable arguments in support
of a Bill of Rights, specifically, a fourth amendment guarantee, warned of
106. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 401.
107. Id. at 398.
108. As one fourth amendment history scholar has understated this case: "[T]he historical
record is not always as clear as we should like it to be. . . ." J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 2, at
19-20. For illustrations of how the unclear historical record is subject to multiple, contradictory interpretations, see the majority and dissenting opinions in the trilogy of cases dealing
with the warrant requirement in felony arrest contexts: Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976).
109. It certainly is neither futile nor unwise to extrapolate from our knowledge of the
Framers' attitudes toward certain historical activities and to hypothesize their probable attitudes toward modem practices. While we cannot "know" what they thought about novel
investigatory conduct, by relying on their purposes we can make rational, educated inferences
concerning what they would have thought. See J. LANDYNSI, supra note 2, at 19-20:
History alone cannot, of course, provide the Supreme Court with clear guidance on
all search and seizure questions up for decision, if only because the historical record
is not always as clear as we should like it to be, and also because some issues raised
under the Fourth Amendment-such as the constitutionality of wire tapping or compulsory blood tests in criminal cases-are of recent origin and could not have been
anticipated by those who drafted the Bill of Rights. However, even concerning those
questions-and they are many and important-to which the words of the Fourth
Amendment do not address themselves with a clarity sufficient to forestall constitutional controversy, history can shed a beam of light to illuminate the underlying
purposes of the amendment and thereby provide some guidance for a selection from
the possible interpretations of the one that would best realize those purposes.
110. 19 Howell's State Trials 1030 (1765).
111. See, eg., id. at 1063 (If the legality of the warrants is upheld "the secret cabinets and
bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to search and inspection .... ");
id. at 1064 (During searches under the warrants at issue the victim's "most valuable secrets are
taken out of his possession."); id. at 1066 ("Papers are the owner's. . . dearest property;...
where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an
aggravation of the trespass.").
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the dangers of invasions of "houses and most secret recesses" by excisemen who would "go into. . . cellars and rooms and search, ransack
and measure everything" eaten, drunk, and worn. 1 2 Undeniably, the

high value placed upon informational secrecy was an influential motivation for the regulation of searches in England and this country.
Conceivably, the respect accorded secrecy might have been engendered wholly by its inherent worth. The Framers might have preserved
secrecy for its intrinsic value, for the solace and nurture that a confidential domain can afford. While neither the Entick quotations nor Patrick
Henry's rhetoric precludes that possibility, other historical facts indicate
that more was known to be at stake.
First, the search and seizure practices that prompted British and
American cries for protection were designed to, and did in fact, suppress
political and religious freedom. Excessively discretionary general warrants and writs of assistance were employed to impede the exercise of
freedoms of speech, press, and religion and made enjoyment of those liberties difficult, if not impossible.1 13 The unfettered power exercised by
virtue of those law enforcement tools led to demands for regulation of
searches and seizures." 14 Framers who were aware that unregulated government access to our affairs provided by those writs and warrants entailed serious costs to freedom could hardly be ignorant of the
proposition that the informational privacy of those affairs was valuable
because of the opportunities it afforded for enjoyment of religious, expressive, and political freedoms.
In addition, some of the earliest comments concerning the desirabil112. N. LASSON, supra note 4, at 92-93. Henry's use of the term "secret" coupled with his
concern with official measurement of personal items suggests that he regarded the loss of informational privacy as one of the reasons for constitutionally curbing government conduct.
113. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 469-70 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("We must bear in mind that historically the search and seizure power was used to suppress
freedom of speech and of the press.") (citation omitted); see also N. LASSON, supra note 4, at
37-50; Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Governmental Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (1979); Stengel, The Background of the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Part One, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 278,
283-98; Comment, Pen Registers, supra note 84, at 760.
In America, abusive search and seizure powers were primarily used to assist enforcement
of colonial trade restrictions and regulations. Writs of assistance employed by customs officers
constituted "continuous license[s] and authority" which "empowered the officer and his deputies and servants to search. . . wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to be and to break
open any receptacle or package ..
" N. LASSON, supra note 4, at 54. Consequently, "[t]he
principal agitation in the colonies in regard to search and seizure. . . did not focus on the use
of the general warrant in proceedings involving political and religious offenses, . . . but instead . . . in proceedings concerning commercial offenses .... ." Stengel, supra, at 293-94;
see also T. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 35. Nevertheless, the Framers undoubtedly were aware of
the British experience and were conscious of the threats to political and religious freedom
posed by unbridled search and seizure power.
114. See N. LASSON, supra note 4, at 55-73.
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ity of reining in power to search and seize suggest a concern broader than
secrecy alone. In Entick v. Carrington,115 Lord Camden stated that legalization of general warrant power "would be subversive to all the comforts of society." 116 James Otis, the patriot-orator whose denunciation of
writs of assistance and general warrants is said to have commenced the
course of events that culminated in the birth of our nation, termed such
devices "most destructive of. . . liberty." 117 Such expressions convey
strong hints that more than mere secrecy is jeopardized by searches and,
consequently, that more is preserved by restricting them.
In sum, neither the fourth amendment text nor the historical record' 18 are unduly strained by an interpretation of fourth amendment informational privacy as more expansive than simply secrecy for its own
sake. The constitutional language and background events accommodate
and furnish bases for crediting an instrumental vision of privacy.
The QuintessentialSearch and the Sacredness of the Home
The Framers of the fourth amendment constitutionally curbed official authority to search with the specific intent to eliminate the abuses

and harms resulting from physical intrusions, most particularly, entries

into the home. 119 From earliest times to today, the home has been accorded a special, almost sacred place in our social and constitutional
scheme.' 20 The unchanged reverence for the home could lead to the inferences that the only privacy intended for constitutional protection is
115. 19 Howell's State Trials 1030 (1765).
116. Id. at 1066.
117. N. LASSON, supra note 4, at 59. Similarly, others had called general search and
seizure powers "badge[s] of slavery," id. at 39, and "rod[s] of iron for the chastisement of the
people," which were "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." Id. at 45.
118. Historically, general warrants and writs of assistance were objectionable mainly because they invested executive authorities with nearly boundless discretion to search and seize
persons, homes, and effects. It is consonant with the history of the fourth amendment to err
on the side of caution in making threshold determinations because the conclusion that any
given "technique" is not a "search" means that it "need not be reasonable and may be employed without a warrant and without probable cause, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its use." United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1669 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In other words, a decision against fourth amendment coverage generates harm
from executive discretion identical to that feared and loathed by the Framers. See supra note
4.
119. U.S. CONST. amend IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .
)
(emphasis added).
120. See N. LAsSON, supra note 4, at 123-24 (I[W]ith regard to the dwelling house, the
traditions of time immemorial still control in holding its privacy to be most inviolable.").
The sanctity of the home, a notion of ancient origin reflected in both "custom and law,
[was] partly .. .a result of the natural desire for privacy, partly an outgrowth, in all
probability, of the emphasis placed by the ancients upon the home as a place of hospitality,
shelter, and protection." Id. at 13. Early on, the home assumed an exalted place in the development of Anglo-Saxon culture. See Stengel, supra note 113, at 280. In England, Lord Chat-

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

that resulting from the provision of this tangible enclave and that the
intended benefits of that privacy are solitude, quiet repose, and secrecy
for secrecy's sake. Such benefits undoubtedly are among the fourth
amendment's objectives, but limiting its goals to those benefits reflects
much too narrow a perspective on the rationales for home privacy.
The home not only provides a domain in which to enjoy solitude
and secrecy, it also furnishes a readily identifiable space within which
people can fearlessly enjoy other entitlements of our free society. Homes,
for example, furnish opportunities for free expression, free religious practice, and "personal autonomy."' 121 Security against physical intrusion
into the home provides both a clearly delineated, necessary realm of confidentiality for its own sake and space for the exercise of other personal
freedoms. 1 22 In the latter respect, home privacy is archetypically instrumental, exemplifying the role of privacy as a medium that makes other
benefits realizable. 123 Home searches threaten a free and open society
ham (William Pitt), in a speech directed at general warrants, eloquently expressed the idea in
these familiar words:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter;
the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.

1 T.

COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

610 n.2 (8th ed. 1927). In the colonies, James

Otis invoked the same theme in his orations against writs of assistance:
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one's
house. A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a
prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate
this privilege.

T.

TAYLOR,

supra note 4, at 37 (quoting from 2

LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS

141-44

(Wroth & Zobel eds. 1965)).
No study of the scope of fourth amendment coverage would be complete without acknowledging that the principle of home sanctity resides securely at the core of the guarantee
and motivates its restraints upon official search and seizure power. See T. COOLEY, supra, at
611; J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 2, at 25; N. LASSON, supra note 4, at 13, 49-50; Bacigal, supra
note 29, at 532 n.20; Stengel, supra note 113, at 280, 288. The sanctity of the home remains
today probably the most unassailable fact of fourth amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court regularly reiterates that theme. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097
(1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S. Ct. 641, 648 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
589 (1980); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 390 (1914). For an eloquent restatement of the notion, see United States v. On Lee,
193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting). The Burger Court's assault on
fourth amendment protections recently, however, led it to compromise home sanctity to some
degree. See Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3404 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the "Court's rhetoric" will result in "erosion of the sanctity of the home").
121. Throughout this Article, "personal autonomy" is used as a shorthand expression for
the privacy rights recognized in such cases as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See infra note 357 & accompanying text.
122. While property interest protection is not the main purpose of the guarantee against
unreasonable searches, regulation of physical breaches of the home does protect the integrity
of our dwellings and of the objects within, as well as our undisturbed possession of them.
123. See supra notes 92-93 & accompanying text.
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not only because they disturb the repose of citizens and deprive them of a
right to pure secrecy, but also because they undermine the corollary assurance of opportunities to enjoy other entitlements. The confidentiality
assured by our homes is valuable not just because it closes actual doors to
the government, but because it opens figurative doors for those who
dwell within.124
Thus, the quintessential governmental search and the sacredness of
the home which stands in opposition to it, rather than circumscribing
our view of the constitutional core, should promote an expanded, instrumental conception of the privacy interest protected by the fourth
amendment.
JudicialIntimations of InstrumentalPrivacy
The opinions of the Supreme Court have apprised us that privacy
interests are at the fourth amendment core, but have taught us little
about the true nature of those interests. 125 The development of fourth
amendment privacy theory in the lower courts has been similarly deficient. The weight of direct judicial authority, therefore, will not support
any conception of the core interest, much less the privacy-as-medium
view. Expressions in early Supreme Court opinions, however, are noteworthy because they are consistent with, and might well suggest, an instrumental conception.
In Boyd v. United States,12 6 the first fourth amendment landmark,
the Court took the position-substantially discredited today-that the
fourth and fifth amendments are so intimately related that they "run almost into each other"' 27 and suggested that the guarantee against unreathe privilege against self-incrimination
sonable searches and seizures and 28
"shed great light on each other."'
Implicit in those observations is the
acknowledgement that Bill of Rights provisions need not and ought not
always be viewed in isolation-that more than one safeguard might combine to produce the constitutional liberties sought by the Framers. Without denying that each guarantee addresses an essentially independent
concern, Boyd recognized the potential for relying on the principles of
one provision to comprehend another fully and accord it its intended
124. Cf. Gerety, supra note 76, at 285 n.190 (security of constitutionally protected areas
makes conduct of "intimacies of life" possible); Hufstedler, supra note 113, at 1520 (zones of
privacy, including the home, "are essential to fill some of our most basic human needs");
Parker, supra note 73, at 286-89 (at time of framing of fourth amendment, home protection
was sufficient to preserve privacy, that is, power or control over person, houses, papers, or
effects).
125. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 386; Weinreb, supra note 89, at 49.
126. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
127. Id. at 630.
128. Id. at 633; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3211 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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reach. 129 An instrumental vision of fourth amendment privacy comports
with and implements that recognition.
Additionally, those Boyd observations portray fourth amendment
regulation as a second line of defense against compulsory self-incrimination. The fourth amendment is seen as an assistant to the fifth amendment in providing shelter against inquisitional methods. 130 Justice
Bradley's opinion thus suggests the specific possibility that the fourth
amendment is concerned with preserving other Bill of Rights values.
That intimation-not wholly undermined by subsequent interpretationl 3furthers the case for an instrumental conception of fourth
amendment privacy.
According to the Court in ICC v. Brimson, 132 "of all the rights of
the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace
and happiness than the right of personal security . . . . Without the
enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half their value."' 133 Later,
in Gouled v. United States,134 the majority described fourth amendment
protection as "indispensable to the 'full enjoyment of personal security,
personal liberty and private property' " and observed that it should "be
regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty . . . . '35 Both
of these opinions express sentiments consonant with an instrumental vision of fourth amendment privacy.
In sum, in Boyd and a few other early opinions, the Court, with
varying degrees of precision, pointed toward a conception of privacy
which recognized its critical importance to, indeed, its close relationship
129. Cf. Note, Alternative Approaches for Resolving Associated First and Fourth Amendment Issues, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 420, 420 (1971) ("Since compartmental approaches have been
applied by courts when confronted with [constitutional] issues, judicial interpretations of the
various guarantees insured in the Bill of Rights have developed more or less independently.
However, these approaches often break down when issues overlap articulated
compartments.").
130. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 456 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Although not the main object of fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, promotion and strengthening of the anti-inquisitorial principles upon which our
system was built were among the historical purposes of that guarantee. See F. STIMSON, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 45-46 (1908).
131. The Supreme Court has found fault with Boyd's perception of the closeness of the
relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 472 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976), but has not precluded the
possibility of some relationship between the two provisions. While indicating that analysis of
the significance of the two provisions should be separate, the Supreme Court has not held that
a complete divorce is necessary. Such a holding would be in serious conflict with the historical
origins of the two amendments. See supra note 130; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657
(1961).
132. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
133. Id. at 479 (quoting In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250 (N.D. Cal. 1887)).
134. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
135. Id. at 304.
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with, the other entitlements that are part and .parcel of our free
136
society.

A Critique of and Proposals for Modification of the Current
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Purview
The leading actor in the current drama of fourth amendment scope
is the "reasonable expectation of privacy," a formula of relatively recent
origin and without textual basis in the Constitution. 13 7 The goal of this
section is analysis of the fidelity of the current reasonable expectations
doctrine to the instrumental conception of privacy explained in the last
section. 38 After examining the suitability and impact of the language
136. When the approach to the delineation of fourth amendment territory was narrowed
by Olmstead, majority expressions consistent with an instrumental perspective disappeared.
Dissenters, however, refused to allow the sense that fourth amendment privacy is an encompassing and instrumental entitlement to be extinguished. In Olmstead itself, Justice Brandeis,
speculating about the perils of future technological innovations, observed:
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the
psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs,
thoughts and emotions. "That places the liberty of every man in the hands of every
petty officer" was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these. To Lord
Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed "subversive of all the comforts of society."
Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?
277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Other voices of protest in later
cases have repeatedly reminded the majority of the true breadth of fourth amendment privacy.
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[G]overnmental access to telephone records on less than probable cause may... impede certain
forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly free
society."); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (proposing
that questions of fourth amendment application "be answered by assessing. . . the likely...
impact on the individual's sense of security" which "is the paramount concern of Fourth
Amendment liberties"); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 457 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect individual liberty in the broadest sense
from governmental intrusion"); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 137 (1942) (Murphy,
J., dissenting) (The "spiritual freedom of the individual depends in no small measure upon the
preservation" of the right to privacy enshrined in the fourth amendment.); see also Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323-24 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Some lower court opinions have reflected similar ideas. See, eg., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J.
338, 347 (1982) ("dangers to political liberty" acknowledged); see also id. at 351 (Pashman, J.,
concurring) (warning of the "danger of political abuse posed by unlimited police access");
People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 143 n.7 (Colo. 1983) ("chilling effect" on associational
rights); cf. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 198-99 (9th Cir.) (Hufstedler, J., concurring
and dissenting) (fourth amendment privacy is "related to the liberty interests which preclude
governmental interference with highly personal decisions and the right to keep personal facts
to oneself.") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978), aftd, 619 F.2d 21 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
138. In evaluating the theoretical appropriateness of the formula and its doctrinal
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chosen to perform the definitional tasks, I will assess the operational details of the accepted doctrine, that is, the factors that have figured prominently in the "reasonable expectation" threshold cases. The discussion
indicates how the current approach has gone astray and wherein its deficiencies lie.
The Language of the Current Formula

The ExpectationalPrerequisite
The Katz Court gave its stamp of approval to a conclusion that has
since become a central principle of fourth amendment law, "that the
principal object of the fourth amendment is the protection of privacy,
rather than property .... ,"139 Katz' further conclusion that the "principal object" must control threshold decisions1' 4 generated a critical need
for identification and refinement of the constituency of fourth amendment privacy. Naked privacy alone would not do. The adoption of the
simple "reasonable expectations of privacy" language commenced the
descriptive task. Beneath the mantle of that deceptively straightforward
benchmark, however, intriguing, unsettling connotations and critical, unanswered questions crept into constitutional law.
One problematic aspect of the formula is the selection of the concept
of "expectations" as a qualification upon the fourth amendment core. 141
It was but a small and natural step from that gloss to the "actual expectation" prong of the two-stage test. The illogic of inquiry into the reasonableness of a nonexistent expectation-that is, the apparent impossibility
of possessing a reasonable expectation of anything without first possessing an expectation of that entity-made introduction of the "actual expectation" element an almost inevitable occurrence. 142
branches, scholars have indicted the formula's hindrance of clear, rational fourth amendment
analysis as well as its potentially adverse impact upon the value and scope of that guarantee's
protection. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 383; Grano, supra note 84, at 429; Kitch, supra
note 29, at 134-35; Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH.
L. REv. 154, 157 (1977); Comment, Pen Registers, supra note 84, at 762.
139. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
140. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
141. It is noteworthy that Justice Stewart never used the words "expectation" or "expect"
in the Katz majority opinion. He stated only that Mr. Katz had "justifiably relied" upon
privacy. 389 U.S. at 353.
142. Reasonable expectations of privacy are inconceivable without actual expectations of
some kind. Those requisite actual expectations, however, did not have to take the form of
subjective expectations of specific claimants or presumed subjective expectations of people in
general. Such expectations could have been conceptualized as those that would be harbored by
the "reasonable person" in a given setting. Although that perspective may be akin to the
"people in general" approach to actual expectation assessment, the latter does not make reference to "reasonable" people. Also, assessment of actual expectations objectively would not be
duplicative of the second Harlan prong, which demands expectations that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable, not expectations that the reasonable person would possess. The
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In accord with Justice Harlan's later repudiation of some implications of his Katz concurrence, 143 courts and commentators have criticized the actual (subjective) expectation component. Purely subjective
expectations have been said to have no proper place in a description of
fourth amendment privacy. 144 According to the critics, individuals
should be capable of neither expanding nor contracting the extent of
fourth amendment coverage. 145 More importantly, that component has
raised concerns about unwarranted and intolerable government control
of the constitutional scope by designed manipulation of what the popu146
lace expects.
Some courts apparently believe that the proper solution to those
problems is objectification of the first step of the Harlan standard. They
would ask not what a specific victim of an alleged search in fact expected,
but what people in general who behave like a given victim has behaved
would expect.' 47 While eliminating fourth amendment idiosyncracies resulting from an aberrant or oblivious individual, that approach will not
extirpate the inherent risk of official tinkering with popular expectations.
More importantly, an objective perspective on the actual expectation criterion fails to address the basic issue of the propriety of imposing
any expectational qualification upon the central fourth amendment interest. Should people have to conduct themselves in manners exhibiting
certain expectations of the public or the government to be entitled to
potential differences among these standards need not be fully explored in light of my conclusion that no expectational component should be involved in fourth amendment analysis. See
infra notes 153-60 & accompanying text.
143. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
144. See, ag., Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 384 ("An actual, subjective expectation of
privacy obviously has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the
Fourth Amendment protects."); Comment, A Taxonomy, supra note 69, at 1462 ("For the
courts. . . to say that privacy will be protected only where people expect such protection is a
circular avoidance of responsibility.").
145. "[An actual expectation of privacy] can neither add to, nor can its absence detract
from, an individual's claim to Fourth Amendment protection." Amsterdam, supra note 1, at
384.
146. See, eg., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The use of a
subjective test as to expectations of privacy has been criticized by some courts and commentators on Orwellian grounds, that is, that it would be possible for the government by edict or by
known systematic practice to condition the expectations of the populace in such a way that no
one would have any real hope of privacy."); Amsterdam, supra note 1,at 384 ("[Ihe government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing
half-hourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive
electronic surveillance."); Note, supra note 138, at 157 ("[T]he government might reduce--or
even make it impossible to have-such expectations simply by announcing prior to initiating
any investigation that it intends to conduct searches.").
147. See supra note 45. The Supreme Court might be among this objectifying group, for
its pronouncements concerning the character of the actual expectation requirement support
both a subjective, "individual claimant" and an objective, "people in general" perspective. See
supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
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fourth amendment shelter? Other fundamental rights do not appear to
be dependent upon the expectations of potential claimants. 148 Considering the implications of its adoption, such an ostensibly novel qualifier
must be theoretically justified. Unfortunately, the judiciary has defaulted
on that task.
The genesis of the expectation element may well be attributed to a
conception of privacy as essentially and exclusively an interest in secrecy
for its own sake. Arguably, insofar as one has any interest in maintaining
secrecy, she will necessarily behave in manners evincing that interest.
According to that reasoning, the inherent nature of secrecy requires, as a
precondition to a meritorious claim, that the interested party not surrender it by revelatory behavior. Rather, secrecy's character necessitates
that a person jealously safeguard or "keep" it. Consequently, insofar as a
person demonstrates no expectation of confidentiality-for example, by
failing to build barriers, by talking openly to others, by travelling in public-she must have little or no interest in preserving secrecy, thus no
privacy interest worthy of fourth amendment protection. In sum, threshold analysis includes an expectational element because it is an intrinsic
characteristic of the core fourth amendment interest.
That reasoning has several logical flaws. Underlying the argument
outlined above lurks the unexpressed assumption that secrecy is an allor-nothing proposition. 149 There is, however, no sound reason for adherence to an absolutist view of secrecy. 150 Even if the privacy interest safe148. In Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), Chief Justice Burger admitted, in discussing the subjective expectation threshold element, that "constitutional rights are generally
not defined by the subjective intent of those asserting the rights." Id. at 3199 n.7. The Chief
Justice, however, did not mean that the absence of subjective expectations cannot defeat constitutional protection, but only that their presence does not necessarily generate such protection. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (reasoning that the exclusionary rule is
essential to ensure that fourth amendment rights "would [not] stand in marked contrast to all
other rights").
149. LaFave, Nine Key Decisions Expand Authority to Search and Seize, 69 A.B.A. J.
1740, 1740 (1983) (The Court "often has taken an exceedingly narrow view of Katz, relying on
the fallacious notion that privacy is an all-or-nothing proposition.
...).
150. In his Smith v. Maryland, dissent, which contains the seeds of some of the central
ideas developed in this Article, Justice Marshall pointedly observed that "[p]rivacy is not a
discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts...
for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other
persons for other purposes." 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Earlier, Justice Douglas had stated:
[The] individual must keep some facts concerning his thoughts within a small zone of
people. At the same time he must be free to pour out his woes or inspirations or
dreams to others. He remains the sole judge as to what must be said and what must
remain unspoken. This is the essence of the idea of privacy implicit in the First and
Fifth Amendments as well as in the Fourth.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 763 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 659 n. 13 (1980) ("A partial invasion of privacy cannot automatically justify a total invasion."); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 164 (1978) (White, J., dissent-
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guarded by the fourth amendment is purely and simply a confidentiality
entitlement, it does not necessarily follow that every instance of open
conduct, or that any behavior that permits or demonstrates a breach of
total secrecy, ought to result in forfeit of the right to claim any privacy
interest. Selective secrecy and partial confidentiality are wholly conceivable and not, despite the superficial allure of the argument to the contrary, internally inconsistent. Not to allow an individual to sacrifice a
portion of her secrecy interest, or to suspend confidentiality vis-a-vis specific individuals and not others, without surrendering all claims to fourth
amendment privacy, makes little sense. 151
Certain conduct, of course, might demonstrate such a lack of inter-

est in confidentiality that the finding of an insufficient basis for a merito-

rious fourth amendment claim would be justifiable. 152 The contention
here is simply that not every instance of openness, not every breach of
ing) (recognizing possibility of "sharing" that results in "privacy [that] is not absolute");
Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 404; cf. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 68, at 218 ("The right to
privacy ceases upon publication of the facts by the individual, or with his consent. . . . [But
a] private communication or circulation for a restricted purpose is not a publication within the
meaning of the law.") (footnote omitted); Note, supra note 138, at 167 ("[T]he expectation of
privacy test. . . certainly is not consistent with differentiating between activities and areas
about which an individual has yielded his expectation and those about which he has not.").
151. One way in which the nondiscriminating, all-or-nothing view of privacy has operated
is through the general proclivity to assess a claimant's expectations vis-a-vis the public at large.
Analysts have maintained that this is not the appropriate inquiry, that attention must be paid
to the differences among one's expectations of different parties. See, e.g., Baciga, supra note
29, at 550; Note, supra note 138, at 166; cf. Simmel, supra note 69, at 72 ("The territory that
we claim as our private sphere varies with the adversary we face. It is quite a different thing,
depending on whether 'society' manifests itself as a government, or community, school, or
employer, neighbor, friend, or spouse."). In addition, if expectations are pertinent to fourth
amendment interests, they must be measured with reference to expectations of the government.
See, eg., Grano, supra note 84, at 432; Comment, Pen Registers, supra note 84, at 757-58; see
also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 164 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (One who shares an area
with a limited number of others, "though his privacy is not absolute, is entitled to expect that
he is sharing it only with those persons and that governmental officials will intrude only with
consent or by complying with the Fourth Amendment."); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d
535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (1973); State v. Stanton, 7 Or. App. 286, 296-97, 490 P.2d
1274, 1279 (1971); see also Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 798 (Alaska 1973).
The merits of an approach that measures actual expectations vis-a-vis the government will
not be analyzed here. From later discussion regarding the flaws in current criteria for judging
the existence of a fourth amendment interest, however, it should be evident that the evaluation
of entitlements to informational privacy by reference to arguable expectations vis-a-vis other
private parties is often seriously inconsistent with the reasons for such a grant of privacy. See,
e.g., infra text accompanying notes 257-59, 336-39.
152. Just as there is no reason to demand total insulation of all information to preserve a
justifiable informational privacy claim against the government, there is no reason to deny that
some voluntary behavior is so nonprotective and self-revelatory that it belies any claim to
secrecy for its own sake. In essence, individuals who choose to behave in those manners "constructively waive" whatever privacy entitlement they might otherwise possess. It may well be
proper, therefore, to deny them the opportunity to revoke their choice at a later date. Such
reasoning is most likely to be valid, however, when the only reason for protecting privacy is the

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[V/ol. 36

secrecy should result in loss of fourth amendment protection through
application of the actual expectation criterion. Unless one takes an absolute view of confidentiality, the critical question is how protective an individual must be, or, in the language of current doctrine, what kind and
degree of expectation a person must exhibit to retain a constitutionally
protected informational privacy interest. In other words, unless one can
preserve an interest in secrecy only by foregoing all openness, the "expectational" issue must be one of degree-that is, how much and what
kind of "nonsecretive" behavior is permissible without forfeit of all
expectations?
The concession that the nature of secrecy for its own sake might
demand some precautionary behavior exhibiting an actual expectation of
privacy is not (and is not meant to seem) tantamount to acknowledgement of the appropriateness of that qualification upon our fourth amendment entitlement. That constitutional concession would follow if fourth
amendment privacy could properly be viewed as a simple secrecy interest. As the earlier examination of the character of fourth amendment
privacy has demonstrated, 153 however, such an interpretation constitutes
a serious and unwarranted underestimation of the worth of constitutional
protection and the function of the fourth amendment. Consequently, the
case for an expectational gloss on the fourth amendment privacy interest
cannot be defensibly grounded in a narrow secrecy conception of the constitutional core. Furthermore, an instrumental vision of fourth amendment privacy 154 not only fails to support the expectational ingredient, but
proves that element to be an unfaithful, even traitorous guide to fourth
amendment scope. The demand for expectation exhibitory behavior as a
precondition to valid privacy claims often undercuts the liberty-enhancing objectives of instrumental informational privacy.
The expectational demand of current doctrine is not always inconsistent with correct fourth amendment analysis. In certain instances, an
individual's conduct might involve revelation of a type or to an extent
that is unnecessary, gratuitous, and easily avoided.1 55 In many contexts,
however, a degree of openness is essential to and integrally connected
with the exercise and enjoyment of constitutional rights. Expressive free"inherent" worth of secrecy. It must not be permitted to undermine proper instrumental
objectives.
153. See supra notes 91-136 & accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 91-136 & accompanying text.
155. In those cases, it would seem permissible to infer that the person has no need, desire,
or concern for the informational privacy furnished by the Constitution. Such truly incautious
behavior could appropriately be counted against a claim of confidentiality from the government. Absent reasons for the behavioral failure to demonstrate expectations of secrecy-type
privacy vis-a-vis the government, a "constructive waiver" finding is logical. Such a conclusion
is consonant with the doctrine of fourth amendment consent. See Bacigal, supra note 29, at
537.

May 1985]

BEYOND SECRECY

dom, associational rights, and interests in "personal autonomy" can
often be fully taken advantage of only by engaging in somewhat revelatory behavior-that is, conduct that makes information about one's affairs more accessible to others, including the government.1 56 An
appropriately broad conception of fourth amendment informational privacy should provide a medium for the enjoyment of those liberties. Yet
current doctrine discovers in the openness involved in the exercise of
those freedoms an absence of privacy expectations that is fatal to fourth
amendment entitlement. In essence, behavioral characteristics that are
part and parcel of the very activities the fourth amendment should be
promoting can nullify the viability of a constitutional claim.
In instances in which arguably revelatory conduct is important to
enjoying other interests and freedoms, doctrine that responds to any
amount of openness with a denial of constitutional protection is perverse
and dissonant with the essential purposes of the fourth amendment.
Neither a particular individual's expectations nor the expectations of
people in general 157 concerning government access to information should
be determinative of constitutional scope in those situations. Rather, decisions regarding fourth amendment entitlement must take into account
the reasons for according informational privacy. Minimizing the risks of
constitutional infidelity requires that the pertinence of "actual expectations" be determined by assessing the degree of, type of, and rationales
for nonsecretive conduct in the light of those reasons.
The expectational gloss in current threshold doctrine could be retained, and its impact could be confined to appropriate situations, if it
was employed with an understanding of the risks it poses to fourth
amendment goals. The perils threatened by continued employment of
the language of expectations, however, coupled with the absence of substantial reasons for retaining it, militate in favor of its abolition. 158 An
156. See infra notes 257-59, 336-38, 357-58 & accompanying text.
157. See supra note 147 & accompanying text.
158. The operation of the actual expectation component is not completely unwarranted in
threshold analysis. See supra note 155 & accompanying text. Nevertheless, the dangers posed
by expectational doctrine call for termination of reliance upon it. First, the language of expectations does not indicate the relevant inquiry. What in fact justifies suspension of constitutional coverage are not the "expectations" of privacy, but the "desires" or "needs" for privacy
indicated by (or, rather, shown to be lacking by) revelatory behavior. Furthermore, expectational doctrine is burdened by a past pattern of reflexive'responses to any revelatory behavior,
with conclusions that no privacy entitlement exists, that is, by an all-or-nothing perspective.

Yet even in situations in which the purest of interests in secrecy are at stake, and certainly in
instances in which additional goals of instrumental informational privacy are implicated, such
airtight isolation and self-preservation should not be demanded. The relevance of behavior
that fails to exhibit privacy expectations properly can be assessed only if the all-or-nothing
perspective on privacy is abandoned and the openness of conduct is critically examined with
the specific goals of privacy and needs of the claimant in full view. For these reasons, it is
preferable to adopt different, more appropriate language for handling situations in which voluntary revelatory behavior is arguably apposite to fourth amendment rights.
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expectational gloss generates the potential for idiosyncratic decisions
based on the beliefs or conduct of individual claimants 59 and risks of
improper governmental control of expectations and constriction of constitutional rights. 160 Moreover, even if those pitfalls are avoided, the
most significant peril remains-the uncritical reaction to any exposing or
revelatory conduct with a rejection of fourth amendment entitlement.
The understandable, though misguided, tendency to conclude that people
who behave in revelatory fashions must have no interest in confidentiality is a natural outgrowth of the search for expectations. Considering the
connotations of the words "expectation of privacy," their association
with an interest in secrecy for its own sake, and the doctrinal roles they
have played, it might well be impossible to purge that unwarranted tendency while continuing to employ the criterion. In sum, no matter what
perspective one takes on the expectation of privacy requirement, the risks
to correct fourth amendment outcomes justify its abolition in favor of
doctrine more compatible with the instrumental ends of the fourth
amendment's privacy guarantee.
The PrescriptiveProcess and the Questionable Language of Reasonableness
Although the actual expectation requirement is theoretically disturbing, its infrequent employment as a ground for denying a protectible
interest has minimized its harmful impact on threshold decisions. The
second stage of the two-prong test, at which nearly all critical decisions
regarding fourth amendment applicability occur, should generate much
16
more serious concern.
The determination required by the second stage involves the courts
in what has most accurately been termed "prescriptive" duties. 62 Justice Harlan's original formulation of the second prong inquiry was not
simply whether an expectation is "reasonable," but whether "society is
prepared to recognize [an expectation] as 'reasonable.' 163 In later treat159. See supra note 145 & accompanying text. Realization of that peril, of course, depends upon a court's reliance upon the subjective frame of mind of a specific individual. The

possibility of such an interpretation cannot be ignored in light of the Supreme Court's allusions
to the validity of that perspective. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979); supra text accompanying notes 39-45. Some lower
courts have so construed the actual expectation element. See, e.g., United States v. Haydel,
649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cassity, 546 F. Supp. 611, 617-18 (E.D.
Mich. 1981).
160. See supra note 146 & accompanying text.
161. See Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3199 n.7 (1984) ("The Court has always
emphasized the second of [Harlan's] two requirements" and "even Justice Harlan stressed the
controlling importance of the second of these two requirements .... ").
162. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("By its terms, the constitutional
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures assigns to the judiciary some prescriptive
responsibility.").
163. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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ment of the subject, he left no doubt that the essential role of the courts is
to prescribe entitlements, not to mirror extant individual perceptions or
societal conditions.164 Other expressions by members of the Court have
betrayed at least the suspicion, if not the awareness, that the Court's
function in this area is the prescription of fourth amendment boundaries,
165
not the endorsement of individual or popular perceptions of its reach.
Whereas judges might be tempted to reflect current societal conditions in
resolving actual expectation questions, once they pass beyond that step
their task is to discern and impose norms, to determine what expectations are constitutionally
shielded and thus what entitlements the fourth
16 6
amendment grants.
164. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), after reviewing the "risk analysis
approach" and the "expectations approach," and acknowledging that they "represent an advance over the unsophisticated trespass analysis of the common law," Justice Harlan cautioned
that even these approaches "have their limitations" and must "transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attributions of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks
we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values
of the past and present." Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
165. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 166, 168 n.21 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); supra
note 162 & accompanying text. In Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5, a majority of the Court acknowledged that the determination of "whether a 'legitimate expectation of privacy'" exists
must sometimes be "normative." Granted, Justice Blackmun's opinion does not amount to a
concession that the Katz inquiry is always, or even ordinarily, essentially "normative."
Rather, the reference to setting norms appears in a footnote cautioning against reliance upon
."subjective expectations" and describing a proper inquiry in the presumably rare case in which
"subjective expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms .... " Id. Still, the Smith "caution" is significant because its reference to "well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms" that would, if challenged by "alien
influences," be preserved by "a normative inquiry," and implies a definable constitutional entitlement not subject to elimination or contraction by individuals or societal majorities.
Unfortunately, the Smith Court's discussion is unsatisfying in several respects. The general circumstances that should trigger a normative inquiry are not evident. Though the Court
provides a couple of exemplary situations, it gives no indication of what quality or attribute
renders an influence "alien" to the fourth amendment. Additionally, the features of the normative inquiry that would be proper in special situations are not apparent. Although the majority might have envisioned the possibility of disregarding both prongs of the Harlan test, its
discussion focuses upon only the potential inaptness of the actual expectation prong. Consequently, the Court left open the possibility that a special, normative decision might incorporate
the reasonable expectation prong of current doctrine without modification. The most curious,
unexplained (possibly because it is inexplicable), and flawed aspect of the Smith discussion,
however, is the implication that threshold inquiry does not ordinarily involve the judiciary in
the ascertainment and prescription of fourth amendment privacy norms. That suggestion ignores the fact that the second stage of Harlan's Katz test, the stage at which virtually all
critical decisions have occurred, is inherently prescriptive and requires the Court to make normative judgments. The Smith majority opinion seems to assume that only the rare, extreme
threshold case demands a normative judgment. The antithesis should be true, however. Normative judgments should be the rule, and judgments grounded in subjective perceptions (Le.,
the "constructive waiver" cases) should be the exception. The Court cannot avoid the prescriptive nature of its constitutional threshold task by denial.
166. Scholars have acknowledged the essentially prescriptive character of the judiciary's
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Recognition of the real nature of judicial responsibility raises additional questions about the language of the current formula. Although I
have invariably used the word "reasonable" in the "reasonable expectations of privacy" formula, both "legitimate" and "justifiable" are judi1 67
cially endorsed adjectives for qualifying privacy expectations.
Nevertheless, perhaps because it was the word initially chosen by Justice
Harlan and because the Court originally borrowed it and continues to
use it today,1 68 the term "reasonable" has had substantial impact upon
the threshold processes.1 69 At the risk of indictment for semantic quibbling, I would suggest that its use generates considerable danger of imconstitutional task. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 384; Bacigal, supra note 29, at 536;
Note, supra note 138, at 155-56; Comment, A Taxonomy, supra note 69, at 1462.
167. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
168. The linguistic evolution of the description of the core interest and the second stage of
the Harlan test is interesting. Initially, the Court adopted the term "reasonable." See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). That adjective continued to operate exclusively until "justifiable"
surfaced in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). "Legitimate" debuted and dominated the majority analysis in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142-48 (1978). Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Smith specifically endorsed all three alternatives as descriptive of
the central concern, but referred to the second step of the Harlan test as an inquiry into society's preparedness to recognize privacy expectations as "reasonable." 442 U.S. at 740.
Since Smith, both "legitimate" and "reasonable" have been employed interchangeably in
majority and dissenting threshold and "standing" opinions. It seems that "legitimate" has
become the preferred option in recent majority discussions. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1657 (1984); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3323 (1983); United
States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285
(1983). Nevertheless, "reasonable" appears as an acceptable surrogate in majority discussions,
see, e.g., United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3302 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct.
3194, 3200 (1984); Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1656; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283, surfaces in dissents
and concurrences, see, e.g., Andreas, 103 S. Ct. at 3326 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Knotts, 460
U.S. at 285 (Brennan, J., concurring), and has even returned to center stage in one of the most
recent majority treatments, see Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1740 (1984). In the
last week of the 1983-1984 term, the Court issued two threshold opinions. In both United
States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) and Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), all three
alternatives-reasonable, legitimate, and even the less-favored "justifiable"-appeared.
169. A review of recent lower court cases revealed "reasonable" to be the most frequently
used of the three alternatives. See, e.g., United States v. Bonfiglio, 713 F.2d 932, 937 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1373 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2397 (1984); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 397
(1983); United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1438 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3296
(1984); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296, 299 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984); United
States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 855 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698,
700 (7th Cir. 1982). "Legitimate" appeared in fewer recent opinions. See, e.g., Kramer, 711
F.2d at 793; Karo, 710 F.2d at 1438; United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 32 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 94 (1983); United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 852 (1lth Cir. 1982); United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d
912, 916 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 238 (1982). "Justifiable" seldom surfaced. See
State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. 1982).
"Reasonable" probably has had the most influence in Supreme Court analysis. Despite
the apparent current Supreme Court "preference" for "legitimate," see supra note 168, the
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proper analysis and that the alternative term "legitimate" is more
appropriate.
First, "reasonable" is a useful, but much overused term in legal parlance. 170 It already bears cumbersome fourth amendment baggage due to
its presence within that provision's very language and its consequent central role as the benchmark for determining the constitutionality of government conduct that amounts to a search or seizure. When employed in
that respect, it refers to the constitutional mandate that the government
demonstrate adequate justification for the infringement of protected interests. 17 1 Although no one contends that the significance of the word at
"reasonable expectation of privacy" formula is the best-known shorthand designation for the
core fourth amendment interest and for the objective of the second Harlan step.
170. The word "reasonable" is undoubtedly one of the law's favorite adjectives. It enjoys
varied uses in different fourth amendment contexts. Not only do "reasonable expectations of
privacy" trigger fourth amendment protection, but an officer's "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity can justify a brief, investigatory stop, see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979),
and the amendment only prohibits those searches that are "unreasonable." United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950).
A police officer may use "reasonable force" to apprehend an arrestee, State v. Lingle, 209
Neb. 492, 500, 308 N.W.2d 531, 537 (1981), assuming that the officer has "reasonable
grounds" to make the arrest. State v. Davis, 620 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Mont. 1980). In the ensuing criminal prosecution, the state must establish the defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable
doubt." See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
In any civil or criminal action, the trier of fact may draw "reasonable inferences" from
the testimony and evidence presented. Mele v. All State Ins. Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1338, 1341
(E.D. Pa. 1978). In quantum meruit actions, the plaintiff may recover the "reasonable value of
the services rendered." Cavic v. Missouri Research Labs, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Mo. 1967). In
an action for lost profits due to breach of a contract, damages must be established to a "reasonable certainty." Della Ratta Inc. v. American Better Community Developers, Inc., 38 Md.
App. 119, 143, 380 A.2d 627, 641 (1977). Of course, the "reasonable person" and the "standard of reasonable care" are familiar tort law concepts. See J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW
§ 3.05 (1982).
Even the phrase "reasonable expectations" is employed in other than fourth amendment
contexts. See, eg., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 721 (8th Cir. 1981) (ambiguities in insurance policy to be resolved "in accordance with the reasonable expectations" of
insured); Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L. Field and Co., 516 F.2d 952, 955 (5th Cir.
1975) (reasonable expectancy of a prospective contract is a protectible property right); Stark v.
Chock Full O'Nuts, 77 Misc. 2d 553, 554, 356 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (1974) (under reasonable
expectations doctrine, breach of the implied warranty of fitness is shown if "the natural substance was not to be reasonably anticipated to be in the food, as served").
In sum, one can reasonably expect to encounter the word "reasonable" frequently when
engaged in legal endeavors, and to discover an unreasonable variety of meanings and
connotations.
171. In light of the extant, though exception-riddled, rule that "warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable," United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982), the word "reasonable"
also refers to the preferred "procedural" course of judicial review of law enforcement assessments of cause prior to searches. That ostensibly "procedural" reasonableness hurdle is intended to guarantee "substantive" reasonableness at a time when meaningful privacy
protection for prospective victims is still possible. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948).
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the threshold stage should be the same, connotations of the former usage
can slip into the latter context in which they have little, if any,
relevance. 172
The widespread employment of the word in other legal domains-in
which it often calls for decisions that are more factual than legal (one
might say more "reflective" than "prescriptive") 173-engenders risks of
importing inappropriate criteria from those domains into threshold analysis.174 The "reasonable person" tort law standard, for example, has surfaced in some cases concerned with fourth amendment scope. 1 75 That

standard signifies a reflection of what the average, rational person thinks
or believes and, therefore, could undermine proper performance of the
172. Considerations relevant to reasonable search determinations, but not to threshold
matters, have entered into reasonable expectation analysis under the guise of the "governmental interest" factor. Although law enforcement interests are appropriately put in the balance
when assessing the reasonableness of searches, they do not belong in threshold analysis. See
infra text accompanying notes 200-04. When they enter into the definitional stage they exert
more influence than is proper. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984);
United States v. DeBacker, 453 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
Justice O'Connor demonstrated the potential for confusing the two fourth amendment
roles of reasonable-that is, "reasonable searches" versus "reasonable expectations"-in Hudson, 104 S. Ct. 3194. Claiming to concur with the majority holding that the fourth amendment
does not cover prison cell inspections, she first appropriately reasoned that the "fact of arrest
and incarceration abates all legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy and possessory interests in
personal effects," before mistakenly concluding that "therefore all searches and seizures of the
contents of an inmate's cell are reasonable." 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens pointedly commented that he was "not entirely sure whether [Justice
O'Connor] believes that an inmate can be harassed consistently with the Fourth Amendment
. . . because 'incarceration abates all legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy and possessory
interests in personal effects,' . . . or because 'all searches and seizures of the contents of an
inmate's cell are reasonable'...." Id. at 3209 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The two are distinct issues and should be kept analytically separate.
173. Cf. United States v. Vicknair, 610 F.2d 372, 380 (5th Cir.) ("What is a reasonable
expectation of privacy is by definition related to time, place and circumstance."), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 823 (1980); State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214, 220, 447 A.2d 1284, 1287 (1982) ("The
protection of constitutional rights and effective law enforcement will be better aided by a simpler, less fact-specific test.").
174. For an explanation of the term "threshold" as used in this Article, see supra note 3.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 32 (1st Cir.) (The defendant "should
have expected" the government's activity.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2431 (1983); United States
v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[N]o reasonable man could expect to remain free
"); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir.
from governmental intrusion ....
1980) ("[A]ny reasonable person . . . could expect" the government conduct.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 833 (1981); United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir.) (Trash cans "could
not reasonably be expected by defendants to be secure."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841, (1978);
United States v. Choate, 422 F.Supp. 261, 270 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (A "reasonable person's expectation of privacy with regard to return addresses on mail is a somewhat limited one."), rev'd,
576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978), aff'd, 619 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980).
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constitutional prescriptive assignment. 176 Reliance upon the conduct or
beliefs of the reasonable person in fixing the fourth amendment entitlement is more than questionable, for the ultimate issue is what enduring
benefits the Constitution grants, not what individuals or the public in
general believe, expect, or even desire it to grant. 177 Such a focus also
runs the risk of assigning prescriptive responsibilities to society at large,
thereby injecting an unwarranted majoritarian element into threshold

analysis. 178
Additionally, the term "reasonable," due at least in part to its innate
79
flexibility and variant meanings, virtually invites ipse dixit resolutions.
176. See Bacigal, supra note 29, at 535 ("The reasonable man standard is ... troublesome
in this context ....
).
177. See supra notes 164-66 & accompanying text. It is arguable that Justice Harlan's
specific standard, Le., "society's preparation to recognize given expectations as reasonable,"
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), avoids some of the fallout from reliance on the
single word "reasonable." Harlan's embellishment is not an adequate amelioration, however,
for it fails to eliminate all of the dangerous connotations inherent in the word "reasonable"
and spawns new perils of its own. First, while his phraseology may not mandate, it does
permit consultation of and influence by the "reasonable person." Furthermore, the language
suggests that the public in general (and possibly the "reasonable public") is responsible for
defining fourth amendment interests. Fourth amendment blessings ought to rest on more stable ground than the beliefs of the reasonable person or the preparedness of society at any given
time.
178. The Bill of Rights is counter-majoritarian, pro-minoritarian in nature. See Hudson v.
Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3216 n.33 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); N. LAssON, supra note 4, at 78 n.91 (quoting James Madison); J. STORY, supra note 1, at
659; Gerety, supra note 76, at 277 n.160. Reliance upon either the reasonable person or the
reasonable society in defining fourth amendment rights runs contrary to the purpose and character of that provision and risks contraction of those rights by the restrictive whim and oppression of the greater numbers. In defining fourth amendment entitlement, the question is not
what the reasonable person believes, what "society is prepared to recognize," what "society
would insist" upon, Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201, what "millions of citizens may well believe,"
id. at 3214 n.28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), what "society is willing
to invest with privacy interests," United States v. Trickey, 711 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Keith, J., dissenting), what "society will accept" or "society can accept," United States v.
Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 372 (6th Cir. 1982) (Keith, J., dissenting), affid, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984),
or what "society is prepared. . . to give deference to," United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d
131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980). Both the reasonable person standard and Justice Harlan's formulation, in any form, are unsuitable and replete with danger to the vitality of constitutional
blessings.
179. Recognition of that potential impact of the word in the "reasonable search" context
prompted Justice Frankfurter's famous caution in United States v. Rabinowitz:
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of reason. It is
no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the police to say that an
"unreasonable search" is forbidden-that the search must be reasonable. . . . It is
for this Court to lay down criteria that the district judges can apply. It is no criterion
of reason to say that the district court must find it reasonable.
339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
764-65 (1969).
The Supreme Court's approach to the "reasonableness" of privacy expectations is vulnerable to similar criticism, for it lacks appropriate "criteria of reason." In Rakas v. Illinois, 439
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The open-ended character of the word, and the potential for standardless
discretion which it generates, might well be responsible for the inordinately conclusional decisions abounding in the threshold area.
Because of these serious problems, and because it does not clearly
refer to the judicial responsibility to prescribe the ambit of guaranteed
informational privacy based on the instrumental objectives of the fourth
amendment, use of the term "reasonable" should be discontinued. The
recognized alternative "legitimate" should assume the central role in the
prescriptive process. 1 °
In sum, both the quest for "expectations" and the demand of "reasonableness" in fourth amendment threshold determinations engender
serious risks of inappropriate analyses and incorrect discernment of informational privacy entitlements. Even more problematic and disconcerting than those conceptual flaws, however, are the operational criteria
that regularly have been used to decide whether expectations are
reasonable.
The Operation of the Prescriptive Process: The Unsuitability of Recurrent
Factors in Current Doctrine
Despite the semantic flaws in the formulation of the general threshold standards, it is conceivable that the courts have developed functional
criteria consonant with the instrumental objectives of the fourth amendment. 18 1 The aim of the following discussion is to determine whether the
recurrent factors in threshold cases and the results they yield are consistent with a proper conception of fourth amendment privacy.
Exposure, Precautions,and Disclosure

Three related ingredients that often have entered into reasonableU.S. 128 (1978), Justice White challenged the majority's resolution of the question of "standing" to raise a fourth amendment claim as reflective of "tautological" decisionmaking by
"unadorned fiat." Id. at 165 (White, J., dissenting). Although his characterization of the
majority reasoning is accurate, Justice White apparently failed to recognize the typicality of
such conclusory disposition of "reasonable" or "legitimate" expectation issues in standing and
threshold cases. The recurrent factors relied upon in judicial resolution of such issues can find
no principled defense when analyzed in terms of the privacy protection goals of the fourth
amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 181-205. They merely conceal ad hoc dispositions grounded in particular jurists' senses of "reasonableness." See Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.
Ct. 3194, 3212 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Court's
... perception of what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable ... merely reflects the
perception of the four Justices who have joined the opinion that THE CHIEF JUSTICE has
authored.").
180. For a discussion of the proposed alternative language, see infra text accompanying
notes 210-16.
181. For a discussion of the various instrumental objectives of the fourth amendment, see
supra text accompanying notes 91-93; infra notes 222-28 & accompanying text.
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ness calculations-the public exposure or accessibility, 18 2 ability to take
precautions,1 83 and voluntary disclosure to third party1 84 factors-appear to be logically rooted in the misleading expectational facet of current doctrine. 185 The logic underlying reliance upon each of these three
factors seems to be the same: Those who truly expect privacy conduct
their affairs in a manner indicative of such expectations, that is, they take
upon themselves responsibility for excluding others and do not divulge
their affairs to others who are unquestionably free to reveal the information.1 8 6 Such logical roots prove those three ostensible determinants of
the reasonableness of expectations to be extremely close relatives of the
actual expectation component. Consequently, they insinuate many of
that doctrinal component's analytical deficiencies into the operative pre1 87
scriptive process.
First, although in some cases the public nature of behavior or the
failure to protect against exposure or disclosure might properly diminish
or even extinguish the validity of an informational privacy claim,18 8 the
tendency of the courts has been to react somewhat reflexively to a showing of one of those elements by suspending constitutional coverage.18 9
Ordinarily, the judiciary has neglected to recognize that there can be de182. See supra notes 46-50 & accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 51-53 & accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 54-55 & accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of the error of including such an ingredient in fourth amendment
doctrine and analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 141-60.
186. The "assumption of risk" terminology, which is found in the cases relying upon voluntary disclosure to third parties, clearly evinces the logic implicit in reliance upon the three
factors discussed here. Individuals who expose their behavior, who neglect self-protective precautions, and who disclose matters to others are entitled to no informational privacy because
they have put their confidentiality at risk. See Note, supra note 138, at 168. That reasoning is
not flawed because the risk assumption is involuntary or coerced in a traditional sense, but,
rather, because it fails to acknowledge that what is construed as "risk assumption" often is
necessary to take advantage of fundamental entitlements. See infra notes 257-59, 334-38 &
accompanying text.
187. Responsibility for the genesis of the factors under discussion can be placed squarely
on the shoulders of the majority and concurring opinions in Katz. Justice Stewart's famous
statement that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection," 389 U.S. at 351, and Justice Harlan's
concurring view that "objects, activities, or statements that [one] exposes to the 'plain view' of
outsiders are not 'protected,'" id. at 361, provide impressive parentage for the ingredients at
issue. Justice Stewart probably did not intend endorsement of the reflexive "exposure equals
privacy loss" routine adopted by courts since Katz. Following the statement quoted above, he
added that "what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." Id at 351-52.
188. See supra notes 152, 155 & accompanying text.
189. See, eg., United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 792 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 397 (1983); United States v. Thorrley, 707 F.2d 622, 624-25 (1st Cir. 1983); United States
v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979); Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 274, 265
S.E.2d 88, 91 (1980).
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grees of informational privacy, that it "is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all."' 190 In addition, exposure to "the public"
or a "trusted acquaintance" frequently has resulted in the lack of a constitutionally cognizable privacy interest vis-a-vis the government. Judges
seldom have acknowledged the possibility of differences in the "reasonableness" of one's expectations of different parties. 19 1 As a result, the
three criteria have assumed unwarranted relevance and influence.
Even if a pure secrecy conception of fourth amendment privacy was
correct, the impact of the public exposure, lack of precautions, and voluntary exposure criteria on threshold analysis would be diminished by
the acknowledgement that secrecy is not an all-or-nothing proposition
and the conscientious distinction between the general public and government agents in assessing privacy claims. Recognition of the instrumental
nature of fourth amendment informational privacy, however, constricts
even more severely the appropriate sphere of influence of these three factors. Reliance upon the precautions, exposure, or disclosure factors often
proves wholly inappropriate, even contradictory to the objects of an informational privacy guarantee, which promises secrecy not only for its
own sake, but because it enables the free exercise and full enjoyment of
other entitlements.
According to the instrumental view of fourth amendment informational privacy, much of that interest's function is as a foundation and
1 92
means for adequate enjoyment of other constitutional entitlements.
People have insufficient opportunities to realize the benefits of other
guarantees unless they are assured that the government is restricted in its
quests for information. Various entitlements need informational privacy
as a necessary growth medium. Additionally, by their very nature many
of those freedoms cannot be exercised fully without conduct that involves
some degree of exposure or publicity. Too much exclusionary or precautionary conduct often could stifle or preclude enjoyment of guaranteed
liberties. 93 Freedom of speech, for example, would be virtually worth190. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191. See supra notes 151 & accompanying text.
On one occasion a majority of the Supreme Court did recognize that expectations of the
government and expectations of private parties can be different and that the difference could
affect the resolution of a fourth amendment issue. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
305, 312, 315 (1978) (The Court made the distinction in a case concerned with the propriety of
warrantless OSHA inspections: "The owner of a business has not, by the necessary utilization
of employees in his operation, thrown open the areas where the employees alone are submitted
to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents."); see also Grano, supra note 84, at 431
("Barlow's indicates that the relevant question is the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy vis-a-vis the government.").
192. See supra notes 91-93 & accompanying text.
193. By consistent reference to "guaranteed liberties" I do not intend to exclude the possibility that the instrumental ends of fourth amendment privacy extend beyond other specific
constitutional entitlements. Other interests-for example, those grounded in statutes or the
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less without the opportunity to disclose a certain amount to others.
Thus, the ability to take adequate advantage of many liberties granted by
our free society depends on both the opportunity to behave with some
degree of openness, without the strictest of protective precautions, and
the assurance that confidentiality vis-a-vis the government will be
preserved.
The effect of the current doctrine's unexamined, automatic reliance
upon the three criteria at issue is to preclude coexistence of those prerequisites for full and free enjoyment. If an individual exposes or makes
"public" his conduct in exercising his rights, he ordinarily loses the ability to claim fourth amendment privacy protection. Without that shelter,
the freedom to exercise and enjoy those rights is severely diminished. On

the other hand, if, to ensure retention of the capacity to claim fourth
amendment privacy, a person jealously guards against exposure or publicity and takes the precautions doctrinally demanded, the result is a selfimposed constriction of freedom. 194 It is ironic, indeed, that the inherent
attributes of the exercise of the very rights which the fourth amendment
should promote undermine the ability to claim that guarantee's protection and, consequently, the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of those
rights. The bind is more than ironic; it amounts to a constitutionally
95
impermissible Catch-22.1
common law-might well serve as reasons for preserving and guaranteeing protection against
unjustified governmental breaches of informational privacy. In federal and particularly in
state constitutional adjudication, courts might discover nonconstitutional sources of legitimate
reasons for confidentiality vis-a-vis the government. See infra notes 227-28 & accompanying
text. In this Article, I suggest that other constitutionally rooted interests provide a minimum
content for an appropriately conceived instrumental informational privacy, and leave the door
open to further sources of such content.
194. The self-imposed constriction of freedom, although not "coerced" in a fifth amendment sense, is anything but voluntary. It results from the inhibitory pressure generated by the
prospect of unregulated governmental awareness. The situation is analogous to that the fourth
amendment claimant faced prior to Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). To gain
standing to raise a fourth amendment suppression claim, an individual had been required to
give information which could seal her fate on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. To
protect against that consequence, she had to forego a fourth amendment claim, no matter how
valid. The Simmons Court perceived that dilemma to be constitutionally intolerable. Id. at
394. The choice facing privacy claimants in threshold situations should likewise be considered
impermissible.
195. Cf T. COOLEY, supra note 120, at 375-76 n.2. Cooley discusses a case in which a
Maine court "decided that a telegraph operator could be compelled to disclose the contents of
a message sent by him for another party." He observed that
the case is treated as if no other considerations were involved than those which arise
in the ordinary case of a voluntary disclosure by one private person to another, without necessity. Such, however, is not the nature of the communication made to the
operator of the telegraph. That instrument is used as a means of correspondence,
and as a valuable, and in many cases an indispensable, substitute for the postal facilities; and the communication is made, not because the party desires to put the operator in possession of facts, but because transmission without it is impossible. It is not
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In evaluating the significance of the three criteria, it is imperative to
ascertain the liberties involved in a given individual's exposed or unguarded behavior, the necessity for such behavior in the exercise of those
liberties, and the effect upon those liberties of relying upon that behavior
to deny claims to informational privacy. Reflexive reference to those suspect factors frequently has produced erroneous fourth amendment judgments. Under an appropriately expanded view of fourth amendment
informational privacy, their relevance to threshold determinations be196
comes extremely limited, at best.

Property Rights and Intrusions
Although the property rights and the degree of "intrusion" criteria
would seem to originate in the Olmstead doctrine of the pre-Katz era,
courts frequently find them pertinent to privacy entitlements in the postKatz era. 197 Property notions and "intrusions" may well be pertinent
and useful elements in evaluating fourth amendment privacy claims. The
automatic invocation of those criteria across the board, however, is extremely questionable after Katz and is rendered all the more suspect by
an instrumental conception of constitutional informational privacy.
First, Katz directly repudiated the controlling function of property
and intrusion notions and established privacy as the ultimate determinant.1 98 Nonetheless, later cases reveal so strong a continuing attachvoluntary in any other sense than this, that the party makes it rather than deprive
himself of the benefits of this great invention and improvement.

Id.
196. Exposure, accessibility, and neglect of precautions vis-a-vis the government are matters of degree. To the extent that they are "gratuitous" because they neither are necessary to
nor promoting of the enjoyment and exercise of other rights and interests, it would not seem
improper to count them against a claim of informational privacy. One who truly needs and
wishes to have secrecy from the government probably does not expose information to government officials, but takes care to safeguard confidentiality. A constructive waiver of privacy
rights might well be found in cases of gratuitous exposure or knowing disclosure to the government. See supra notes 152, 155 & accompanying text. In sum, in an appropriate doctrinal
scheme, a narrow operating space for the currently active criteria would remain.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Trickey, 711 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1277 (1984); United
States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Torres, 705 F.2d
1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Nadler, 698 F.2d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 1983); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Cecil Mills), 686 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1020 (1982);
United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 964 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Weir, 657 F.2d
1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154-55 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1981); United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 256, 258 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1316 n.2 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); United States v. McGrath, 613 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980).
198. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53; see Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 383 ("The problem with
the word lies in its subtle suggestion that a particular kind or sort of government activity,
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ment to those formerly dispositive factors that Olmstead's prerequisite of
a physically invasive trespass has retained an inordinate effect upon,
sometimes dictating, constitutional scope in the post-Katz era. If the animating spirit ofKatz is to be respected, courts must be much less inclined
to permit "property" ingredients to determine outcomes.
Furthermore, the relevance of these factors in the prescriptive process must be evaluated from an instrumental perspective. Because ensuring full and free enjoyment of property rights is a valid, cognizable
objective of instrumental informational privacy, it follows that the extent
of a claimant's property interests and the intrusiveness of government
conduct upon those interests can be relevant criteria. The preservation
of such rights, however, is not the only reason for the constitutional privacy grant. In contexts involving other legitimate objectives, the mere
absence of a valid property interest or a tangible official intrusion should
not be determinative. 199 Associational, speech, and travel rights, for example, can be impaired by wholly nonintrusive conduct, and the free exercise of those rights ought not be made dependent upon property rights.
In sum, it is more consistent with Katz' revolution to view property
rights and intrusions as two among many factors in the threshold analysis and to accord them substantial weight only when instrumental objectives other than enjoyment of property rights are not involved. Although
these factors should not be dismissed as wholly inapposite, their function
in the prescriptive inquiry must be kept within proper bounds and justified by reference to the purposes of fourth amendment privacy
protection.
Law Enforcement Interests
Finally, the relatively infrequently used, but ever-available, governmental interests criterion is, to be direct, not relevant in threshold assessments of legitimate privacy needs. 2 00 While the reasonableness of a
search-the violation of a protected privacy interest-should be calculated by balancing in governmental needs, 20o the prior process of determining whether a search has occurred-that is, whether a protected
privacy interest has been violated-should not hinge upon official need to
jeopardize that interest. 20 2 In other words, the degree of fourth amendlabeled an 'intrusion,' is necessary to trigger the fourth amendment. But this, in my view, was
precisely the approach to fourth amendment coverage that Katz decisively rejected.") (footnote
omitted).
199. Situations in which property interests and intrusions can be relevant and situations in
which their impact should be subordinated to other privacy objectives are discussed infra notes
260-63, 300-02, 351-58 & accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 62-65 & accompanying text.
201. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); see also supra notes 171-72 & accompanying
text.
202. There is some scholarly support for the contrary position. See Bacigal, supra note 29,
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ment protection accorded a cognizable interest may well depend upon
the magnitude and urgency of law enforcement interests, but determinations of the existence (or the extent) of an individual's privacy entitle'2 03
ment should not be affected by the countervailing "public need.
Those determinations should rest entirely upon the character of fourth
amendment privacy and the reasons that people need it in a given setting.
The Framers were aware of governmental needs and credited them by
means of the "unreasonableness" and "probable cause" standards. To
factor them into the threshold-definitional stage muddles analysis and
2°4
can also amount to unfair double-counting.
at 535, 539-40. I find, however, no persuasive reason to factor official needs into the process of
ascertaining the presence of a cognizable fourth amendment interest. In determining the nature and substance of our constitutional protection, it is important to be aware not only of the
potential law enforcement costs, but also of perils to individual freedom. If one side of the
balance is permitted to cancel the other before it enters the weighing process, our perception of
the matters at stake will inevitably be distorted and the outcomes of cases will be adversely
affected. Furthermore, if the existence and weight of the governmental interests in depriving
the citizenry of constitutional interests is not determined by reference to the character and
weight of the individual interests involved, it is difficult to understand why the existence or
extent of individual interests should hinge upon the nature and extent of the governmental
interests at stake.
203. Determinations of whether government search activities are reasonable may necessitate a balancing of governmental and individual interests. See supra text accompanying note
201. Accurate balancing demands a fair evaluation of the character and worth of the privacy
interests jeopardized. Such evaluation requires recognition of the instrumental goals of fourth
amendment privacy. The doctrinal alternatives and the approach proffered in this Article,
therefore, will be useful beyond the threshold stage.
204. Governmental needs have come to play a prominent part in fourth amendment exclusionary rule decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984); United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); see also Nix v. Williams,
104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (endorsing an "inevitable discovery" exception for sixth amendment
determinations that inevitably will be extended to fourth amendment cases). Consequently,
the consideration of those interests at the threshold stage raises the possibility of "triple-counting." Law enforcement interests would enter fourth amendment analysis first when deciding
whether the Constitution operates, then when determining how much and what kind of protection it affords, and finally when investigating whether a "remedy" for breaches of that protection should follow.
The temptation to surrender liberty to the demands of criminal law enforcement clearly is
nothing new. Patrick Henry defended the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in our Constitution
because he recognized that without one the authorities "will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort
confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity .... " N. LASSON,
supra note 4, at 93. The Framers recognized the necessary costs to law enforcement efficacy,
but enacted the fourth amendment because "it is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his desks broken
open, his private books, letters and papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions of ignorant and suspicious persons .... " T. COOLEY, supra note 120, at 375.
[W]hat the Framers understood [in 1791] remains true today-that the task of combatting crime and convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such critical and
pressing concern that we may be lured by the temptations of expediency into forsak-
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Two "themes" have emerged from critical analysis of the reasonable
expectation of privacy doctrine and its operational principles and ingredients. First, the basic language has seriously misleading aspects and
perilous flaws. Second, the elements that courts have used in performing
their prescriptive duties-several of which seem to originate in the objec-

tionable terminology of the formula-have not been justified by or reconciled with the ultimate aims and character of the constitutional

guarantee. 20 5 When illuminated by an instrumental vision of fourth
amendment privacy, those factors appear in some instances to be impertinent and in others to be counterproductive. Describing how and why the
courts have strayed from a course faithful to the Constitution has been
relatively easy. It is much more difficult to propose a replacement approach for discerning fourth amendment boundaries.

Fulfilling the Promise of Katz: A Reformed Doctrinal and
Analytical Approach to Delineation of Fourth
Amendment Territory
In the preceding sections this Article has documented the evolution
of Supreme Court doctrine concerning fourth amendment scope, depicted the doctrinal development that followed the Katz shift, 20 6 described the instrumental nature of fourth amendment privacy,20 7 and
evaluated the language and functioning of current doctrine and analysis.
The tools used for fixing constitutional boundaries were shown to be misleading and inadequate, and the results reached under current standards
proved inconsistent with the instrumental objectives of fourth amendment privacy. 20 8 In this final section I suggest a more appropriate manner of approaching fourth amendment purview issues. What is proposed
is neither a completely refined theory with a finalized, comprehensive
ing our commitment to protecting individual liberty and privacy. It was for that very
reason that the Framers of the Bill of Rights insisted that law enforcement efforts be
permanently and unambiguously restricted in order to preserve personal freedoms.
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3431 (1984) (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
The costs to liberty of succumbing to the omnipresent temptations of government needs
should make us cautious and watchful against according that element too many roles in fourth
amendment doctrine. Cf Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected
Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. RFV. 945, 982-83 (1977) (suggesting that balancing tends to discourage privacy protection).
205. Many of the influential criteria should be suspect because of their pre-Katz roots.
Reliance upon "property interests" and "intrusions" runs the risk of resurrecting the Olmstead
standard which Katz intended to bury. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 162-63 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting). "Publicity" factors can also find origins in Olmstead. See Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 466. Finally, the voluntary disclosure to third parties criterion is well grounded in
the "secret agent" cases which predated Katz. See infra note 331.
206. See supra notes 31-65 & accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 91-136 & accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 141-205 & accompanying text.
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doctrinal structure, 20 9 nor a rigid and easy-to-follow formula for judges
confronting issues of fourth amendment coverage. The proposals made
outline an approach that will furnish the basis for future doctrinal and
analytical evolution faithful to the fourth amendment privacy entitlement. Illustrations of how the new methodology should operate in concrete cases follow.
A New Methodology for Approaching and Resolving Fourth Amendment
Threshold Questions
Having rejected the language of the "reasonable expectations of privacy" formula as misleading, it is first necessary to propose preferable
terminology. The central issue is best formulated, not in terms of what
privacy people do expect, or even what privacy people are entitled to expect from the government. Rather, the issue is what informational privacy people need to enjoy guaranteed rights and interests. Therefore, my
initial, modest suggestion is that the language of "expectations of privacy" be supplanted by the terminology of "needs for privacy." Those
"needs" must be judged in light of the underlying reasons for a constitutional right to informational privacy vis-a-vis the government; reasons
that should include, but must not be limited to, an interest in secrecy for
its own sake.
A focus upon "needs for privacy" should suggest a constitutional
mandate to look beyond simple interests in secrecy, thereby avoiding
many of the current doctrinal implications that are not faithful to the
essence of fourth amendment privacy. Evaluations of needs, in place of
expectations, also should improve fourth amendment analysis by implying a more stable constitutional entitlement, diminishing the risks of variations due to individual, eccentric beliefs, and minimizing the perils of
governmental manipulation. 2 10
In these respects, the language of
"needs" should serve the ends of fourth amendment privacy better than
that of "expectations."
With the term "reasonable" also banished from threshold
209. One of the drawbacks of the foregoing assault on the current approach to threshold
questions has been my suspicion all along that it would be extremely difficult to describe a
worthy, workable supplanter in sufficiently precise terms. Any losses in specificity inherent in
a truly interest-oriented methodology, however, will be tolerable when balanced against the
gains in fourth amendment fidelity. "Whatever the application of [the new] standard[s] may
lack in ready administration, [they will be] more faithful to the purposes of the Fourth Amendment" than the prior standards. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46. Not all individual control of privacy
entitlement will be eliminated by the proposed doctrine. If a person behaves in such a way that
it is fair to conclude that she has no need for secrecy from the government, a "constructive
waiver" of the fourth amendment right to privacy might properly be found. See supra text
accompanying notes 152, 155.
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thought, 21 1 a replacement to describe the privacy needs that qualify for
constitutional shelter is necessary. For the reasons outlined earlier, 21 2 I
would adopt the already endorsed alternative "legitimate" to fill the role.
While not a panacea, the term is an amelioration that can promote fidelity to fourth amendment ends.

First, although it is not unused in other legal domains, unlike "reasonable," the word "legitimate" has not been exhausted. It seems rela-

tively free of the heavy connotative baggage of the "reasonable" and thus
is much less likely to lead to the ready borrowing of such erroneous standards as "reasonable search" or "reasonable person." The ever-present
risks of introducing misleading notions into fourth amendment threshold
analysis are fewer and less substantial.
Further, and more important, the term "legitimate" more accurately reflects the prescriptive nature of the courts' tasks. The search for
"reasonable" expectations has fostered too great a judicial reliance upon
certain superficially attractive behavioral factors without reference to the
essence and underlying purposes of constitutional privacy. 21 3 A focus
upon legitimacy suggests the necessity to respect the instrumental goals
of informational privacy and can prompt the courts to choose appropriate prescriptive criteria based in law, custom, or tradition rather than in
21 4
extant behavior patterns.
Finally, the fourth amendment should have a more fixed privacy
content than whatever a particular court adjudges "reasonable" or
whatever society is currently prepared to recognize as reasonable. Legiti211. See supra notes 167-80 & accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 170-79 & accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 46-65, 182-204.
214. Ordinary dictionary definitions of the two options under discussion bolster the soundness of the contentions regarding the potential for excessive subjectivity and open-endedness in
determinations of reasonableness and the preferability of the language of legitimacy in prescribing fourth amendment norms. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(1985) includes among the meanings of "reasonable": "agreeable to reason," "not extreme or
excessive," "moderate, fair," "having the faculty of reason," and "possessing sound judgment." Id. at 981. "Legitimate" means, inter alia, "accordant with law or with established
legal forms and requirements," "law-abiding," "conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards," "lawful." Id. at 683. By definition, therefore, the latter term
triggers reference to "recognized principles or accepted rules and standards." Id. The third
judicially accepted alternative, "justifiable," has been the least frequently used. According to
WEBSTER'S, "justifiable" means "capable of being justified," and to "justify" is "to prove or
show to be just, right or reasonable" or "to show to have had a sufficient legal reason." Id. at
656. Like "legitimate," "justifiable" may not yield all the risks engendered by the ubiquity,
excess employment, and variable meanings of "reasonable." Unlike "legitimate," however, it
does not clearly capture or convey the necessity to refer to "legal" bases, principles, or traditions. Nor does it as clearly imply the stability of content which fourth amendment doctrine
needs to avoid the dangerous proclivity for unprincipled, ad hoc decisionmaking apparent
under the current doctrine.
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macy, as opposed to reasonableness, suggests more permanent, less mutable standards and thus a more stable privacy content.
In sum, it seems preferable to have the courts deciding what protected privacy interests we can "legitimately" claim from the government, not what interests it is "reasonable" for us to claim. The "legitimate needs for privacy" phraseology better reflects the duties imposed
upon courts to ascertain and prescribe constitutional entitlements to informational privacy. 2 15 The issue is not whether privacy is in fact expected, but whether people who are in the claimant's situation 21 6 need it
for some legitimate purpose. In other words, a qualifying privacy need
must have a basis in the laws, principles, traditions, or customs of the
American social order and, if so grounded, should not be ignored simply
because a court senses that it is not "reasonable."
I do not mean to make too much of the suggested language modifications. Although the choice of terms is significant and influential, simple linguistic changes will not eliminate the extant flaws in the law of
fourth amendment scope. The most critical elements of constitutional
doctrine are not its terms, but the substantive criteria that give content to
the language. 2 17 Thus, development of suitable criteria for determining
the legitimacy of claimed privacy needs is essential.
Katz requires that privacy be the prime referent in determining
fourth amendment scope. The cornerstone of the instant proposals is
215. While the term "legitimate needs" captures the essence of the fourth amendment
privacy promise without substantial risks of error or distortion, the term "needs" could be
misused or could give rise to unwanted and unwarranted glosses in the same manner that
"expectations" has. In the wrong hands almost any tool is capable of damage. If the possibility of personal or subjective connotations of the word "needs" should pose problems, an even
more neutral term such as "entitlements," "grounds," "bases," or "reasons" could be employed. For now, I proffer "needs" because it connotes the possibility of an effective waiver,
effectively describes the prescriptive duties of the courts, and does not pose serious risks of
error.
216. I do not advocate an inquiry into the precise, subjective needs or desires of any given
claimant. The inquiry should focus upon whether people conducting their affairs like the
claimant have legitimate needs for privacy. Absent an expressed or clearly demonstrated lack
of need for, interest in, or desire for privacy, the question is whether legitimate instrumental
goals are promoted by providing privacy protection for those in situations such as the claimant's. Cf Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1748 n.13 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(The "inquiry requires analysis of the sorts of uses to which a given space is susceptible, not
the manner in which the person asserting an expectation of privacy in the space was in fact
employing it .... ").
217. While no changes in terminology will eliminate all the doctrinal and analytical difficulties in the threshold area, the words chosen to perform the tasks of defining the domain of
fourth amendment operation are important, as the reasonable expectation doctrine has proven.
They betray mindsets, influence thoughts, and affect outcomes with the often subtle, but effective connotations and limitations they insinuate into the law. They breed doctrinal offspring,
which, by force of repetition, gain solid footholds in the law. The terms in which we express
our constitutional decisions, therefore, should not be casually or carelessly selected, but should
be examined closely for unwanted and unwarranted implications.
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accurate comprehension of that privacy as informational and instrumental-that is, as an interest that is more than secrecy for its own sake.
Consequently, in deciding what factors are relevant to the legitimacy of
constitutional privacy needs, the suffocating assumption that secrecy is
the ultimate and sole object of the fourth amendment must be abandoned
in favor of a conception of informational privacy that factors into threshold calculations the values and interests which are, and are intended to
be, promoted by a guaranteed secrecy medium.
In our haste to liberate fourth amendment privacy from its present
confinement, however, we must not overlook the intrinsic value of secrecy itself. The need for confidentiality is one of the reasons for protecting informational privacy. 2 18 The simple assurance of an inviolate
domain of thought, feeling, and activity furnishes breathing space for
personal growth and development and enables us to lead more satisfying,
fulfilled lives. 2 19 Certainly, the value of such an interest was an important
motivation for constitutional protection against searches 220 and is among
the purposes of recognizing privacy today. 221 While it is far from the
entire ambition of the fourth amendment, the preservation of a pure secrecy interest is one of the potential objectives to be factored into threshold determinations of legitimate needs.
Evaluating the legitimacy of alleged needs for privacy rooted entirely or partially in that objective will be difficult. Courts will be required to decide how much, if any, of the pure secrecy entitlement the
fourth amendment affords in particular circumstances. Though relatively easy in the context of the home-indeed, unnecessary barring "sacrificial" behavior by the claimant-assessments of pure secrecy entitlement become more difficult in traditionally less sacrosanct realms. There
can be no ready guides for such value judgments. Nevertheless, determinations of legitimacy must accord recognition and weight to that most
elementary benefit of constitutional restraint upon governmental
searches.
218. See supra notes 87-92 & accompanying text.
219. Cf Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 401 ("[Ihe human soul cries out for someplace it
can breathe and not be stared at."); Note, supra note 204, at 987 ("[T]he primary value underlying the constitutional right to privacy is the preservation of an inviolate enclave for one's
private personality.").
220. See supra note 112 & accompanying text.
221. The traditional sacredness of the home in fourth amendment jurisprudence must rest,
in part, upon its provision of a designated, ascertainable enclave for the enjoyment of the pure
secrecy interest. Although the interest may not appear with equal clarity or strength once one
ventures into the world, surely one should still be entitled to maintain and enjoy some measure
of confidentiality for its intrinsic worth alone when one leaves home. Cf United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (The Court's "cases reflect the settled constitutional principle
.. . that a fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard. . . privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of the home.") (citation and
footnote omitted).
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In a search, the government intends, or is likely, to gather information. The individual, by reliance upon the fourth amendment, claims a
right to the privacy of that information-a right to keep it from the government. But individuals do not claim that entitlement simply and solely
because of its inherent value. They also stake such claims because the
privacy enables the exercise of other rights. Those instrumental objectives for which informational privacy exists and is needed in a free society must furnish the substantive criteria and be the prime sources of
guidance for evaluations of the legitimacy of claimed privacy needs. Ultimately, they should determine the reach of the fourth amendment, for
only governmental information acquisition that treads upon legitimate
privacy needs should constitute a constitutional search.
The essence of the instant proposals, therefore, is that the instrumental purposes for according secrecy-type privacy against the government must be accorded significant roles in fourth amendment boundary
cases. Of course, that requires identification of the various rights whose
protection is the objective of a constitutional privacy guarantee. The entitlements preserved in other provisions of the Bill of Rights are the
clearest examples of such rights; they are important reasons for protection of informational privacy. The first amendment guarantees of religious freedom, associational freedom, and freedom of speech and press
are particularly appropriate objectives. 2 22 In addition, the autonomytype privacy rights found within the ninth and fourteenth amendments
and the penumbras of the Bill of Rights-particularly interests in familial
and procreative liberty-should be considered. 22 3 The constitutional
right to travel, 224 the related liberty entitlement of the fourth amend222. In nonthreshold cases, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the relationship between governmental search and seizure activity and perils to rights of association, speech, and
press. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). Dissenters occasionally have suggested the relevance of such
liberties to threshold fourth amendment questions. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
748 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971) (Harlan,
J., dissenting); id. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 446
(1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Note, Domestic Intelligence Informants, the First
Amendment and the Need for Prior Judicial Review, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 173, 196 (19761977) ("A convergence of 1st and 4th Amendment values is not uncommon.") (footnote
omitted).
223. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Gaugush, The Ninth Amendment in the Federal Courts, 1965-1980: From Desuetude to
Fundamentalism?, 61 DENVER L.J. 25 (1983); see also infra note 357.
224. See, e.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418 (1981) ("Although the textual source of
[the] right [to travel] has been the subject of debate, its fundamental nature has been consistently recognized by this Court."); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978) ("The constitutional right to interstate travel is virtually unqualified."); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
630-31 (1969) ("Freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a
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ment, 225 and the property right promises of the fourth and fifth amendments 226 provide further privacy need rationales. Such freedoms can
flourish if privacy is protected and will wither if the government is unregulated in monitoring our enjoyment of them.
In this initial effort it would be futile to attempt to provide closure
on the subject of possible grounds for the legitimacy of needs for privacy.
The listing of recurrent legitimacy bases is not meant to be exhaustive.
Other constitutional blessings, 227 if dependent on informational privacy,
may be implicated in threshold cases and ought to be seen as proper
objects of the fourth amendment privacy grant. Further, as theory and
doctrine develop, certain statutory and common law benefits might seem
228

appropriate considerations in legitimacy calculations.

In sum, questions of fourth amendment coverage should be decided
basic right under the Constitution."); see also Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare,
and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U. L. R.EV. 989 (1969) (discussion of the right to travel).
225. The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person grants
an entitlement to physical mobility, a freedom from restraint of the person that finds expression in the law of detention and arrest. See United States v. Place, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645
(1983); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 159-60 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Amendment protects one's liberty. . . against unreasonable seizures of self .
) (footnote omitted); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 446 (1976) (Marshall, J.,dissenting) ("[A]n
unjustified arrest. . . forces the individual temporarily to forfeit his right to control his person
and movements and interrupts the course of his daily business .. ").A degree of informational privacy can sometimes be essential to maintain the vitality of our physical freedom.
226. The fourth amendment regulation of seizures of houses, papers, and effects safeguards
interests in the possession, integrity, and free use of our real and personal property. See United
States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 1662 (1984) ("A 'seizure' of property occurs when
there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.") (footnote omitted); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3326 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (The fourth amendment protects a person's "right to maintain the integrity of his
container."); Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2645 (The "detention of luggage.

. .

intrudes on

. .

.the

suspect's possessory interest in his luggage ....");Rakas, 439 U.S. at 159-60 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Amendment protects one's . . . property interests against unreasonable
seizures of.

.

.effects .....
") (footnotes omitted).

The fifth amendment further constitutionalizes property entitlements and restrains the
ability of the government to interfere with our interests in enjoying and making use of our
property by providing that "no person shall be deprived of. . .property without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
227. The Supreme Court recently held that the fourth amendment does control "searches"
of students by school officials. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985). In making
such a threshold determination in the school context, an instrumental perspective might well
have taken into account the injury that a deprivation of privacy entitlement could cause to
rights to education. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (Although "[p]ublic education
is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution," it is not "merely some governmental benefit indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. . . . [E]ducation
has a fundamental role in the fabric of our society."); see also N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para.
1.
In a proper case, preservation of the sixth amendment right to counsel could also conceivably ground a legitimate privacy need.
228. States might find, for example, that nonconstitutional interests in the promotion and
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by reference to the instrumental character of fourth amendment privacy.
In assessing legitimate needs for privacy to determine if the fourth
amendment operates at all, rights and freedoms that thrive on privacy
but starve without it must be considered. If protection against informational quests by the government is important to the free enjoyment of
such rights, then fourth amendment regulatory safeguards ought to be
triggered. Those are but the logical conclusions yielded by faithful pursuit of the spirit of Katz.
Illustrative Applications of the Proposed Methodology
In this final section, the proposed methodology for approaching
questions of fourth amendment coverage is clarified by discussing exemplary applications in troublesome contexts. Situations raising the threshold question of whether a search has occurred, 229 as well as situations
raising the issue of "standing" to challenge the constitutionality of a
search, are treated. 230 These illustrations demonstrate the concrete significance of an instrumental conception of privacy and the merits of my
criticisms of the current approach.
Electronic Tracking Devices

Modern technology has provided law enforcement agents with an
ingenious device that enables them to track the movements of individuals
upon whom some suspicion or interest has focused. Tracking beacons,
or "beepers," '23 1 can be attached to or installed within inanimate possespreservation of marriage and family life constitute valid reasons for needing secrecy and thus
legitimate grounds for constitutional shelter.
229. Due to the Supreme Court's activities during recent terms, only one of the chosen
illustrative contexts-trash inspections-involves a wholly "unsettled" question. The Court's
analyses and resolutions of the federal constitutional issues in these areas, however, are suspect
under the instrumental conception of fourth amendment privacy. The permissibility of any of
the activities treated here is also subject to independent analysis under state constitutional
search and seizure provisions. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); see also
Michigan v. Long, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3474-78 (1983) (requiring a plain statement of the independent state ground to preclude federal review).
There are other governmental investigatory techniques that have not been confronted by
the Supreme Court. See infra note 341 (discussing the unresolved issue of "mail cover" use).
Furthermore, new technologies might raise new threshold questions. See, e.g., United States v.
Ward, 703 F.2d 1058, 1059 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983) (use of a telescopic nightscope); United States
v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980) (seismic sensors); see also Drug Sniffer Works
Without a Nose, Des Moines Register, May 10, 1983, at 5A, col. 1 (machine that "analyzes
body smells" and "helps detect concealed drugs"). Novel uses of "old" technologies in familiar or unfamiliar contexts might open novel legal doors in areas thought to be settled. See infra
note 234.
230. For an explanation of the relationship between threshold and standing issues, see
supra note 66.

231. An electronic tracking device-also called a "beeper," "beacon," or "transponder"-is a miniature, battery-powered radio transmitter that emits a recurrent signal
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including moveable vehicles. 233 They emit a continuous electronic signal which is sensed by receiving equipment monitored by
investigators and enables the investigators to determine the location of
the carrier. 234 The use of these devices has been the subject of many
fourth amendment challenges and much discussion235regarding the existence and content of fourth amendment protection.
The Supreme Court recently decided its first beeper cases, United
States v. Knotts2 3 6 and United States v. Karo,2 37 and resolved some of the
major issues in the area. In those two cases, the Court held that monitoring the signals that beepers emit from "public" domains falls outside
fourth amendment regulation, 238 while monitoring their signals from
homes and other "private" spheres comes within constitutional control. 239 The Court did not resolve the status of beeper installation, 240 but
sionS, 2 3

2

at a set frequency. When monitored by directional finders, the beeper provides information as to the location and movement of the object attached. A beeper is incapable
of transmitting conversations or recording sounds.
United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1983).
232. See, eg., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 939 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 347
(10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1978).
233. See, eg., United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1140 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States v.
Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); United States v.
Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976); United States v.
Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1975), affd in part,rev'd in part, 537 F.2d 227 (1976).
234. Some "transponders" are capable of indicating that the container within which they
have been installed has been opened. See United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888 n.1 (lst Cir. 1976). Barring unwarranted categorical pronouncements, potential technological innovations make it unlikely that
the courts will soon resolve all beeper issues with finality.
235. See cases cited supra notes 232-33; see also United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d
1147 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S.
896 (1978); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926
(1978); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Perez, 526
F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976).
236. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
237. 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
238. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. Due to the specific facts and the narrowness of the challenge raised, the majority opinion in Knotts addressed only a fairly limited sphere of transponder use-monitoring of the signals from an item to track its movements along public roads and
to ascertain its location on private property, but outside of any building, Le., "in the 'open
fields.'" Id. at 282. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, was able to avoid addressing the
monitoring of beepers located within private structures. Id. at 285. When the Tenth Circuit,
shortly after Knotts, confronted certain of the questions left unsettled in Knotts, see United
States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), the Court quickly
granted review and finished more of the task that Knotts had merely begun.
239. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3304.
240. Resolution of this question was specifically reserved in Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279, and
again left open in Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3301. In Karo, at the time of the installation no claimant
had an interest in the object into which the beeper was implanted. The Court held, as a result,
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item infringes no fourth
did hold that the transfer of a beeper-bearing
24 1
amendment interest of the recipient.

According to the Court, monitoring the location and movements of
transponders in public areas is outside constitutional control because a
person travelling in such spheres "voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who
want[s] to look [at] the fact[s]"' 242 concerning his travels. Consequently,
he "has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another. ' 243 Documenting a transponder's location upon private property in the out-of-doors triggers no fourth amendment restrictions because such beeper-revealed information can also be acquired by
"the naked eyed from outside" private structures. 244 The monitoring of
that all defendants lacked the privacy interests necessary for standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to the installation. Id. Similarly, lower courts often have found that a claimant was not constitutionally protected against beeper installation because the object to bear the
beeper was owned and possessed by a private third party vendor or by government agents at
the time the beeper was implanted. See, e.g., United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 860 (9th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896
(1978); United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1156 n.1 (1977). In several cases in which a
claimant has had an ownership or possessory interest in an object at the time of installation,
courts have denied fourth amendment coverage because the item at issue harbored contraband
in which no legitimate proprietary interest can exist. See, e.g., United States v. Washington,
586 F.2d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1976).
The inability to have valid, cognizable property interests in contraband is well established. See
United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1662 (1984) ("Congress has decided-and there is
no question about its power to do so-to treat the interest in 'privately' possessing cocaine as
illegitimate .... ").
A minority of courts has concluded that the installation of transponders is fourth amendment activity. See, e.g., United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States
v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v.
Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1975), affd in part,rev'd in part, 537 F.2d 227 (1976).
Some have reached that conclusion even though the objector did not own or possess the
beeper-bearing item at the time of attachment. See, e.g., Butts, 710 F.2d at 1147; Moore, 562
F.2d at 113. The latter, of course, are contradicted by Karo's holdings regarding standing to
object to the attachment and the absence of any fourth amendment interests which protect one
against "receipt." See infra note 241.
241. Karo, 104 S.Ct. at 3302. The Tenth Circuit had acknowledged the claimants' lack of
standing to object to installation per se, but had held that a "violation occurred at the time the
beeper laden can was transferred to Karo." Id. The Tenth Circuit's focus on the damage done
to fourth amendment interests by delivery of an item into which a beeper previously had been
inserted has not been typical in the lower courts. But see United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938,
944 (6th Cir. 1980). The judiciary has focused attention on either the installation or the
monitoring.
242. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 285. According to Justice Rehnquist, an additional reason that neither tracking public movements nor documenting locations in the out-of-doors implicates fourth amendment concerns is that "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibit[s] the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as sci-
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beeper signals emitted from homes and other private enclosures to learn
the location and "activities" of objects within those domains constitutes a
search, according to the Court, because in so doing "the Government

surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain information that it
could not have obtained by observation from outside" a protected
245
area.
The Court has concluded that the critical distinction between public
monitoring and private tracking is that in the former instance "the information obtained is 'voluntarily conveyed to anyone who want[s] to
look' . . . ,"246 whereas in the latter situation the "monitoring indicate[s] fact[s] that could not have been visually verified. '247 A search
occurs in the latter case because "[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property
that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious
a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of
Fourth Amendment oversight." 248 In essence, even though it is "less
intrusive than a full-scale search," 249 beeper monitoring of objects inside
protected private areas comes within fourth amendment territory because it is analogous to, and not materially distinguishable from, other
250
governmental entrances into those areas.
ence and technology afford[ ] them.. . ." Id. at 283. The Court's faith in the validity of that
reason, however, seemed less than absolute in Karo. See infra note 266.
245. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3303.
246. Id. at 3304 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
247. Id. Before Knotts and Karo, lower courts ordinarily had found monitoring a beeper's
signal in public domains outside fourth amendment governance. The predominant rationale
for that conclusion was the "publicly exposed" nature of automobile or airplane travel. See,
e.g., United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978);
United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hufford, 539
F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). But see United States v. Bailey, 628
F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864-66 (5th Cir. 1975),
aff'd in part,rev'd in part,539 F.2d 227 (1976). A related consideration was that public tracking of beepers accomplishes no more than could be accomplished by visual surveillance because those devices merely "augment" or "enhance" the government's visual capacities. See,
e.g., United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978); Hufford, 539 F.2d at 34.
Thus, the Knotts reasoning validated some of the precise analyses of the lower tribunals.
The lower courts had usually drawn a line at the entrance of a dwelling, concluding that
the fourth amendment operates when tracking crosses the threshold of the home. See, e.g.,
United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Moore, 562
F.2d 106, 113 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). The heightened privacy interest possessed in dwellings and the traditional fourth amendment sacredness of the home were
relied upon to support that conclusion. See, eg., Clayborne, 584 F.2d at 351; Moore, 562 F.2d
at 113. The Karo majority found the logic of that reasoning persuasive. See infra notes 248-50
& accompanying text.
248. Karo, 104 S.Ct. at 3303.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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The Court's reasoning is disconcerting and seriously flawed. 25 1 The
251. Karo's impact on and implications for the Knotts holding are somewhat unclear. The
majority's reasoning seems to restrict the applicability of Knotts to situations in which the
information obtained by electronic tracking definitely could have been secured by continuous
visual surveillance. The Karo Court's emphasis upon the government's inability to obtain locational and movement information by ordinary sight from unprotected areas suggests that if
agents would not have been able to pursue an item by the use of natural senses because initially, or any time thereafter, it was removed from public view (for example, by entrance into a
dwelling or nonobservable placement within any other type of protected enclosure), Knotts'
"voluntary conveyance/public exposure" rationale would not justify unregulated monitoring.
Without probable cause and/or a warrant, tracking is permissible only when the location of the
object being moved about could at all times be known without beeper use-that is, by visual
surveillance alone. Once locational knowledge by unaided senses used in "public" areas becomes impossible, subsequent monitoring becomes impermissible.
Still, Karo's restriction of Knotts might be perceived as less severe. First, the Karo majority opinion's emphasis upon "homes" and their traditional sanctity, see 104 S. Ct. at 3303-04,
could be seen as limiting its holding to monitoring of signals from within dwellings. Such a
limitation, however, would neither be consonant with prior law regarding the applicability of
the fourth amendment beyond homes, see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1971), nor
with suggestions in Karo that monitoring signals from within any protected enclosure is covered by its holding. See Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305, 3306 n.6; see also id. at 3313 n.8 (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
More significantly, in Karo the majority sustained warrantless monitoring of a can of
ether after a period during which the can had entered a private dwelling, had been moved
without government awareness and, thereafter, had been located by beeper within a warehouse. Justice White reasoned that the claimants could not object to the beeper-effected locating of the object in the warehouse because of their lack of protected fourth amendment privacy
interests there; that the location of the ether in the specific locker in the warehouse where they
did have privacy interests was accomplished by the unaided sense of smell that triggered no
fourth amendment scrutiny; and that because the can was exposed to public view prior to the
contested beeper tracking from the warehouse into another private residence, the post-exposure tracking was permissible under Knotts' rationale. See id. at 3306.
Although in isolation the post-exposure warrantless beeper monitoring was constitutionally permissible under the Knotts-Karo analysis, the majority erred in failing to recognize that
even if the claimants lacked "standing" in the warehouse building, the location of the device
while it remained in a "private" locker in the warehouse revealed "private" locational information concerning a specific object that could not have been obtained by the use of unaided senses
in "nonprivate" places. Consequently, the later "exposure" of the container to the agents'
view appears to have been the product of Karo-barred monitoring. By revealing information
protected by the locker in which the claimants had a clear privacy interest, the monitoring
"poisoned" its "fruit," Le., the later monitoring that it enabled. The Court's explanatory observations that the monitoring "did not identify the specific locker" and "revealed nothing
about the contents of the locker," 104 S. Ct. at 3306, are hair-splitting sophistry that does not
explain how the use of the warrantless beeper to locate the can at the warehouse respected the
claimants' fourth amendment rights.
The flawed Karo analysis creates the possibility of a broader reading of the scope of
Knotts-approved monitoring than Karo reasoning should allow. Karo and Knotts together
might be illogically construed to mean that the fourth amendment protects only information
concerning the interiors of homes or other enclosures-that is, information not acquirable by
ordinary senses operating in public areas. Courts might allow any electronic tracking which
could have been accomplished by natural senses in public spheres no matter what preceded it
"beeper-wise." See Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3307 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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majority opinions in Knotts and Karo evince a lack of appreciation for
the true character of fourth amendment privacy and a total neglect of the
substantial reasons, beyond mere secrecy, for granting that constitutional
entitlement. 25 2 The installation and monitoring of an electronic tracking
beacon to follow an individual or object indisputably involves a purposeful governmental quest for information and thus possesses the initial
essential characteristic of a fourth amendment search. The important
and neglected question is whether that activity threatens legitimate needs
for privacy.
In most transponder cases the claimant does not challenge the
breach of a closed repository sometimes involved in installation. Rather,
both installation and monitoring are contested because of the comprehensive information about an individual's movements provided by the
combination of the two practices. The needs for privacy against such
acquisitive endeavors are grounded in more than an interest in secrecy
for its own sake.25 3 Informational privacy concerning one's movements
is needed to facilitate enjoyment of constitutional rights to travel, 254 liberty of movement, 255 and freedom to associate. 25 6 Without the assurance
252. The Karo Court's clear and repeated emphases upon information obtainment, the
critical division between sources located in private domains and those in public, the failure to
recognize the high potential value of confidentiality in public movements, and the characterization of an object's location and continued presence inside a home as "critical fact[s] about
the interior of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing," 104 S.
Ct. at 3303-04, all point toward a too narrow conception of fourth amendment privacy. See
also id. at 3310 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("[O]ne who lacks dominion and control
over the object's location has no privacy interest invaded when that information is disclosed.
It is simply not his secret that the beeper is disclosing, just as it is not hisprivacy that would be
invaded by a search of the container whose contents he did not control.") (emphasis added)).
Occasionally, lower court opinions have hinted at proper concerns. See, e.g., United
States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 265-66 (5th Cir.) (Tate, J., dissenting) (relying on the "fundamental liberty of owning private property free of unauthorized government intrusion. . . a
fundamental attribute of individual liberty guaranteed by our Constitution" to reach a decision
regarding search status of beeper activity), cert denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); id. at 272
(Godbold, J., dissenting) (referring to fifth amendment self-incrimination concerns for same
purpose); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 948-49 (6th Cir. 1980) (Keith, J., concurring)
("Privacy, whether it be of conversation or movement, is destroyed when monitored.") (emphasis in the original).
253. See supra notes 92-93 & accompanying text.
254. See supra note 224. For a discussion of the right to travel, see Note, supra note 224,
at 989.
255. The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures of the person is essentially an assurance of freedom of physical mobility. See supra note 225. The Terry v. Ohio
line of cases recognizes that "stops" and "detentions" which interfere with that freedom can
occur without actual physical restraint. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503 (1983).
The question is whether a reasonable person would feel free to walk away in the circumstances.
See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1769 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
The suggestion here is that, despite the lack of evident physical restraint, our freedom of movement is seriously hampered by the fear of unregulated beeper employment and the resulting
governmental omniscience regarding our movements. Preservation of the freedom of physical
mobility is a legitimate reason for needing confidentiality in beeper situations.
256. Although no specific protection of freedom of association appears in the Constitution,
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that our movements will not be surveilled or recorded, these liberties are
subject to chill and diminution. Confidence that our movements and associations are not being watched and documented by the government is a
foundation that liberates them. The privacy-provided opportunities to
enjoy such freedoms infuse claimed needs for constitutional shelter
against beeper employment with legitimacy.
The criteria adverted to by the courts appear defective when evaluated in light of the instrumental privacy objectives apparent in the beeper
context. Free movement and travel are, by their nature, public activities.
It would be ludicrous to speak of freedom to travel in private spheres or
of liberty from physical restraint in private places. Similarly, association
with those other than the intimates with whom we live often requires
some public behavior.2 5 7 To be truly free to associate, we must go to the
homes of friends, travel to meeting halls, or convene for business or pleasure in a variety of sites, ranging from tightly "closed" private homes to
much more "open," accessible environments. While such public behavior could diminish the merits of a claim to pure secrecy, it should not
the Court has discerned constitutional bases for that liberty. Originally, associational freedom
was grounded in the first amendment "right. . . peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." The Court's recognition that the guarantees within
the first amendment are closely related, see UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 398 U.S. 217, 222
(1967); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945), led it to expand the basis of the staunchly safeguarded freedom of association to
include the freedom of speech. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); see also
Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968). The critical importance of freedom of association
in our social order finds expression in the close scrutiny to which claims of deprivation are
subjected. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). Moreover, the recognition that
freedom of association is a part of the bedrock of our nation is no modern phenomenon. More
than a hundred years ago Lieber observed:
The associative principle is an element of progress, protection, and efficient activity. The freer a nation, the more developed we find it in larger or smaller spheres;
and the more despotic a government is, the more actively it suppresses all associations. . . . There is nothing that more forcibly strikes a person arriving for the first
time from the European continent, either in the United States or in England, than the
thousandfold evidences of an all-pervading associative spirit in all moral and practical spheres . . . . Strike out from England or America this feature and principle,
and they are no longer the same self-relying, energetic, indomitably active people.
The spirit of self-government would be gone.
F. LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 125-26 (3d ed. 1874).
A viable freedom to associate is difficult to imagine in the absence of liberty to go from
place to place. Unregulated transponder use imperils our first amendment freedom to associate by inhibiting our liberty to move about.
257. Although a measure of free association with those within our households is possible
without public conduct, adequate opportunities to nurture and develop those associations
probably also require some public behavior. Many of the activities which give meaning and
substance to such relationships-for example, worship, entertainment, vacations, therapycannot transpire without free physical mobility.
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undercut a claim to secrecy for the purpose of exercising those necessarily public rights. The fourth amendment affords informational privacy to
enable the full enjoyment of such blessings. 258 To permit the unavoidable
attributes of those freedoms to undermine the capacity to claim privacy
protection is perverse and indefensible. Thus, contrary to current doctrine, public exposure or accessibility ought not abrogate informational
25 9
privacy entitlements against beeper employment.
The minimal nature of the "intrusion" is also a misguided criterion
of fourth amendment coverage of beacon use. It harks back only too
clearly to Olmstead and the discredited notion that property interests and
258. See supra notes 91-93, 218-28 & accompanying text.
259. In Knotts, the Court excluded an instance of governmental transponder employment
from fourth amendment control mainly because of public exposure. 460 U.S. at 280. Such
reliance on exposure can be wholly inconsistent with an instrumental view of informational
privacy. Karo may reduce the damage to proper instrumental ends threatened by Knottn See
supra note 251. If Karo means that the Constitution is inapplicable only when the information
about locations and movements could be visually obtained from vantage points where officers
have the fourth amendment right to be, it substantially limits the opportunities for causeless,
warrantless monitoring. In addition, Karo increases the incentive to have adequate justification in every case of monitoring-even Knotts-authorized monitoring-lest permissible activity
suddenly become impermissible. See Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3305. The contention, however, that
Knotts and Karo together provide adequate protection for travel and associational rights because the individual truly interested in preserving informational privacy needs only withdraw a
beeper-bearing item from public view is completely untenable. The individual will probably be
unaware of the transponder employment and, in any case, the object bearing the beeper may be
too large effectively to be withdrawn from public view.
The only instances in which it is both logical and fair to count public exposure against a
claimant is when the circumstances-including his or her awareness of the beacon, the feasibility of effective concealment, and the reasonableness and onerousness of measures required to
remove the beacon from public view-indicate no real interest in and no need for confidentiality. Karo and Knotts, however, do not limit the significance of exposure to such cases. Perversely, Karo most clearly protects information when the target object is confined within a
dwelling. Because that information is likely to be less significant and less substantial than data
regarding public locations and movements, breach of its confidentiality is less damaging to
instrumental goals.
Read broadly, Karo will protect free movement to some extent. If an individual is able to
conceal a beacon-laden object from public view, either because of "beeper awareness" or fortuity, fourth amendment protection should be available under Karo. Awareness of that opportunity for self-protection, however, can provide little assurance or security to the individual who
cannot know when or where the government has "infected" his life with an electronic bug.
That assurance, and the freedom that goes with it, arise only from the knowledge that, barring
relinquishment of our interests, transponder use will fall prey to the regulation of the fourth
amendment. But cf Christie, Government Surveillance and IndividualFreedom: A Proposed
Statutory Response to Laird v. Tatum and the BroaderProblem of Government Surveillanceof
the Individual, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 871, 885 n.68 (1972) ("When 'surveillance' involves the
observation of the public activities of an individual and the collection and maintenance of
publicly available information about an individual, it is hard to pin down any fourth amendment rights that have been violated.").
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physical "trespasses" control fourth amendment scope.2 6° The word "intrusion," 261 if used at all, should be understood to refer to the severity of
262
the threat to privacy interests safeguarded by the fourth amendment.
In that respect, contrary to current analysis, the "intrusion" in electronic
tracking device cases is clearly substantial because the jeopardy to travel
and associational rights is grave. Consequently, the needs for
privacy
2 63
against the informational "intrusion" of beepers are weighty.
The questionable conclusion that beepers merely augment or enhance the visual capacities of agents is also an inappropriate basis for
denying privacy protection. 264 First, tracking beacons, by providing continuous and comprehensive records of movement, enable "informational
intrusions" markedly different in degree and in kind than those accomplishable by the natural human senses. 2 65 In addition, Katz itself renders
suspect the assumption that "mere" augmentation of senses by science is
260. See supra notes 21-25 & accompanying text; see also supra note 198 & accompanying
text.
261. See supra notes 197-99 & accompanying text. In Katz, Justice Stewart concluded that
the government's eavesdropping was within fourth amendment confines because it "violated"
the claimant's privacy. 389 U.S. at 353. "Violation" is preferable to "intrusion" since it at
least minimizes connotations appropriate to pre-privacy conceptions of the fourth amendment
guarantee.
262. While "physical intrusion brings us to the core of our expectations and intuitions
about privacy and hence to our rights to it," Gerety, supra note 76, at 265, the language and
concept of "intrusions" pose difficulties and engender risks of improperly confining fourth
amendment privacy when other than physical "intrusions" are involved. See Amsterdam,
supra note 1, at 383.
263. In Karo, the Court employed the language of "intrusions," but commendably refused
to judge the severity of the "intrusion" in terms of the physical breach or disruption caused by
a beeper's entrance into a dwelling. Instead, "intrusiveness" depended upon the criticality and
unobtainability of information concerning the interior of the home. Still, the Court's excessive
concern with the interior betrays lingering ties to the notion that conduct must "intrude" (at
least informationally) upon protected areas in order to trigger the fourth amendment. Furthermore, the Court completely neglected instrumental goals in assessing the "intrusiveness"
of the government's information acquisition.
264. See LaFave, supra note 149; ConstitutionalLaw Symposium Features Discussion of
Gates, Bradshaw Cases, 34 CRIM. L. RaP. (BNA) 2098, 2100-01 (Nov. 2, 1983).
265. The comprehensiveness and the continuity of the picture provided by tracking devices distinguish them from ordinary, unaided human surveillance abilities. See Comment,
Pen Registers, supra note 84, at 757. The fallibility of natural sensory capacities and the related potential for elusion by the target make the possibility of securing a comparably complete
record of information concerning any given individual minimal at best. In essence, beepers do
not simply increase the range or reach of our human senses, they furnish a new ability, an
adjunct to the natural senses. See United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir. 1983)
("The beeper gave law enforcement officials information that could not be discovered by ordinary visual surveillance, even had that surveillance been constant."), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3296
(1984); see also Moore, 562 F.2d at 112; Holmes, 521 F.2d at 866 n.13; cf United States v.
Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Transmitting [a) package's location is merely an aid
to what can be accomplished by visual surveillance. Permissive techniques of surveillance include more than the five senses of officers and their unaided physical abilities.").
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always constitutionally permissible. 2 6" Most important, the unspoken assumption that comprehensive surveillance by means of natural senses is
immune from fourth amendment coverage is vulnerable. 2 67 The Constitution might well govern such use of unenhanced natural senses; if so, it
would also control the utilization of "mere" enhancing devices.2 68 Effective and comprehensive visual surveillance and recordation-whether accomplished by the natural senses alone or aided by electronic devicesinfringe on the need for the informational privacy essential to travel,
physical mobility and association.

Insofar as installation is challenged because it enables tracking, the
issues and interests would appear to be the same as those involved in
challenges to monitoring, and those two stages of beeper employment
can be analyzed together.2 69 On the other hand, if attachment involves
the opening of or entry into closed containers or structures, it raises an
additional, traditionally recognized fourth amendment concern-the
"pure" interest in the secrecy of that enclosure's contents. Whether or
not the government intends to acquire information by opening a
266. If the beeper in Knotts could be viewed as a "mere augmenter" of visual senses, there
is no reason the electronic eavesdropping device in Katz could not be characterized as a "mere
enhancer" of ordinary auditory faculties. It should be clear from the tenor and intent of the
Katz opinion that such a characterization would not have obviated the conclusion that the
governmental practice "violated the privacy upon which [Mr. Katz] justifiably relied." Katz,
389 U.S. at 353; see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court suggests
that the Fourth Amendment does not inhibit 'the police from augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them'
....
But the Court held to the contrary in Katz."); cf Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302 (expressing
the view that the transfer of a beeper-bearing object did not trigger fourth amendment operation because "[it] is the exploitation of technological advances that implicates the Fourth
Amendment, not their mere existence.").
267. See Giancana v. Johnson, No. 63C 1145 (N.D. Ill. 1963), vacated, 335 F.2d 366 (7th
Cir. 1964), cert denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965).
268. Regrettably, the Karo Court seemed to endorse the remarkable premise that unaugmented use of human sense capacities does not trigger constitutional concern. If followed to
its logical extreme, that premise could lead to no fourth amendment protection against quintessential searches and most of the other actions it clearly should and does cover. After all, the
breaking of doors, the entry into homes, and the acquisition of information therein involves no
more than the use of ordinary human senses. Because threats to legitimate privacy interests
are the true concern, decisions regarding fourth amendment purview should not hinge upon
whether ordinary, natural senses, devices that "merely enhance" them, or devices that bestow
additional "senses" or "extend" the natural senses are involved in governmental investigatory
activity, but should depend upon whether any of those methods infringes upon legitimate
fourth amendment privacy interests.
269. There seems to be no reason to analyze installation separately from monitoring when
the basis of concern with attachment is the revelation of locations and movements. Cf Karo,
104 S. Ct. at 3302 (applying similar reasoning to the transfer of a beeper-laden object). But see
id. at 3310-11 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that installation of a beeper and
delivery of a beeper-bearing object is a fourth amendment seizure of property because "by
attaching a monitoring device ... the agents usurped a part of a citizen's property" and "in
the most fundamental sense [were] asserting 'dominion and control' over the property.").
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container to insert a beeper, it is likely to do so. 270 If agents enter a
vehicle or unwrap a parcel to attach a beacon, they threaten the confidentiality of the contents. As long as a person has not evinced a substantial
lack of concern for secrecy vis-a-vis the government, the well-recognized
fourth amendment interest in maintaining secrecy for its own sake ought
to stand as a barrier to the unregulated opening of containers-at least
271
those in which an individual has an ownership or possessory interest.
In sum, there are legitimate purposes beneath a grant of informational privacy against official use of tracking devices. The opinions that
have employed the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis either to
deny or to grant protection have invoked inappropriate criteria, paying
virtually no heed to the reasons that privacy is constitutionalized. Under
a proper conception of the significance of the privacy involved, the fourth
amendment regulatory regime ought to operate when the government
surreptitiously installs and monitors transponders.
Open Fields
In Hester v. United States, 272 the Supreme Court held that revenue
officers had not "searched and seized" within the meaning of the Constitution when they "trespassed" onto property owned by the claimant's
father, observed the claimant's moonshining activities, and ultimately acquired evidence that he had jettisoned when alerted to the presence of
law enforcement officers. As a basis for rejecting Hester's claim, Justice
Holmes pithily observed that "the special protection accorded by the
Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and
'273
effects,' is not extended to the open fields."
270. Of course, the government always does intend to acquire information by beeper employment. There are no conceivable motives for that activity other than the obtainment of
data about a person's or object's travels and movements. The point of the textual discussion is
that, in some instances, the government may unintentionally acquire more confidential information of a different sort than the movement and locational data that it is after. The likelihood of such acquisition ought to suffice for purposes of the initial, information-acquisitive
qualification of fourth amendment searches. See supra notes 81-88 & accompanying text.
271. This conclusion reflects no more than the principles underlying the Court's container
and automobile cases. See United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1657, 1660 (1984);
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
There is a substantial interest in "secrecy per se" within such objects. Consequently, installation alone could serve as the basis of a cognizable fourth amendment claim.
If a claimant has no interest in the object prior to installation, no information regarding
his life or activities could possibly be obtained. Thus, insofar as such confidentiality is the
interest involved in an installation claim, the conclusion that the fourth amendment does not
protect one who has no interest in an item prior to beeper installation seems defensible. Similarly, the mere transfer of the object does not threaten any valid interest the recipient has in the
secrecy of the contents because the recipient has no such interest prior to delivery and transfer
alone risks no revelation of the contents. See supra note 269.
272. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
273. Id. at 59.
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The "open fields doctrine" of that case did not generate controversy
until 1967, when Katz revamped the law of fourth amendment reach. In
the new light cast by the emerging "reasonable expectation of privacy"
doctrine, courts began to question the meaning, scope, and continuing
validity of Hester. Analyses, conclusions, and results varied. Some held
that by virtue of Hester, any activity in the "open fields" remained
wholly unprotected after Katz.2 74 Others, however, concluded that Katz'
replacement of property-based limitations on fourth amendment scope
with the reasonable expectation of privacy standard severely curtailed
the constitutional validity of Hester. Those courts required examination
of all circumstances to ascertain whether a protected privacy expectation
275
was threatened.
In Oliver v. United States,276 the Supreme Court finally settled the
controversy over the relationship between Katz and Hester. The Court
held that despite the intervention of the reasonable expectation doctrine,
Justice Holmes' refusal to extend the protection of the fourth amendment
to the open fields remains sound constitutional law. The majority opinion in Oliver seemed to follow "two independent analytical routes" 2 77 to
Hester's reaffirmation.
Initially, the Court relied heavily upon the restrictive terminology of
the fourth amendment, which specifically guarantees security in "persons, houses, papers and effects, ' 278 thus "indicat[ing] with some precision the places and things encompassed by its protections. ' 279 Because
274. See United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1982), afd, 104 S. Ct. 1735
(1984); United States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1973); Atwell v. United States, 414
F.2d 136, 138 (5th Cir. 1969). The faithful Hester disciples who perpetuated the categorical
exemption of the "open fields" from fourth amendment coverage were apparently in the minority. See Oliver, 686 F.2d at 372-73 (Keith, J., dissenting). The minority, however, was not
as small a group as it might have seemed. Some courts, while purporting to apply the "reasonable expectations" doctrine, actually were adhering to a disguised Hester doctrine by placing
the determinative line between "searches" and "nonsearches" at the boundary between the
"curtilage" of homes and the "open fields." See United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1374
(11th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 104 S.Ct. 2397 (1984); United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848,
852-53 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Van Dyke, 643"F.2d 992, 993-94 (4th Cir. 1981). The
approach of the covert Hester adherents imposed the same limitation upon fourth amendment
coverage as that imposed by the Hesterfollowers because their conclusion was, in essence, that
no reasonable privacy expectation could exist outside the curtilage. This holding received
Supreme Court sanction in Oliver. See infra note 299.
275. See, e.g., United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 32-33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2431 (1983); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980); State v. Rickard, 420
So. 2d 303, 305-06 (Fla. 1982); State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489, 494-95 (Me. 1982), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 1735 (1984). The application of the reasonable expectation of privacy formula as a
standard for case-by-case adjudication of fourth amendment coverage in open fields cases represented a clear majority position prior to 1984.
276. 104 S.Ct. 1735 (1984).
277. Id. at 1744 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
278. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
279. Oliver, 104 S.Ct. at 1740.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

"open fields" are not described by that language, "the government's intrusion upon [them] is not one of those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed by the text."' 280 In essence, "the open fields doctrine, as
enunciated in Hester," was sustained because it "is consistent with the
281
plain language of the Fourth Amendment and its historical purposes.
The majority opinion in Oliver strongly suggested that such textually
grounded reasoning, with support from the history of the common law,
would be an independently adequate basis for retaining Hester.282 Nevertheless, Justice Powell was not content with mimicking the "characteristically laconic style" 283 of Justice Holmes, for he proceeded to analyze
of prithe open fields situation in light "of the 'reasonable expectation 284
vacy' doctrine developed in subsequent decisions of [the] Court.
That analysis opened with the conclusion that the majority's "interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's language is consistent with the understanding of the right to privacy expressed in [the Court's prior]
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. ' 285 In explaining that conclusion,
however, the majority departed markedly from well-established doctrinal
paths, apprising us that "factors" that "may be relevant to Fourth
Amendment analysis in some contexts . . . cannot be decisive on the
question whether the search of an open field is subject to the Amendment. ' 286 Those suddenly irrelevant factors that earlier opinions had
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1744.
282. The brief, text-based portion of the majority opinion is contained in a separate section
that "conclud[ed], as did the Court in deciding Hester v. United States, that the government's
intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those unreasonable searches proscribed by the text
of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1740. Only then did the Court proceed to its reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis, which commenced with the observation that the preceding
"interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's language is consistent with the understanding of
the right to privacy expressed in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. Thus, both the
structure and language of the opinion provide support for the view that the Court majority
thought its semantic analysis alone could support reaffirmation of Hester's open fields doctrine.
Justice Marshall so assessed the majority's effort. Id. at 744-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 1740.
284. Id. at 1744. Justice White would have been content with such a "laconic," languagebased resolution of Oliver. In an extremely concise concurrence, he concluded that "[h]owever
reasonable a landowner's expectations of privacy may be, those expectations cannot convert a
field into a 'house' or an 'effect.'" Id. at 1744 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall believed that the Court majority shied away from such wholesale reliance on the constitutional text because it was "[s]ensitive to the weakness of its argument that
the 'persons and things' mentioned in the Fourth Amendment exhaust the coverage of the
provision." He was optimistic that the Court's inclusion of an analysis of "the privacy interests that might legitimately be asserted in 'open fields,'" plus the "reaffirmation of Katz and its
progeny, . . . strongly suggest that the plain-language theory. . . will have little or no effect
on our future decisions in this area." Id. at 1746 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1740.
286. Id. at 1743.
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ensconced as determinants of fourth
amendment operation 287 included
"steps taken to protect privacy" 288 and the "existence" of "general rights
of property protected by the common law. ' 289 Eschewing reliance upon
those ingredients, the Court based its conclusion that "the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that 'society rec-

ognizes as reasonable'

"290

on the premises'that "open fields do not

provide the setting for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter," and that "[t]here is no societal interest in
protecting the privacy of those activities,
such as the cultivation of crops,
29 1
that occur in the open fields."
Insofar as the Oliver Court intended to suggest that the fourth
amendment's text alone provides an independently sufficient source of
definitive answers to questions of constitutional scope posed in open
fields contexts, its opinion is unfaithful to and "inconsistent with the
[Katz] line of cases and with the understanding of the nature of constitu287. Between Katz and Oliver, the lower courts had rested their decisions in open fields
cases upon elements prescribed by the Supreme Court as apposite to boundary disputes, see
supra notes 46-58 & accompanying text, namely: (1) precautions, see, eg., United States v.
Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 371 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 1735 (1984) (Keith, J., dissenting);
United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 104 S.Ct. 2380 (1984);
State v. Rickard, 420 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 1982); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (Fla.
1981), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984); State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489, 494 (Me. 1982), rev'd,
104 S.Ct. 1735 (1984), (2) public exposure or accessibility, see, eg., United States v. Hensel,
699 F.2d 18, 32 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2431 (1983); Rickard, 420 So.2d at 305-06;
Brady, 406 So. 2d at 1098; Thornton, 453 A.2d at 495, and (3) property concepts and interests,
see, eg., Dunn, 674 F.2d at 1100; United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1159 (4th Cir.
1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981) (Ervin, J., dissenting); United States v. Holmes, 521
F.2d 859, 870 (1975), afl'd in part,rev'd in part,537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); Rickard, 420 So.
2d at 306.
288. Oliver, 104 S.Ct. at 1743. The Court made passing reference to the public accessibility factor by observing that the precautions taken by the defendants might have made their
property accessible to "few members of the public." Id. In an earlier portion of the opinion,
however, the Court had suggested that "as a practical matter these lands [Le., open fields]
usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office or commercial
structure would not be. It is not generally true that fences or no trespassing signs effectively
bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas." Id. at 1741. The Court, thus, could
have reached the same noncoverage result for most open fields cases without suspending current doctrine. The public access factor would provide a basis for declaring most claimants'
expectations of privacy in open fields unreasonable.
289. Id.at 1744. The Court "reject[ed] the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are legitimate." Id. at 1743. It termed
"general rights of property protected by the common law of trespass [of] little or no relevance
to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment." I. at 1744. The dissenters relied heavily
upon the "property rights" and "precautionary measures" criteria. Id. at 1747-50 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 1741.
291. Id (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall also referred to the activities that might occur in or the uses to which one might put open fields. A primary reason that his ultimate
conclusion diverged from the majority's was his perception of a broader range of potential
endeavors in the out-of-doors that "deserve privacy." Id at 1748-49 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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tional adjudication from which it derives. ' 292 The propriety of such
analysis merits no further discussion here, for the day of such blind faith
in constitutional language is long past. 293 The Court's alternative "reasonable expectations" route, however, merits critical attention.
Considering the fallacies and misunderstandings of fourth amendment privacy injected by the recurrent criteria2 94 that had come to dictate threshold decisionmaking, the Oliver Court's decision to abandon
rigid reliance upon them seems a step in the right direction. Furthermore, the Court's focus upon "activities that the Amendment is intended
to shelter" and prescription of "the correct inquiry [as to] whether the
government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment, '295 appear to contain the potential
for progressive redirection of fourth amendment law along instrumental
lines. 296 Close examination, however, shows that those doctrinal choices
do not make the progressive promises suggested at first glance.
First, the Court's eschewal of precautions, exposure, and property
rights evidently constitutes an exception to otherwise applicable reasonable expectations doctrine, rather than a general reform of purview analysis. 2 9 7 Second, if the prescribed inquiry into "personal and societal
292. Id. at 1745 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court's literal reading of the constitutional
text is irreconcilable with the spirit and result of Katz because "neither a public telephone
booth nor a conversation conducted therein can fairly be described as a person, house, paper or
effect; yet [Katz] held that the Fourth Amendment forbids the police without a warrant to
eavesdrop on such a conversation." Id. at 1745 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Moreover, the Court's literal approach to the fourth amendment betrays "the understanding of
the nature of constitutional adjudication" which should guide threshold decisions because
[t]he Fourth Amendment... was designed, not to prescribe with "precision" permissible and impermissible activities, but to identify a fundamental human liberty
that should be shielded forever from government intrusion. . . . [W]hen interpreting. . . seminal constitutional provisions, [the Court must strive] to effectuate their
purpose-to lend them meanings that ensure that the liberties the Framers sought to
protect are not undermined by the changing activities of government officials.
Id. at 1745-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). In other words, the Court's textbased analysis is unfaithful to the "purpose" or "interest-based" mode essential to preserve the
fourth amendment's vitality.
293. This should be evident from Justice Black's "lone wolf" position in Katz, 389 U.S. at
364 (Black, J., dissenting). See supra note 81.
294. See supra notes 182-205 & accompanying text.
295. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, 1743.
296. The lower court in Oliver had also shown some analytical progress along instrumental
lines. Regrettably, like the Supreme Court, see infra note 298, the Sixth Circuit Court ultimately underestimated privacy needs in the out-of-doors. See United States v. Oliver, 686
F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
297. Justice Powell stated that "the factors" that "may be relevant.., in some contexts
. . . cannot be decisive on the question whether the search of an open field is subject to the
Amendment." Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1743 (emphasis added). The unexplained departure from
accepted threshold doctrine in situations in which the traditional approach could militate
strongly in favor of fourth amendment application creates an impression of result-oriented
analysis, corruptive of doctrine and designed to continue a recent trend toward narrow fourth
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values" does reflect an awareness of the instrumental character of informational privacy, that awareness is incipient at most and bears little
promise of growth. The Court does not discuss the nature of such an
inquiry, and, ultimately, the one it conducts in Oliver is superficial and
conclusory. 298 The deficiencies in the Court's analysis are evident in the
decision to adhere to Hester and to declare categorically that privacy protection for activities in the out-of-doors is a constitutional impossibility. 299 The potential legitimate bases for recognizing some privacy
entitlement in the open fields are more substantial and persuasive than
the Court was willing to acknowledge.
Real property rights of ownership and possession are valuable for
many reasons, not the least of which are the opportunities to make use of
our land and conduct our lives on it as we see fit and the ability to share
it with associates, acquaintances, family, and friends. 300 Our interests in
land would lack substance without the possibilities afforded by free use
and exploitation. We may choose to cultivate our lands or to leave them
in a natural state in order to enjoy their benefits and beauties. We might
take advantage of the out-of-doors by sunning ourselves in various states
of undress, by speaking our minds to no one in particular, or by meeting
with others. None of these possible exploitations of the opportunities
that secluded lands afford are criminal. And, contrary to the Oliver
amendment confines. See, eg., United States v. Karo, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (1984); Hudson v.
Palmer, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652 (1984); Illinois v.
Andreas, 103 S.Ct. 3319 (1983); United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978). "of late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for judicial activism in
its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least when it comes to restricting the constitutional
rights of the citizen." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S.Ct. 3583, 3584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Court's complete and categorical rejection of precautions and property
rights as irrelevant to fourth amendment coverage of "open fields" is unsound. See infra notes
300-02 & accompanying text.
298. The superficiality of the majority's search for "personal and societal values protected
by the Fourth Amendment" is evinced by its facile rejection of the possibility of uses of open
fields other than "the cultivation of crops." Oliver, 104 S.Ct. at 1743, 1741. After the cursory
evaluation of potential reasons for recognizing privacy entitlement in the open fields, the Court
easily found "no basis for concluding that a police inspection of open fields accomplishes...
an infringement" upon the "personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id at 1743. Apparently, the majority thought that the only out-of-doors activities for
which a claimant might need or desire informational privacy are criminal, and therefore undeserving of protection. See id. at 1741 n.10, 1743 n.13.
299. Actually, not all out-of-doors conduct is left unsheltered by Oliver because the Court
recognized a "curtilage" exception. Id at 1742. The Court found it unnecessary "to consider
the scope of the curtilage exception to the open fields doctrine," but hinted that the curtilage
might be accorded less than full fourth amendment protection. Id. at 1742 n. 11.
300. Id. at 1748-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's observation that "one of
the purposes of the law of real property. . . is to define and enforce privacy interests," id. at
1747 n. 10, however, seems to have the analysis backwards. The purpose of informational privacy in this context is the preservation and enforcement of property rights.
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Court's conclusion, many activities that property rights make possible,
which are an integral part of the worth of land, generate legitimate needs
for informational privacy.
The free exercise of property rights in the manners described depends upon an assurance of privacy vis-a-vis the government. The privacy grant of the fourth amendment can assure us that authorities will
not have unregulated access to information about the conduct of our
lives in the open fields. That assurance can liberate our actions, enabling
us to take full advantage of property interests. Conversely, a lack of informational privacy and the resultant knowledge that authorities have
unrestrained access can only yield inhibition, self-censorship of behavior,
and a corresponding diminution of the ability to enjoy the benefits of
ownership or possession. In sum, privacy in the open fields should be
constitutionally protected to safeguard and promote property values.
The Oliver Court's decision, however, by excluding open fields from the
fourth amendment regulatory scheme, gives notice that we are entitled to
no confidentiality for our conduct there and therefore constrains free
property use and enjoyment.
The hazardous implications of Oliver, however, ought not send us
hastily back to the shelter of the doctrine conveniently avoided by the
Court. Automatic, uncritical reference to the "public exclusion" and
"precautionary measures" criteria could also undermine the very values
that fourth amendment privacy should promote. Under the regime of
those criteria, if one seeks to enjoy the benefits of property ownership or
possession by permitting others onto her land, by not turning her realty
into a fortress, the government's access to information about her life and
conduct on such property will be constitutionally uncontrolled. 30 1 As
suggested, the knowledge that authorities have unfettered access can only
chill our freedom, thus our property enjoyment. If we have to take exclusionary or precautionary measures that curtail the free exercise of our
rights in order to avoid that chilling awareness and preserve privacy, an
is created for the indiimpermissible bind involving no-win alternatives
30 2
vidual interested in property enjoyment.
We should not pursue an approach to fourth amendment threshold
301. See United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 32 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2431
(1983); United States v. Edmonds, 611 F.2d 1386, 1388 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979); United States v.
Noe, 494 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (E.D. Ky. 1980); Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 259, 274
S.E.2d 595, 597 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
302. Unrestricted public access probably is not a prerequisite for adequate enjoyment of
property rights. Similary, the erection of a perimeter fence or the posting of a few "No Trespassing" signs will not interfere significantly with full property enjoyment or with associational
freedom. Such minimal restrictive measures generally evince a need for confidentiality and put
investigators on notice of fourth amendment operation. Because such measures are not harmful to legitimate interests, an owner or possessor who neglects them might fairly be perceived
as unconcerned with and therefore willing to forego fourth amendment privacy.
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questions that precludes ample enjoyment of the benefits of our property
rights by dictating that both the necessary concomitants of the exercise
of those rights and the liberating security that comes from restrictions
upon the government's power to acquire information cannot coexist.
The legitimacy of a fourth amendment interest cannot depend upon
"public exclusion" and "precautionary measures" which defeat the very
interests the Constitution ought to promote. Threshold methodology
and doctrine should ensure that informational privacy is protected in the
open fields whenever it is important to the full enjoyment and free exercise of our constitutionally protected property and associational rights.
Canine Detection of Contraband
A large majority of lower courts had foreshadowed the Supreme
Court's conclusion in United States v. Place30 3 that the use of trained
canines to detect the presence of contraband in containers does not constitute a search. 3°4 In Place, the Court acknowledged "that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage that is
protected by the Fourth Amendment, ' 30 5 but concluded that canine

sniffs do not significantly infringe that interest because the "manner in
which information is obtained," involving no opening and rummaging
that could expose noncontraband, "is much less intrusive than a typical
search," and "the information obtained is limited [to] only the presence
or absence of narcotics, a contraband item." 30 6 In sum, no reasonable
privacy expectation is jeopardized because of the "limited. . .manner in
which the information is obtained and. . 7 . the [limited] content of the
'30
information revealed by the procedure.
303. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
304. The conclusion is dictum, unnecessary to the decision in Place, because a majority
held that the detention of the claimant's luggage exceeded the scope justified by the government's showing of cause and purpose. Id. at 2646.
305. Id. at 2644; see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
306. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2644.
307. Id. For pre-Place lower court decisions based on similar reasoning, see United States
v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370, 372-73 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S.Ct. 3543 (1983); United
States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459,
463 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 341,
644 P.2d 810, 813, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620-21 (1982); cf United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327,
1334 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that "reasonable suspicion" is required to justify the caninesniff), vacated, 103 S.Ct. 3529 (1983). Lower courts had also observed that the information
gained in canine sniffs is acquired from the airspace surrounding the container, an area in
which there could be no reasonable privacy expectation. See United States v. Lewis, 708 F.2d
1078, 1080 (6th Cir. 1983); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470,477 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S.Ct. 3536 (1983); United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361
(5th Cir.), cerL denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). Apparently, that territory was considered a public domain and thus one which the government is wholly free to explore and probe by any
means, including canine and human. See United States v. Sentovich, 677 F.2d 834, 835-36
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The majority opinion in Place evinces a fairly clear conception of
fourth amendment privacy as primarily informational in character. 30 8
The Court's sketchy analysis conveys the message that fourth amendment operation depends upon the extent of jeopardy to interests in secrecy, but fails to explore the instrumental purposes for which
informational secrecy in one's belongings is needed. Although such a
neglect in a threshold context ordinarily would result in too constricted a
territory of regulation, in the case of drug-sniffing canines the Court's
failure to look beyond secrecy alone does not seem to lead to erroneous
results.
As noted before, the inherent worth of secrecy ought to be taken
into account in threshold calculations. 30 9 In the canine situation, minimal threats to pure secrecy are posed because the external olfactory examination reveals only the presence or absence of contraband and
discloses nothing about other contents. 310 In the scheme of societal values, an interest in the secrecy of contraband is negligible and ought to be
an inadequate basis for legitimate privacy needs. Arguably, more is at
stake. The freedom to travel and move about without governmental restraint is compromised by the knowledge that what we bear is examinable in the unfettered discretion of investigating officials. The potential
merit of that argument, however, is limited because only the physical
freedom of those transporting contraband is threatened by reliable, discriminating canines. That "liberty" interest, a cognizable instrumental
end of fourth amendment privacy, is also of scant social
worth and
3 11
should be inadequate to support legitimate privacy needs.
(1lth Cir. 1982); United States v. Brown, 487 F.2d 208, 209 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 909 (1984).
The location of the examined container in a "public place" at the time of the sniffing also
had counted against the reasonableness of a claimed expectation. See Horton, 690 F.2d at 477;
United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th Cir. 1980). In Place, the Supreme Court adverted to that element. 103 S. Ct. at 2644-45. Because luggage and other private repositories
would be of little value if they remained in nonpublic realms, their public location should not
detract from the legitimacy of privacy entitlements within them.
308. See Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2644 ("IT]he sniff discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item. . . . Thus,. . . the information obtained is limited."); see also
United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1658-59, 1660 (1984) (analyzing the threshold
question by reference to what agents learned by their challenged conduct).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 218-21.
310. The container cannot be opened based on a canine alert alone. The substantial threat
to the confidentiality of a repository's contents posed by opening it necessitates that, absent an
exception, a probable cause showing be made to a neutral judicial officer and that a search
warrant issue prior to the breach of the container. See People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335,
342, 644 P.2d 810, 814, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 621 (1982).
311. As long as the only information acquired pertains to an individual's knowing transportation of contraband, similar reasoning would support the installation and monitoring of a
beeper. See United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1976) (upholding beeper
use on basis that contraband was bearer). If private information about noncontraband matters
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The foregoing analysis relies substantially upon the limited character of the activity exempted from constitutional regulation. The extremely limited nature of the informational breach accomplished by
canines minimizes the potential threats to both pure secrecy interests and
legitimate instrumental ends. 3 12 If the attributes of the governmental device change, however, the analysis may well change. For example, some
canines apparently can detect alcohol and noncontraband drugs. 3 13 Because they reveal information about legally possessed items, the threat
posed to pure secrecy interests becomes more significant. Likewise, the
potential chill upon free movement and travel spreads to those bearing
solely licit belongings and therefore merits more concern. If dogs do disclose, and we are aware that they disclose, information about a broader
range of subjects than simply the presence of contraband, the threat to
our interests in secrecy and to the further benefits afforded by informational privacy preservation
might well furnish legitimate bases for recog3 14
nizing privacy needs.
is threatened, however, fourth amendment operation is in order. Contra Grano, supra note 84,
at 438 n.113.
312. Professor Grano thinks that a similar rationale can support the refusal to apply
fourth amendment constraints to cases like Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), and
undercover "stings." In Lewis, a pre-Katz case, "a federal narcotics agent, by misrepresenting
his identity and stating his willingness to purchase narcotics, was invited into petitioner's home
where an unlawful narcotics transaction was consummated." Id. at 206-07. The Court found
no privacy breach because the agent's pretense "merely encouraged the suspect to say things
he was willing and anxious to say to anyone who would be interested in purchasing marijuana." Id at 212. According to Professor Grano, the proper question in such cases is
"whether the conduct at issue could ever threaten or intrude upon informational privacy expectations unrelated to criminal conduct." Grano, supra note 84, at 437-38. He believes that
Lewis is correct because "the fourth amendment's concern for the security of persons is exceeded when justifiable expectations of privacy include expectations that relate to nothing
more than a propensity for wrongful conduct." Id at 438.
Although I agree with that basic hypothesis, I believe that both the Court in Lewis and
Professor Grano misanalyze the risks to legitimate privacy interests posed by unregulated entries into homes and other protected areas. The agent's entrance in Lewis created a serious
threat to informational privacy interests therein, and there was no guarantee that all information acquired, like that provided by accurate canines, would be pertinent to unlawful conduct.
Although the acquisition of information solely related to a target individual's willingness to
engage in criminal conduct is of little concern, concern should increase dramatically when
there is no assurance that an informational privacy breach will be so confined. See infra note
315. It is interesting that Professor Grano declares that his hypothesis is not satisfactory, in a
setting where it seems to make eminently good sense-use of a "sensor that detects narcotics
but nothing else. . . at airports." Grano, supra note 84, at 437 n.111. Like a canine-sniff, that
situation poses a minimal threat to legitimate secrets and ought to trigger no fourth amendment concern.
313. See Horton, 690 F.2d at 474 (involving "dogs. . . trained to alert their handlers to
the presence of any one of approximately sixty different substances, including alcohol and
drugs, both over-the-counter and controlled").
314. The accuracy of canine olfactory detection abilities is questionable. See id (two students of several subjected to sniffs "triggered alerts," but neither was found to possess contra-

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

Thus, in the limited context of Place and many canine-sniff cases the
results reached by the Supreme Court and the lower courts probably are
defensible. If the investigatory procedure changes, however, the situation must be examined for potential jeopardy to the panoply of blessings
promoted by constitutional privacy. 3 15
Trash Inspection

Federal and state courts have long been confronted with fourth
31 6
amendment challenges to law enforcement inspections of trash.
band); see also Experts Question Ability of Evidence-Sniffing Dog, Des Moines Register, July
26, 1983, at 3T, col. 1 (discussing suspicions about the claimed olfactory exploits of an alleged
"superdog"). Risks of canine error may raise privacy concerns similar to those generated by
canines trained to respond to lawfully possessed items. If the rate of alerts to noncontraband
items is more than de minimis, and if magistrates routinely rely on such error-prone animals
alone in granting search warrant applications, the threat of breaching legitimate confidentiality
interests is serious. Although the violation of informational privacy interests is one step removed from the dog sniff-that is, the serious confidentiality breach occurs upon opening of
the container pursuant to a search warrant-if and when magistrates routinely defer to such
erring beasts, the costs to constitutionally protected interests due to revelation of information
concerning the contents are directly attributable to the dog sniffs. Cf LaFave, supra note 149,
at 1742 ("[I]f [Place's] underlying assumption is that the use of these dogs jeopardizes only the
guilty, it is in error," because canine use creates the "risk of unnecessary intrusions on innocent persons.
...). Magistrates must hold canines to rigorous standards of reliability,
thereby curbing the canine-generated peril to legitimate informational privacy interests.
315. Cf United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1660-62 (1984) (A chemical field test
that "can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest." Reopening of a privately-opened package is "not a
'search' " because "there was a virtual certainty" that the inspection "would not tell [the
agent] anything more than he already had been told."). The Jacobsen Court's reasoning is
palatable only when it truly is virtually certain that no infringement of a legitimate interest in
informational privacy is threatened by government conduct because of a clearly neutral, disinterested method of learning only information about contraband or a means of discerning only
information that is already known. If not so confined, the analysis could undermine much of
the fourth amendment's protection. See id. at 1667 (White, J., dissenting). The risk of undue
reliance upon the Jacobsen rationale is evidenced by United States v. Bonfiglio, 713 F.2d 932,
937 (2d Cir. 1983), a case involving the warrantless playing of a cassette tape. The court
reasoned that a somewhat cryptic "notation on the envelope" containing the cassette "had the
practical effect of putting the contents of the tape in plain view and therefore reducing the
expectation of privacy" sufficiently to suspend constitutional protection of the recorded contents. Id. at 937. Clearly, the court erred, for the information gained by playing the cassette
was substantial. Jacobsen will not support the Bonfiglio conclusion, and Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), would seem to contradict it.
316. See, e.g., United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1081 (1980); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
959 (1979); United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978);
Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (1st
Cir. 1972); United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971);
Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973); People v. Krivda, 5
Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), aif'd, 8 Cal.
3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973); State v. Chapman,
250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969); Ball v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 653, 205 N.W.2d 353 (1973).
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Agents use various methods to obtain access to the contents of refuse
receptacles. In some cases, they openly rummage through containers
placed for collection; 31 7 in others they pose as collectors or arrange for
actual collectors to segregate or inspect targetted trash. 3 18 Ordinarily,
officers wait until individuals have removed their refuse from its customary resting place on private land and have transported it to a publicly
tresaccessible spot for pickup. 3 19 On infrequent occasions, officers have
320
passed onto private land to investigate the contents of rubbish.
The Supreme Court has not yet confronted the issues raised by

fourth amendment challenges to trash inspections. In general, the lower
courts have not viewed such claims favorably. While California has
found such conduct to be within fourth amendment and equivalent1 state
32 most
constitutional regulation no matter where the rubbish is located,
state tribunals have joined with every federal appellate court that has
considered the subject in holding that inspections of garbage not retained
within the home or its curtilage are not searches. 322 A dominant theme
in the usually brief opinions is "abandonment," a property-related concept referring to the relinquishment of interests in an object. In essence,
the courts have typically held that when people discard their trash by
removing it from their property and placing it on a site reserved for collection and accessible to others, they cannot expect (or cannot reasonably
expect) that it will remain secure and unknown. In effect, such persons
have sacrificed their privacy interests by allowing their refuse to pass out
317. See, e.g., Smith, 510 P.2d at 794; Chapman, 250 A.2d at 206; State v. Oquist, 327
N.W.2d 587, 589 (Mian. 1982); Ball, 57 Wis. 2d at 656, 205 N.W.2d at 354; see also People v.
Whotte, 113 Mich. App. 12, 15, 317 N.W.2d 266, 267 (1982) (inspection of trash strewn about
defendant's backyard).
318. See, e.g., United States v. Biondich, 652 F.2d 743, 744-45 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,454
U.S. 975 (1981); Crowell, 586 F.2d at 1024; Shelby, 573 F.2d at 973; Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d at 360,
486 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
319. See, eg., United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 306 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 103 S. Ct.
2095 (1983); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 398 (3d Cir. 1981); Magda, 536 F.2d at
112; Mustone, 469 F.2d at 972; Smith, 510 P.2d at 794; Oquist, 327 N.W.2d at 589.
320. See, eg., United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 794 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 397 (1983); Chapman, 250 A.2d at 206; Whotte, 113 Mich. App. at 15, 317 N.W.2d at 267;
Ball, 57 Wis. 2d at 659, 205 N.W.2d at 356.
321. See Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d at 366-67, 486 P.2d at 1268-69, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68-69.
322. See, eg., Terry, 702 F.2d 299; Biondich, 652 F.2d 743; Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397;
Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99; Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020; Shelby, 573 F.2d 971; Magda, 536 F.2d 111;
Mustone, 469 F.2d 970; Smith, 510 P.2d 793; Stone v. State, 402 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Whotte, 113 Mich. App. 12, 317 N.W.2d 266; Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587; Commonwealth v. Minton, 288 Pa. Super. 381, 432 A.2d 212 (1981). When the refuse bins inspected
have not yet been transferred to resting places outside the home and its curtilage, courts have
been willing to find fourth amendment activity. See, eg., Chapman, 250 A.2d at 212; Ball, 57
Wis. 2d at 664, 205 N.W.2d at 358; see also Biondich, 652 F.2d at 745 (emphasizing the distinction: "A person ordinarily retains some expectation of privacy in items that remain on his
or her property."). Those holdings are consonant with the Supreme Court's distinction in the
"open fields" context. See supra note 299.
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of their sole control and into a publicly accessible domain. 323
The results reached by the majority may be correct; their analysis,
however, is incomplete. In the trash context it is difficult to discern any
substantial reasons for needing informational privacy other than the
value of pure secrecy. 324 No other significant value or interest seems to
325
hinge upon an ability to dispose of refuse freely and anonymously.
The questions confronting courts, therefore, are whether and to what extent the interest in pure secrecy protected by the fourth amendment in
our homes, automobiles and other closed repositories ought to extend to
discarded, "containerized" garbage.
Clearly, we are constitutionally entitled to a domain of confidentiality. Just as clearly, our daily lives necessitate that we find some way for
disposing of various items, some of which we might wish to keep unknown to others, including the government. 326 Given that necessity, the
critical inquiry is whether the domain of pure personal secrecy afforded
by the Constitution is impermissibly narrowed and denied adequate
breathing space if it does not extend to garbage put out for pickup in the
ordinary course of human affairs. If government access to our refuse
does not significantly jeopardize the potential for such self-realizing secrecy afforded by constitutional sheltering of unquestionably protected
zones (for example, homes or closed containers), it is probably not neces327
sary to extend that shelter to discarded matter.
Courts might arrive at different answers to the basic questions raised
by trash inspections. They should not, however, be diverted from their
prescriptive responsibilities by inordinate reliance upon misleading,
unenlightening criteria and "magical" language such as "abandonment"
and the "reasonableness" of expectations. 328 Decisions should be in323. See, e.g., Biondich, 652 F.2d at 745; Reicherter,647 F.2d at 399; Vahalik, 606 F.2d at
101; Crowell, 586 F.2d at 1025; Mustone, 469 F.2d at 972; Dzialak, 441 F.2d at 215.
324. See Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d at 366, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (apparently reflecting only the interest in pure secrecy when considering the reasons why residents would not

want their trash examined).
325. See infra note 329.
326. See Smith, 510 P.2d at 798 ("[A]lmost every human activity ultimately manifests
itself in waste products and . . . any individual may understandably wish to maintain the

confidentiality of his refuse.").
327. The protection afforded a garbage receptacle located within the curtilage of a dwelling, see supra note 322 & accompanying text, must and should be grounded on the conclusion
that the health of our interests in pure secrecy depends upon recognition of a zone of informational confidentiality that extends beyond the four walls of the home. The question here is
whether the legitimate need for such a zone of privacy extends further, justifying constitutional
shelter for discarded items within enclosed rubbish containers even after they have traversed
the border of the curtilage and entered more public realms.
328. The elements that have been influential in trash cases may be appropriate in some
cases. If "abandonment" is used to refer to privacy relinquishment, and not some archaic
property notion, see, e.g., Oquist, 327 N.W.2d at 590, it is closely related to the precautionary
measures factor that has also found utility in trash cases. See Terry, 702 F.2d at 309; Biondich,

May 1985]

BEYOND SECRECY

formed by a proper view of the character of privacy and guided by an
inquiry into the legitimate reasons for needing informational privacy in
3 29
trash.
SurreptitiousSurveillance by False Friends

Although technological advances have undoubtedly improved its efficacy today, the practice of employing recruits and volunteers to insinuate themselves into, or simply to remain within, the company of persons
about whose activities information is desired is far from novel.33 0 From
their debut in the Supreme Court until today, fourth amendment challenges to this law enforcement method, in all its forms, have inevitably
fallen upon a majority of deaf ears. 331 Consequently, the police are free
to use such agents to hear, report, record, and transmit the conversations
of family, friends, acquaintances, and strangers with no fourth amend3 32

ment restraint.

652 F.2d at 745; Crowell, 586 F.2d at 1025. Analyzed properly, such criteria might support
the finding of a voluntary constructive waiver of privacy entitlement. If one can easily guard
against acquisition of waste product information, there is little need to afford constitutional
privacy protection. However, if the options for confidential disposal are unduly burdensome
or impracticable, it is neither fair nor justifiable to require that an individual either take those
measures or suffer loss of her interest in pure secrecy. That person is not a willing abandoner
of privacy interests any more than the homeowner who does not turn her dwelling into an
impenetrable fortress. And if we demand substantial expenditures of time, money, or energy
for the preservation of constitutional interests, the result will be indirect, yet effective, constriction of the benefits of the Bill of Rights.
329. It is arguable that garbage inspections indirectly could threaten some instrumental
privacy goals, for example, by revealing associations, personal expressions, or intimacies of
family life. Although unfettered governmental access to such data could chill freedoms of
speech and association and familial autonomy, the connection between our opportunities for
confidential trash disposal and the enjoyment of such rights is not a close one. Consequently,
the threats to those rights are not too severe even if the government has uncontrolled access.
Moreover, if there are readily available alternatives to ordinary disposition methods for that
data (eg., burning, burying, shredding, or other destructive techniques), and if such alternatives as exist pose no serious hindrances to the free exercise or enjoyment of other rights, there
seem to be no constitutionally legitimate reasons for needing constitutional privacy protection
for trash.
330. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952); United States v. Wainer, 49
F.2d 789, 790-91 (W.D. Pa. 1931); Blanchard v. United States, 40 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 865 (1930); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928).
331. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952). Some state courts have found that state constitutional guarantees analogous to the
fourth amendment do regulate forms of false friend employment. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d
872, 879 (Alaska 1978) (use of "body bug" to transmit conversations between defendant and
undercover police officer to other officers); State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981)
(use of "body bug"); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 564, 227 N.W.2d 511, 514 (1975) (use
of "body bug").
332. The Court has not even seen fit to apply watered-down fourth amendment safeguards
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The currently accepted, exceedingly simple rationale for the conclusion that secret agents do not trigger fourth amendment protection is
that the victims of the practice have "voluntarily disclosed" the information obtained to third parties, thereby "assuming the risk" of disclosure
to the government. There is no search because such voluntary disclosure
renders any expectation of privacy "unreasonable. ' 333 That conclusion
appears rooted in the logic that secrecy is the protected object of the
fourth amendment. A person who freely discloses information to others
demonstrates an insufficient interest in the confidentiality of that information. As a result, that person cannot reasonably expect, and therefore
is not entitled to, the fourth amendment protection of secret information.
The consequences of such reasoning present the clearest illustrations
of the serious perils to protected interests posed by current reasonable
expectation doctrine. 334 From an instrumental perspective of informational privacy, that logic proves fundamentally defective and exceedingly
dangerous to liberty. 335 The values most obviously compromised by the
spectre of unregulated official presence in our lives through undercover
agents are freedoms of association and of speech. 336 To be meaningful,
those freedoms must encompass opportunities to communicate thoughts
to others. Free communication, in turn, often depends upon the assurance that, absent adequate justification, the government cannot gain access to the information communicated. 337 In essence, expressive and
to false friends. In the past decade, the Court has been increasingly willing to "split the baby"
by balancing interests and arriving at diluted requirements. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
105 S. Ct. 733, 741-44 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Michigan v. Long, 103
S. Ct. 3469, 3479 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1983);
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699-700 (1981); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 555 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). That approach has typically been employed to weaken the substance of fourth amendment protection,
not to provide or enhance shelter where it has traditionally been nonexistent or weak.
333. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749-52 (1971).
334. Perhaps that is why the secret agent context has given rise to the clearest judicial, see
infra note 338, and scholarly recognitions of the instrumental character of fourth amendment
privacy. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 407, 408-09; Comment, Domestic Intelligence
Informants, the FirstAmendment and the Need for PriorJudicialReview, 26 BUFFALO L. REV.
173, 173 (1977); Comment, The Applicability of the "New" Fourth Amendment to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed Delineation of the Emerging Fourth Amendment Right to
Privacy, 45 WASH. L. REv. 785, 810 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Right to Privacy];
see also C. FRIED, supra note 73, at 139; Bacigal, supra note 29, at 553-54, 570; Note, supra
note 204, at 988-89.
335. A less serious flaw in the logic is the failure to acknowledge that even a pure secrecy
interest against the government need not be extinguished whenever one selectively sacrifices it
to private individuals. See supra notes 149-51, 191 & accompanying text.
336. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 407-08; Comment, Right to Privacy, supra note 334,
at 786.
337. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), Justice White stated that "conversation" would cease if "individual defendants" knew or suspected "that their colleagues have
gone or will go to the police or are carrying recorders or transmitters" and that if "one con-
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associational rights demand both disclosure to others and a measure of
protected confidentiality with respect to the government. 338 Once again,
the perversity of current analysis is its preclusion of the simultaneous
presence of those two foundational requirements. On the one hand, first
amendment freedoms are inhibited by the lack of an informational confidentiality assurance generated by the uncurbed risk that an associaterecipient is the government. On the other hand, to earn the informa-

tional secrecy needed to exercise those freedoms amply, one must avoid
voluntary disclosures to others and thus self-constrict his first amendment enjoyment. In effect, to enjoy the rights, one must not enjoy the
rights. Such a trap is certainly antithetical to the spirit of our constitutional liberties.
The preferable approach recognizes that expressive and associational freedoms are seriously threatened by the unregulated use of "false
friend" investigatory techniques. The severe perils to liberty provide substantial, legitimate grounds for respecting claimed needs for informa-

tional privacy against all forms of governmental false friend

employment. 339 Focusing upon reasonable expectations of privacy and
templating illegal activities. . . sufficiently doubts [his companions'] trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize." Id. at 751-52. It is regrettable that he
failed to acknowledge that all communication and association, not just criminal communication and association, is potentially threatened by unregulated false friend surveillance by law
enforcement.
338. Supreme Court members have recognized the importance of both privacy and openness to meaningful first amendment rights and the role the fourth amendment must play in
ensuring the privacy medium. See, eg., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (The decision that pen registers fall outside fourth amendment control
"ignores the vital role telephonic communication plays in our personal and professional relationships."); White, 401 U.S. at 762-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Monitoring, if prevalent,
certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances. Free discourse... is not free if
there is surveillance."); id at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (many "values are sacrificed by a
rule of law that permits official monitoring of private discourse"); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Privacy involves the choice of the individual to
disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses."); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 452 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I believe that there is a grave
danger of chilling all private, free, and unconstrained communication if secret recordings,
turned over to law enforcement officers by one party to a conversation, are competent evidence
of any self-incriminating statement the speaker may have made. In a free society, people ought
not to have to watch their every word so carefully."); see also United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972) ("[Ihe fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping
[must not] deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private
conversation.").
339. Although the chance of any form of governmental monitoring of our speech and
relationships is hazardous to our freedoms, the threats are variable. The specific character of
the practice employed in a given setting determines the kinds and intensities of the dangers
posed. The possibility of a permanent record of one's thoughts, words, and associations by
means of tape or videotape probably generates a greater potential inhibition than the possibility of the capture of the same information by a human memory. See White, 401 U.S. at 787-8 8
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, the poten-
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allowing reasonableness to be negated by voluntary disclosure has done a
disservice to the instrumental purposes of fourth amendment privacy. 34°
Fourth amendment fidelity demands full investigation of the reasons people need constitutional privacy in the false friend context. Such an investigation reveals a degree of jeopardy to significant fourth amendment
objectives that ought to trigger operation of the constitutional scheme. 34 1
tial for transmissions to audiences beyond the individuals or groups to whom one knows one is
speaking creates risks of a higher caliber and, consequently, more severe constraints on freedom. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting); White, 401 U.S. at 764 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); id. at 790 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see White, 401 U.S. at 752. Thus, the
sophistication and efficacy of the recordings and broadcasts exacerbate the jeopardies to rights
generated by simple employment of unknown government agents to hear, see, and report our
thoughts, words, and deeds. In addition, recruitment of family members and close associates
probably poses more substantial risks and should raise greater concerns than enlistment of
strangers. The inherently greater value of the former bonds raises the costs of a potential chill.
340. The inappropriateness of reliance upon voluntary disclosure in this context has not
escaped notice. See Lopez, 373 U.S. at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note
204, at 989.
In recent years, the voluntary disclosure factor has surfaced in other contexts, notably the
governmental use of pen registers, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and inspections of
bank records, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see supra note 54 & accompanying
text. Pen register surveillance threatens the same values as false friend employment. Awareness that the government is unlimited in its power to learn of the parties we telephonically
encounter creates undeniable potential for chilling our willingness to express ourselves and to
begin, continue, and preserve relationships. Justice Marshall recognized such threats in his
Smith dissent. See 452 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also People v. Sporleder, 666
P.2d 135, 143 n.7 (Colo. 1983); cf Comment, Pen Registers, supra note 84, at 753, 760, 766
(recognizing that pen registers implicate associational and travel rights); Goodman, In Place
Of Being There, Des Moines Register, Mar. 29, 1983, at 6A, col. 3 ("My friends live in other
places: other neighborhoods, other towns, other states. For us, the telephone is a meeting hall,
a neighborhood; it is the way we keep our small community together.). The threat of bank
record access does not seem as serious or substantial because instrumental goals of privacy are
not as apparent in that context. But see Miller, 425 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Because only pure secrecy interests are implicated in the bank records context, the question is
similar to that posed by trash rummaging. See supra notes 324-29 & accompanying text. Any
pressure to address that question has diminished since congressional enactment of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982).
341. One interesting, but infrequently litigated, surveillance method that might be thought
of as a "postal pen register," is the "mail cover." A mail cover involves official recordation of
all the information concerning the senders of letters to a given individual. See Vreeken v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 345 n.1 (10th Cir. 1983). The government can learn who is communicating by post with a target individual and effectively catalogue his correspondents. See United
States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 187 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978), afl'd, 619 F.2d
21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
Lower courts have analyzed this practice as the Supreme Court analyzed pen register use.
Vreeken, 718 F.2d at 348; see supra note 54. Considering the importance of postal communication to expressive and associational freedoms, see Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970); United States ex rel Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J.,dissenting); Choate, 576 F.2d at 202 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), it would be more faithful to the nature of fourth amendment privacy to
hold that mail cover use is a search. Hufstedler, supra note 113, at 1511. Reliance upon
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The Question of Standing to Raise a Fourth Amendment Claim

Finally, the ramifications of the instrumental perspective can be illustrated by considering its application to the issue of "standing" 342 to
challenge government conduct under the fourth amendment. This section does not deal with the threshold question of whether a specific governmental investigatory practice triggers any fourth amendment regulation. Rather, the concern here is whether government conduct that
does threaten the fourth amendment interests of some person threatens
the interests of the particular individual who desires to litigate a fourth
amendment claim. Although threshold and standing issues are distinct,
both share the common function of defining the sphere of fourth amendment operation, and after Rakas
v. Illinois,343 both depend upon reason344
doctrine.
able expectations
The central role of reasonable expectations doctrine in "standing"
cases has resulted in judicial reliance upon the same factors as those operative in threshold cases. The presence or absence of property rights in
the place searched 345 or the effect seized, 346 precautions taken to safeguard privacy, 347 and public accessibility or exposure3 48 predominate in
"voluntary disclosure" to deny protection and undermine confidence is as inappropriate here
as in other situations in which rights cannot be exercised without such disclosure.
342. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), Justice Rehnquist stated that there is no
appropriate place for an analytically separate "standing" inquiry, see supra note 66, and
seemed desirous of eliminating the term from fourth amendment law. 439 U.S at 133. If such
a purge was his intent, it has not been successful. See, eg. United States v. Karo, 104 S.Ct.
3296, 3306 (1984); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980); United States v.
Hernandez, 668 F.2d 824, 826 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Arce, 633 F.2d 689, 694 (5th
Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981); United States v. Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 426
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313,
1316 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299,
305-06 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); United States v. McGrath, 613 F.2d 361,
365 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247,
1252 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 955 (1979).
343. 439 U.S. 128 (1979).
344. Since the Court informed us that standing questions should be analyzed like threshold questions, see supra note 66, the former have played a larger role in defining fourth amendment territory. Consequently, they merit separate treatment here.
345. See, e.g., United States v. Trickey, 711 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Thornley, 707 F.2d 622, 625 (Ist Cir. 1983); United States v. Nadler, 698 F.2d 995, 999 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Vicknair, 610 F.2d 372, 379-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
823 (1980).
346. See, e.g., United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 1277 (1984); United States v. Parks, 684 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. McGrath, 613 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980).
347. See, e.g., United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 981 (1984); United States v. Thornley, 707 F.2d 622, 624 (1st
Cir. 1983); United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir.), modified, 664 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,455 U.S.
1022 (1981).
348. See, eg., Trickey, 711 F.2d at 58; Nadler, 698 F.2d at 999; United States v. Perez, 689
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the courts' reasoning. 34 9 The consequences of ready reliance upon those
criteria have often been similar to those occasioned by reflexive reference
to the identical criteria in threshold cases. Put simply, analyses have frequently been superficial and facile, 350 and interests worthy of shelter have
been ignored, if not undermined, in the process. Because standing cases
come in such variant forms, it is not possible to isolate one or more values or rights that fourth amendment privacy will promote in every case.
It is possible, however, from the array of fact situations presented by
these cases, to distill some potential objects of a properly focused inquiry.
The exercise of associational freedom necessarily involves convening
with others in various places. We join others in their homes,
automobiles, and places of business and come together in meeting halls,
clubs, and auditoriums. Without free access to those places, associational liberty would be severely constricted. Current doctrine makes our
privacy dependent upon such things as our proprietary interests in, our
maintenance of precautionary measures regarding, and our restriction of
public access to those places. Given the character of some of our gathering sites, however, we are quite likely to fail to satisfy one or more of
those criteria of reasonableness when associating in groups. We often
come together in places where we have no proprietary or possessory
claims, 35 1 where we possess no authority or ability to erect special barriers to access, 352 or where exclusion of others is contrary to the purpose of
the convocation. 353 Consequently, under current doctrine, the free exercise of rights of association frequently generates circumstances that can
F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1982); Vicknair, 610 F.2d at 380.
349. All of those elements find sanction in the Supreme Court's recent significant decisions
in this area. See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3301, 3306 (1984) (property interests);
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (right to exclude and take precautions to exclude others); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1979) (referring to property interests in a
car and the diminished expectation of privacy in cars, which is based, in part, on public exposure notions).
350. See, e.g., United States v. Arce, 633 F.2d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 972 (1981); United States v. Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 912 (1981).
351. To form, promote, and maintain associations, we join others in their automobiles,
yards, and homes. Clubs, religious congregations, and political entities convene in structures
that might be institutionally owned. Under the current scheme, the lack of possessory or
ownership interest in those locations can deprive many individuals involved in the gathering of
the security provided by the fourth amendment's privacy grant.
352. We do not have the ability to post warnings or to construct physical impediments to
access in the contexts described infra note 353. Yet, under present analysis it is possible that
only those with such power will reap the benefits of the fourth amendment.
353. Clubs, political assemblies, and church groups, for example, may wish to ensure not
only that members will be able to attend, but also that others will feel invited to join. Inclusion
is important and exclusion contrary to associational continuity and development. Consequently, to demand exclusion in order to secure protection from unregulated government
awareness is to undermine a prime reason for seeking privacy protection. Although current
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defeat entitlements to the informational privacy critical to the unconstrained exercise of those associational rights. 354 To preserve privacy we
are forced to restrict opportunities for association. As suggested earlier,

something is seriously awry with an approach to fourth amendment privacy that yields effects antithetical to its instrumental objectives.
Other important values are involved in many contexts in which personal entitlements to fourth amendment privacy have been challenged.
Physical liberty and the related right to travel freely are often realized
only outside our own proprietary spheres, in realms where strict precau-

tions against exposure are infeasible, if not impossible. We do not always
move from place to place in our own automobiles. Of necessity, we
sometimes ride with friends, acquaintances or family members, borrow
the vehicles of those individuals, or avail ourselves of public transportation. 35 5 To suggest that we can avoid taking our "secrets" along in those
doctrine would imply the contrary, invitations to others to become members of groups or to
attend gatherings do not implicitly include invitations to the government to snoop.
354. The major recent Supreme Court standing cases illustrate the potential for constriction of associational opportunities that can result from reliance upon the accepted factors to
deny privacy protection. In Rakas, passengers in an automobile owned by another were found
to lack standing due to the natural attributes of a typical associative setting, le., a lack of
property interest and public exposure. In Rawlings, the defendant lacked standing to object to
the search of his companion's purse. It is arguable that people need opportunities to turn their
property and information over to others to fully realize the benefits of association. Again, the
normal characteristics of such sharing-e., absence of a property interest and failure to take
precautions-defeated privacy interests. Finally, in Karo, the lack of property interests in an
associate's dwelling defeated the right to object to monitoring of a beeper that had entered that
structure. If we cannot claim the security of informational privacy in our acquaintances'
homes unless we buy into their realty, our associational opportunities will surely shrink.
Lower court cases also illustrate the counterproductive results reached under current "standing" doctrine. See United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 981 (1984); United States v. Rodriguez-Ramos, 704 F.2d 17, 21
(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3542 (1983); United States v. Nadler, 698 F.2d 995, 999-1000
(9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v.
Meyer, 656 F.2d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 1981). Some do not simply ignore, but directly deny the
relevance of associational factors to standing decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Vicknair,
610 F.2d 372, 379 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); United States v. Crowell, 586
F.2d 1020, 1026 (4th Cir. 1978). But see Rodriguez-Ramos, 704 F.2d at 21.
355. Yet the current approach, with the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in Rakas, holds
that the absence of some property right in the vehicle in which we are travelling counts
strongly against a fourth amendment privacy entitlement. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148; see also
United States v. Parks, 684 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1982); cf United States v. Trickey, 711
F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Clearly, both the owner and the lessee of the premises would be
recognized by society as having a legitimate expectation of privacy.
...
). It is no answer to
say that if we want privacy we should travel in our own vehicles. The liberty of those who
cannot afford private transportation should not be limited by their relative poverty. Furthermore, there are reasons other than financial for using or riding in public transportation or the
vehicles of others. Our own autos will inevitably be incapacitated at times, premiums on
parking space might require carpool arrangements, others' vehicles might be suited to tasks
that our own are not. Additionally, meaningful association often means group travel in a
vehicle in which some will lack property and exclusionary rights. To deprive individuals of
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situations is ludicrous, for the reasons we travel in society necessitate
carrying along parts of our lives and the information inherent therein. If
our freedom to move about is conditioned on not bearing our belongings,
that freedom loses much substance. Uncontrolled official access to the
information passengers carry with them in vehicles they do not own and
to which they cannot restrict access 356 diminishes opportunities for personal physical freedom.
Enjoyment of familial autonomy rights 357 seems to demand free and
open use of areas and items in which some members do not have strict
property interests and requires that some information about our lives be
made accessible to several others. Family members who reside in a common dwelling must share certain areas and may need access to even the
personal domains of fellow members. Again, precautions and restricted

access would be counterproductive, preventing realization of the nurturing goals of familial autonomy. The potential for familial intimacy, development, growth, and fulfillment which autonomy rights seek to
promote would shrink if information could not be freely shared among
members, but instead had to be jealously guarded. Further, to condition
privacy entitlement upon members' possession of property interests in
the areas within which they share, exchange, or retain information about
their lives is surely to ignore the realities of many, if not most, familial
358
arrangements.
privacy in such instances will discourage people from involvement in those situations and impermissibly infringe on our associational and physical freedoms.
356. According to the dissenters, that is the upshot of the majority decision in Rakas. 439
U.S. at 157 (White, J., dissenting) ("Insofar as passengers are concerned, the Court's opinion
today declares an 'open season' on automobiles. However unlawful stopping and searching a
car may be, absent a possessory or ownership interest, no 'mere' passenger may object, regardless of his relationship to the owner.").
357. Constitutional autonomy-type privacy rights-rights that pertain to the privacy of
and freedom to make decisions and choices regarding familial, marital, and procreative matters-find their sources in more than one Bill of Rights provision. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (citing the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments and
"penumbras, formed by emanations from" the Bill of Rights, while emphasizing the ninth
amendment); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.12 (1977) (mentioning ninth amendment); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1976) (explaining that Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was based solely on the fourteenth amendment); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (ninth amendment); Gaugush, supra note 223, at 27 (concluding
that Justice "Douglas' ...
contributions. . . [in Griswold] have not been modified, limited or
overruled"). No matter the source, the Court has continued to recognize basic rights to privacy and unhindered decisionmaking in familial matters. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; Stanley,
405 U.S. at 651; see also, Comment, A Taxonomy, supra note 69, at 1469 (referring to objectionability of even "indirect" influence on "an individual's decision calculus").
358. Not every member of a nuclear family, and certainly not those within extended families, will possess property rights in homes, automobiles, and other familial possessions. To
count this against their entitlement to privacy results in an erosion of their freedom to exchange information, thus constraining their abilities to engage in free decisionmaking and action pertaining to intimate family matters. When fourth amendment privacy becomes a slave
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In sum, factors such as the lack of a proprietary or possessory interest and the failure to foreclose the access of others ought not count
against the privacy needed for adequate enjoyment of various rights. Determinations of whether the fourth amendment should operate in either
threshold or standing cases require an inventory of the potential instrumental goals in any situation and evaluation of the elements ordinarily or
necessarily involved in realization of those goals. Legitimate individual
needs for informational privacy find foundations in the ends served by
guaranteeing that interest and should not be disregarded because of factors that are irrelevant to, or attributes that are integral parts of, the free
exercise and enjoyment of the very freedoms that the fourth amendment
should preserve.
Conclusion
Both the current methodology for defining fourth amendment scope
and the approach proposed here are interest-dictated and are therefore
consonant with the spirit and major contribution of Katz: the announcement that governmental "violations of privacy" must determine the operation of the fourth amendment regulation of searches. The fundamental
defect of current doctrine is its limited conception of the fourth amendment privacy interest as merely an interest in secrecy for secrecy's sake.
The methodology proposed here revolves around an expanded vision of
that privacy interest, a vision that looks beyond a simple interest in the
secrecy of information to the instrumental ends that secrecy promotes, to
the reasons why secrecy against the government is valuable and merits
constitutional shelter. This instrumental view of the purpose of the
fourth amendment is supported by the text and history of the fourth
amendment, its place in the structure of the Constitution, and the role
that protection against governmental searches plays in the legal traditions and principles of a free society.
The adjustment of perspective involved in adoption of an instrumental view would bring about a major change in fourth amendment threshold jurisprudence. The erroneously narrow view of privacy that is
express or implicit in the courts' opinions has had enormous influence
upon the development of the doctrinal framework used to resolve cases.
An instrumental view leads to different doctrine, radically altering the
analysis and resolution of many threshold issues. Through corrective expansion of our perspective on privacy, the instrumental view exposes the
deficiencies of the current scheme and points the way toward resolutions
of threshold issues-that are consistent with the purposes of the fourth
amendment.
to property interests in such situations, it is derelict in its duty to enable the enjoyment of other

constitutional benefits.
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The proposals can be summarized as follows: Fourth amendment
threshold questions should be resolved not by asking whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but by asking whether that
individual had a need for informational privacy in order to enjoy fully
the benefits of various constitutional entitlements. Automatic reference
to the recurrent factors operative in reasonable expectations doctrine
should be abandoned outright. Instead, courts should attempt to ascertain whether the government's actions deprived an individual of informational privacy and whether the individual's freedom to exercise and enjoy
constitutional rights required some degree of informational privacy vis-avis the government. Reasonable expectation doctrine has ordinarily protected, at most, an interest in secrecy for its own sake. The proposed
methodology, consistent with the purposes of the fourth amendment,
also protects privacy that enables the exercise of rights protected by other
constitutional provisions.
The methodology proposed and the criteria suggested here provide
anything but a rigid, formulaic scheme for resolving threshold questions.
They call for difficult judgments about the legitimacy of claimed privacy
needs. Because it does not prescribe methods of quantification nor the
levels of need that qualify as legitimate, the suggested approach involves
much judicial discretion. A substantial degree of discretion and ambiguity, however, is inherent in the Katz-prescribed task. The best that can
be hoped for is specification of the most appropriate and accurate linguistic tools and inquiries and an indication of the relevant types of
359
criteria.
The analytical and doctrinal structure constructed here is no less
administrable or feasible than the current scheme. The quantifiability of
the factors that dictate current decisions is usually chimerical. 36° The
proposed methodology eliminates ambiguity and constrains discretion to
the extent possible in such constitutional decision making. More important, fidelity to fourth amendment goals is greatly advanced by the proposed methodology, which seeks to identify the real harms occasioned by
359. As Justice Powell observed:
This is not an area of law in which any "bright line" rule would safeguard both
Fourth Amendment rights and the public interest in a fair and effective criminal
justice system. The range of variables in the fact situations of search and seizure is
almost infinite. Rather than seek facile solutions, it is best to apply principles
broadly faithful to Fourth Amendment purposes.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 155-56 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
360. There is no greater precision in the assessment of "precautions taken" or "public
access" or "degree of intrusion" than in the evaluation of risks to freedoms of association,
travel, and familial autonomy, for example. Current doctrine provides no more precise tools
for assessing "reasonableness" than the present proposals furnish for determining "legitimacy." Moreover, current doctrine provides less stability and uniformity by neglecting reference to the enduring goals of instrumental informational privacy, and relying instead upon
variable factual details.

May 1985]

BEYOND SECRECY

governmental privacy deprivations and provides appropriate terminology
for expressing the prescriptive tasks involved. If carefully employed, the
proffered methodology can lead to constitutionally supportable answers
to difficult questions concerning the reach of fourth amendment protection. 361 The instrumental approach to resolving fourth amendment
threshold questions will further realization of the full potential of the
Katz revolution, and, by ensuring more faithful patrol of fourth amendment borders, it will promote preservation of those invaluable liberties
362
that are central and indispensable to the American social order.

361. By suggesting sources of guidance for determining whether privacy needs are legitimate, the proposed scheme avoids begging the question involved in the declaration "that the
fourth amendment protects those interests that may justifiably claim fourth amendment protection." Amsterdam, supra note I, at 385. It also provides more specific guidance than a
broad inquiry into "whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is
permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom
remaining would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open
society," id. at 403, or an unconfined determination of "which expectations of privacy are
justifiable and desirable in society." Bacigal, supra note 29, at 543.
The proposed methodology should also have constructive impact in other fourth amendment doctrinal domains. For example, proper identification of the interests and values at stake
should promote more "accurate" determinations of the kind and degree ofjustification needed
to make a search reasonable under the fourth amendment. See supra note 203.
362. The fate of other republics, their rise, their progress, their decline, and their fall,
are written but too legibly on the pages of history, if indeed they were not continually
before us in the startling fragments of their ruins. They have perished, and perished
by their own hands.
Let the American youth never forget that they possess a noble inheritance,
bought by the toils, and sufferings, and blood of their ancestors; and capable, if wisely
improved, and faithfully guarded, of transmitting to their latest posterity all the substantial blessings of life, the peaceful enjoyment of liberty, property, religion, and
independence. The structure has been erected by architects of consummate skill and
fidelity; its foundations are solid; its compartments are beautiful as well as useful; its
arrangements are full of wisdom and order; and its defences are impregnable from
without. It has been reared for immortality, if the work of man may justly aspire to
such a title. It may, nevertheless, perish in an hour by the folly, or corruption, or
negligence of its only keepers, THE PEOPLE.
2 J. STORY, supra note 1, at 685, 687.

